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Planwirtschaft?
Jun 23rd, 2015 by Gao

Ein neuerer Artikel von Heiko Khoo (s. u.) greift diese Debatte von Ende letzten Jahres auf:
Sebastian Heilmann, Oliver Melton: The Reinvention of Development Planning in China, 1993–2012. In: Modern China 39 (November 2013), S. 580–628.

In studies of China’s economic rise and political system, multiyear comprehensive and sectoral plans issued by the national government tend to be played down as futile efforts at reigning in a political economy increasingly driven by market incentives and decentralized decisions. Contrary to this, we provide evidence that China’s planning system has been transformed alongside the economic transition, yet remains central to almost all domains of public policy making and the political institutions that have fostered China’s high-speed growth and economic stability. The incorporation of experimental programs into macro-plans, a tiered hierarchy of policy oversight, newly introduced mid-course plan evaluations, and systematic top-level policy review have allowed Chinese planners to play a central role in economic policy making without succumbing to the rigidity traps that debased traditional planned economies. By better understanding how the planning cycle influences incentives and resources of successive layers of bureaucracies and jurisdictions, and how it updates itself and adapts to new challenges, it is possible to explain a greater proportion of the Chinese policy-making process, including many of its successes and pathologies.

Hu Angang: The Distinctive Transition of China’s Five-Year Plans. Modern China 39 (November 2013), S. 629–639.

China has taken a distinctive path of economic transition, combining both the market and the plan. In introducing the market mechanism, the government has not abandoned the planning mechanism, as was done in other socialist countries, but instead has reformed it. The five-year plan has thus been transformed from economic planning to public affairs governance planning. Today the plan and the market are combined so that the two supplement and stimulate each other.

Barry Naughton: The Return of Planning in China. Comment on Heilmann–Melton and Hu Angang. In: Modern China 39 (November 2013), S. 640–652.

Heilmann and Melton break important new ground in describing the revival of development planning in China and showing how planning is now interwoven with other aspects of the political system, particularly policy formulation and cadre evaluation. Clarification of the instruments planners use and their link to developmental outcomes would improve the argument. Although planners believe their plans are consistent with a market economy, it may turn out that the revival of planning after 2003 was purchased at the cost of significant distortions in the market economy and reduced efficiency.

Heiko Khoo: China’s modern planning system (China.org.cn)

The 12th Five-Year Plan comes to a close this year and the 13th Five-Year Plan is being elaborated, so it is worth looking at how China’s planning system functions so we can better understand the forces driving China’s economy.

Sozialversicherungssystem | Mao Zedong | Long Baorong | Propaganda
Feb 14th, 2015 by Gao

China’s social security system (China Labour Bulletin)

The problems in China’s social security system can be traced back to two key events: The break-up of the state-run economy, which had provided urban workers with an “iron rice bowl” (employment, housing, healthcare and pension), and the introduction of the one-child policy in the 1980s, which meant that parents could no longer rely on a large extended family to look after them in their old age. In other words, as the economy developed and liberalized in the 1990s and 2000s, both the state and social structures that had supported workers in their old age, ill-health and during times of economic hardship gradually vanished, leaving a huge vacuum to fill.
The Chinese government sought to create a new social security system based on individual employment contracts that would make employers, rather than the state, primarily responsible for contributions to pensions, unemployment, medical, work-related injury and maternity insurance. In addition, the government established a housing fund designed to help employees, who no longer had housing provided for them, buy their own home…
After China embarked on its much vaunted economic reform and development program, the government gradually abdicated its authority in labour relations to business interests. As the private sector expanded, employers could unilaterally and arbitrarily determine the pay and working conditions of their employees, keeping wages low and benefits largely non-existent. The national government sought to protect the interests of workers by implementing legislation, such as the 1994 Labour Law and 2008 Labour Contract Law, however local governments either could not or would not enforce the law in the workplace.
Under these circumstances, creating a system where employers are primarily responsible for their employees’ social security was doomed to failure. Employers could often simply ignore their legal obligations and continue with business as usual, often with official connivance…
The failure of the Chinese government to enforce the law and create a social security system that covers everyone has not only disadvantaged China’s workers, it has severely hampered the government’s own ability to push ahead with and accomplish other important policy goals.

Rebecca E. Karl, Michael Schoenhals, Andrew J. Nathan, Richard Bernstein, Ho-Fung Hung, Sebastian Heilmann: Is Mao Still Dead? (ChinaFile)

It has long been standard operating procedure for China’s leaders to pay tribute to Mao. Even as the People’s Republic he wrought has embraced capitalist behavior with ever more heated ardor, the party he founded has remained firmly in power and his portrait has stared out over Tiananmen Square toward the squat building where his body reposes peacefully at the heart of a country he would scarcely recognize. But since Xi Jinping’s arrival at the helm, Mao’s words have seemed to reverberate more loudly. From the rejection of liberalism that colors the internal Party directive known as Document 9, to Education Minister Yuan Guiren’s recent speech demanding an “ideological campaign,” to Xi’s own speeches which seem to reference Mao and Marx far more often than his predecessors’, Chinese politics under Xi seem to have taken a hard ideological turn. How significant is this phenomenon and what does it mean? Is Mao still dead?

Edward Wong: China Sentences 27 Linked to Official Who Reported Graft (New York Times, auch via Google News)

A court in southern China has sentenced to prison 27 family members and supporters of a former official, now dead, who had sought to expose local corruption, a lawyer for one of them said Thursday.
The large number of people sentenced in a single trial for what their advocates have said were political rather than criminal activities was unusual. All were members of the Miao ethnic group, more commonly known in the West as the Hmong.
The former official, Long Baorong, of Fenghuang County in Hunan Province, was detained by Communist Party investigators in 2010 after he raised questions about the local government. In 2011, a court sentenced him to four or five years in prison for fraud and embezzlement, but he was unexpectedly released in 2012. He died shortly afterward, according to the lawyer, Ma Gangquan.

Luisetta Mudie: China Jails Ethnic Miao Leader’s Relatives, Supporters For ‚Triad‘ Activities (Radio Free Asia)

《网信精神》 (YouTube)

网络强国 网在哪光荣梦想在哪
网络强国 从遥远的宇宙到思念的家
网络强国 告诉世界中国梦在崛起大中华
网络强国 一个我在世界代表着国家

Josh Chin, Chun Han Wong: China’s Internet Censors Now Have Their Own Theme Song, And It Is Glorious (Wall Street Journal)
Und im wilden Nordwesten:
新疆喀什市《小苹果》广场舞大赛第一季全记录(天山网)
Rachel Lu: ‘De-radicalizing’ Xinjiang, One Bad Pop Song at a Time (Foreign Policy)

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