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Chinesische Wirtschaft
Mrz 1st, 2017 by Gao

Thomas Piketty, Li Yang, Gabriel Zucman: Capital Accumulation, Private Property and Rising Inequality in China, 1978-2015 (PDF; World Wealth & Income Database)

This paper combines national accounts, survey, wealth and fiscal data (including recently released tax data on high-income taxpayers) in order to provide consistent series on the accumulation and distribution of income and wealth in China over the 1978-2015 period. We find that the aggregate national wealth-income ratio has increased, from 350% in 1978 to almost 700% in 2015. This can be accounted for by a combination of high saving and investment rates and a gradual rise in relative asset prices, reflecting changes in the legal system of property. The share of public property in national wealth has declined from about 70% in 1978 to less than 35% in 2015, which is still a lot higher than in rich countries (close to 0% or negative). Next, we provide sharp upward revision of official inequality estimates. The top 10% income share rose from 26% to 41% of national income between 1978 and 2015, while the bottom 50% share dropped from 28% to 15%. China’s inequality levels used to be close to Nordic countries, and are now approaching U.S. levels.

Cheng Enfu, Ding Xiaoqin: A Theory of China’s ‘Miracle’. Eight Principles of Contemporary Chinese Political Economy (Monthly Review)

China’s rapid economic development in recent years is often characterized as “miraculous.” Talk of a “Beijing Consensus” or “China model” has become commonplace in academic debates. But as we have written elsewhere, “theoretical problems have started to emerge with regards to the very existence, content, and prospects of the China model.” The key question, then, is what kind of economic theory and strategy underpin this “miracle.” China’s model has been variously described as a form of neoliberalism, or as a novel kind of Keynesianism. Against these positions, we hold that the country’s major recent developmental gains are the achievements of theoretical advances in political economy, originating in China itself, while the main problems that have accompanied China’s development reflect the damaging influence of Western neoliberalism. President Xi Jinping has emphasized the need to uphold and develop a Marxian political economy for the twenty-first century, adapted to China’s needs and resources.

Sit Tsui, Erebus Wong, Lau Kin Chi, Wen Tiejun: The Tyranny of Monopoly-Finance Capital. A Chinese Perspective (Monthly Review)

The tyranny of global monopoly-finance capital can be seen in part as monetary geopolitics backed by military power. Through investment schemes, it directly appropriates the production gains made by the physical and resource economies of developing countries. At the same time, it engages in financial speculation by buying long and selling short in capital markets. The end result is the plundering of social wealth. China is not immune to this tyranny. This article analyzes the causes and effects of China’s financial crises, which are in large part the fallout of crises occurring outside China. Crucial here is uncovering how financial capital–both domestic and foreign–has become alienated from the physical economy and “de-localized” in its pursuit of profits.

Erebus Wong, Lau Kin Chi, Sit Tsui, Wen Tiejun: One Belt, One Road. China’s Strategy for a New Global Financial Order (Monthly Review)

In late 2013, Chinese premier Xi Jinping announced a pair of new development and trade initiatives for China and the surrounding region: the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road,” together known as One Belt, One Road (OBOR). Along with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the OBOR policies represent an ambitious spatial expansion of Chinese state capitalism, driven by an excess of industrial production capacity, as well as by emerging financial capital interests. The Chinese government has publicly stressed the lessons of the 1930s overcapacity crisis in the West that precipitated the Second World War, and promoted these new initiatives in the name of “peaceful development.” Nevertheless, the turn to OBOR suggests a regional scenario broadly similar to that in Europe between the end of the nineteenth century and the years before the First World War, when strong nations jostled one another for industrial and military dominance. The OBOR strategy combines land power and maritime power, bolstering China’s existing oceanic hegemony in East Asia.

Streik bei Cuiheng | Mindestreservesatz | Dokument Nr. 9
Apr 20th, 2015 by Gao

At the sharp end of the workers’ movement in China: The Zhongshan Cuiheng strike (China Labour Bulletin)

A month-long strike at a Japanese-owned bag manufacturer in the Pearl River Delta town of Zhongshan has been characterized by police violence, arrests and intimidation, and the absolute refusal of the boss to negotiate. Welcome to the sharp end of the workers’ movement in China.
The strike broke out in mid-March. The roughly 200 workers at Cuiheng Co. were unhappy at low-pay and the refusal of the company to pay social security and housing fund contributions, year-end bonuses and other benefits.

Tom Barnes, Kevin Lin: China’s growing labour movement offers hope for workers globally (Conversation)

Reuters: China’s central bank cuts reserve ratio (Guardian)

China’s central bank has cut the amount of cash that banks must hold as reserves on Sunday, the second industry-wide cut in two months, adding more liquidity to the world’s second-biggest economy to help spur bank lending and combat slowing growth.
The People’s Bank of China lowered the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) for all banks by 100 basis points to 18.5%, effective from Monday, the central bank said in a statement on its website.

Angus Grigg: China frees up $200b to stoke economy (Financial Review)

The RRR cut is expected to release around 1 trillion yuan ($208 billion) of capital into the economy.

China Steps Up Economy Help With Reduced Bank Reserve Ratios (Bloomberg)

The reserve-requirement ratio was lowered 1 percentage point Monday, the People’s Bank of China said. While that was the second reduction this year, the new level of 18.5 percent is still high by global standards. The cut will allow banks to boost lending by about 1.2 trillion yuan ($194 billion)…
The reserve ratio will be reduced by another percentage point for rural financial institutions, two additional percentage points for Agricultural Development Bank and a further 0.5 percentage point for banks with a certain level of loans to agriculture and small enterprises.
Those extra reductions give the move a “reformist flavor,” wrote Bloomberg economists Tom Orlik and Fielding Chen. Still, with growth weak and small companies most at risk, it’s understandable banks see state-owned firms as safer bets.
“As ever, the price of stronger growth is slower progress on structural reform,” they wrote.

Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation (ChinaFile)

This weekend, China’s leaders gather in Beijing for meetings widely expected to determine the shape of China’s economy, as well as the nation’s progress, over the next decade. What exactly the outcome of this Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party will be remains shrouded in no small measure of secrecy, like most matters of high politics in China. President Xi Jinping has signaled that a significant new wave of economic liberalization may be in the works. But in the realm of political reform, Xi also has signaled a deep reluctance. In fact, many of the actions taken and techniques used under his year of leadership suggest a return to ideas and tactics that hark back to the days of Mao Zedong.
One such signal came during this past spring, when reports began to appear that the Party leadership was being urged to guard against seven political “perils,” including constitutionalism, civil society, “nihilistic” views of history, “universal values,” and the promotion of “the West’s view of media.” It also called on Party members to strengthen their resistance to “infiltration” by outside ideas, renew their commitment to work “in the ideological sphere,” and to handle with renewed vigilance all ideas, institutions, and people deemed threatening to unilateral Party rule. These warnings were enumerated in a communiqué circulated within the Party by its General Office in April, and, because they constituted the ninth such paper issued this year, have come to be known as “Document 9.”

Daniel A. Bell: Teaching ‘Western Values’ in China (New York Times)

Nobody is surprised that the Chinese government curbs “Western-style” civil and political liberties. But it may be news to some people that the government has recently called for the strengthening of Marxist ideology in universities and a ban on “teaching materials that disseminate Western values in our classrooms.” On the face of it, such regulations are absurd. It would mean banning not just the ideas of John Stuart Mill and John Rawls, but also those of such thinkers as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

Reporters Without Borders reveals state secrets in reaction to Gao Yu’s sentence (Reporters Without Borders)

Brian Eyler: China’s new silk roads tie together 3 continents (China Dialogue)

China recently unveiled an action plan for its controversial One Belt, One Road initiative to link its economy with the rest of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Known as the ‘new silk roads’, it combines new infrastructure networks of roads, railway lines, ports to strengthen trade, investment, and people-to-people cooperation.

„Westliche Werte“ | Auslandsstudium
Sep 9th, 2013 by Gao

Chris Buckley: China Takes Aim at Western Ideas (New York Times)

Communist Party cadres have filled meeting halls around China to hear a somber, secretive warning issued by senior leaders. Power could escape their grip, they have been told, unless the party eradicates seven subversive currents coursing through Chinese society.
These seven perils were enumerated in a memo, referred to as Document No. 9, that bears the unmistakable imprimatur of Xi Jinping, China’s new top leader. The first was “Western constitutional democracy”; others included promoting “universal values” of human rights, Western-inspired notions of media independence and civic participation, ardently pro-market “neo-liberalism,” and “nihilist” criticisms of the party’s traumatic past.

Roland Soong (宋春舫) kündigt an, wieder auf Englisch zu schreiben, und stellt die Artikel vor, die er für die 《南方都市报》 geschrieben hat:
Roland Soong: My long absence (EastWestNorthSouth)

Ein längerer, recht negativer Artikel über Mo Yan und seine Werke:
Nikil Saval: White Happy Doves (London Review of Books)

Chinesische Studierende in den USA (speziell an der Purdue-Universität im Bundesstaat Indiana):
Paul Stephens: International Students: Separate but Profitable (Washington Monthly)

China ist nicht Indien, doch der Artikel ist durchaus relevant für weite Teile Asiens:
Jessica Namakkal: Study Abroad as Neo-Colonial Tourism (CounterPunch)

Und dieser Artikel hat gar keinen direkten Bezug zu China:
Bruce Schneider: NSA surveillance: A guide to staying secure (Guardian)

BRICS und Neoliberalismus | „Baby 59“ | Altersarmut
Jun 3rd, 2013 by Gao

Vijay Prashad: Neoliberalismus mit südlichem Antlitz. Der Aufstieg des BRICS-Blocks (Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung)
Dazu noch ein Literaturhinweis:
Vijay Prashad: The Darker Nations. A People’s History of the Third World. New York / London, The New Press, 2007.
Heriberto Araújo, Juan Pablo Cardenal: China’s Economic Empire (New York Times)
Pepe Escobar: Pipelineistan and the New Silk Road(s) (Asia Times)

Tania Branigan: Baby 59 case highlights shortcomings of child protection system in China (Guardian)

The outpouring of sympathy for the little boy, which saw his hospital flooded with gifts and offers of adoption, has underscored society’s warmth towards children. The lack of formal support his mother can expect in the coming years – experts said she was unlikely to be advised or monitored by social workers – highlights the shortcomings of the system. Baby 59 is with his grandparents: China relies on families to provide care, because the child welfare system is at best embryonic. … According to research published by the All-China Women’s Federation, around 61 million children are left behind in the countryside while their parents work in the cities.

dpa/jW: Studie: Jeder vierte Alte in China arm (junge Welt)

Knapp jeder vierte Chinese, der 60 oder älter ist, lebt laut einer Studie unterhalb der Armutsgrenze. 22,9 Prozent der älteren Bevölkerung müssen nach einer am Freitag in Peking veröffentlichten Studie im ländlichen China mit 2344 Yuan (rund 305 Euro) oder weniger im Jahr auskommen. In Städten liege die Armutsgrenze bei 3200 Yuan. »China hat die größte Zahl alter Menschen auf der Welt und eine der am schnellsten wachsenden«, schrieben die Forscher.

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