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THAAD
Mrz 20th, 2017 by Gao

Mel Gurtov: Diplomatic Remedies for THAAD Madness: The US, China and the Two Koreas (Japan Focus)

The US decision, supported by the South Korean government, to deploy an antimissile system known as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) may be one of the most thoughtless strategic moves in a generation. The official US justification is that close-in defense against North Korean missiles is necessary to protect South Korea. But the deployment is having more than a few negative repercussions: an argument in China for increasing its nuclear weapons stockpile; an incentive in North Korea for continuing to develop its long-range missile capability; a deep fissure in China-South Korea relations; a roiling of South Korean politics at a time when its corrupt president has been impeached; and a new source of tension in already fraught Sino-US relations.

U.S. Deploys Missile System Amid Rising Tensions with N. Korea (Democracy Now)

Tensions are rising between the United States, North Korea and China, threatening to create the first significant national security crisis of the Trump presidency. This week, the United States began deploying a missile defense system to South Korea, sparking warnings from Chinese officials who say the U.S. is escalating a regional arms race. The U.S. says the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System, known as THAAD, seeks to protect South Korea amid a series of recent missile tests launched by North Korea…
The deployment of the U.S. missile system is widely opposed by both South Koreans, who have been protesting against U.S. militarization, and by Chinese officials, who say the missile system actually aims to counter China’s military power in the region, not to contain North Korea.
Chinese officials are calling for both an end to North Korea’s nuclear program and an end to joint U.S. and South Korean military drills.

Bruce Cumings, Amy Goodman: North Korea Timed Recent Missile Test to Take Place During Trump-Abe Dinner (Democracy Now)

North Korea tested a ballistic missile last month, sparking widespread international condemnation. The test was a violation of a United Nations Security Council resolution. North Korea claimed the test was a successful launch of an intermediate-range missile. The test came while Trump hosted Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe over the weekend at the Trump-owned Mar-a-Lago resort in Palm Beach, Florida.

Christine Ahn, Bruce Cumings, Amy Goodman: China Warns U.S. & North Korea Are Set for „Head-On“ Collision Amid Rising Tensions & Provocations (Democracy Now)

The political upheaval in South Korea comes shortly after North Korea test-fired several ballistic missiles. In response, the Trump administration announced it would deploy a missile defense system to South Korea. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of South Korean and U.S. troops, backed by warships and warplanes, are currently engaging in a massive military exercise. Last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned that the U.S. and North Korea are like two „accelerating trains coming toward each other.“ He called on both sides to de-escalate tensions.

David E. Sanger, William J. Broad: Trump Inherits a Secret Cyberwar Against North Korean Missiles (New York Times) / 트럼프가 물려받은 유산: 북한 미사일에 대응하는 비밀 사이버戰 / 特朗普接手的秘密计划:网络攻击破坏朝鲜导弹?

Three years ago, President Barack Obama ordered Pentagon officials to step up their cyber and electronic strikes against North Korea’s missile program in hopes of sabotaging test launches in their opening seconds…
An examination of the Pentagon’s disruption effort, based on interviews with officials of the Obama and Trump administrations as well as a review of extensive but obscure public records, found that the United States still does not have the ability to effectively counter the North Korean nuclear and missile programs…
In two meetings of Mr. Trump’s national security deputies in the Situation Room, the most recent on Tuesday, all those options were discussed, along with the possibility of reintroducing nuclear weapons to South Korea as a dramatic warning…
The White House is also looking at pre-emptive military strike options, a senior Trump administration official said, …

Inselstreit
Jan 4th, 2016 by Gao

APA/AFP: China provoziert Vietnam mit Flug zu Spratly-Inseln (Presse)

Mit der Landung eines Flugzeugs auf den umstrittenen Spratly-Inseln im Südchinesischen Meer hat China den Konflikt mit Vietnam erneut angeheizt. Peking wies am späten Samstagabend Kritik aus Hanoi zurück, nachdem ein chinesisches Flugzeug auf einem Atoll der Inseln, dem Fiery Cross Reef, gelandet war. Laut chinesischem Außenministerium habe es sich lediglich um einen „zivilen Testflug“ gehandelt. Die Aktion habe innerhalb von chinesischem Territorium stattgefunden, hieß es weiter. China streitet mit den Ländern Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam und den Philippinen seit Jahren um die Spratly-Inseln. Dort werden große Erdöl- und Erdgasvorkommen vermutet. Vietnam hatte gegen die Landung des chinesischen Flugzeugs protestiert und erklärt, die Aktion beeinflusse „Frieden und Stabilität im Südchinesischen Meer“. China müsse diesen Schritt „umgehend beenden“ und dürfe derlei Aktionen „nicht wiederholen“.

Vietnam protests after China lands plane on disputed Spratly islands (Guardian)

Vietnam has formally accused China of violating its sovereignty by landing a plane on an airstrip Beijing has built on an artificial island in a contested part of the South China Sea.
Foreign ministry spokesman Le Hai Binh said the airfield had been “built illegally” on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly archipelago, in territory that was “part of Vietnam’s Spratlys”.
China’s foreign ministry rejected the complaint, saying that what was a test flight to the newly built airfield on the reef was a matter “completely within China’s sovereignty,” the Chinese state news agency Xinhua reported.
The United States said it was concerned that the flight had exacerbated tensions.
Washington has criticised China’s construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea and worries that Beijing plans to use them for military purposes, even though China says it has no hostile intent.

Ausführlicher Hintergrundartikel:
Alex Calvo: South China Sea arbitration: Beijing puts forward her own views – part one | part two (Center for International Maritime Security)

Militärstützpunkt in Dschibuti
Jan 3rd, 2016 by Gao

China military in talks for logistics „facilities“ in Djibouti (Reuters)

China’s military is in talks with the Horn of Africa country Djibouti to build logistics „facilities“ to support Chinese peacekeeping and anti-piracy missions, the foreign and defence ministries said on Thursday.
In May, Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh told French media his government was in talks with China about a military base, adding Beijing’s presence would be welcome in the former French colony, which borders Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said the facilities would mainly provide logistics services to resolve issues related to fuelling, rest and reorganisation of troops and food supplies.
„The construction of the relevant facilities will help China’s navy and army further participate in UN peacekeeping operations, carry out escort missions in the waters near Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, and provide humanitarian assistance,“ he told a daily news briefing. …
The United States and France both already have bases in the country and its port has been used by foreign navies, including China’s, participating in the fight against Somali pirates.
In an effort to dampen fears about Chinese plans connected to its increasingly modern and confident military, Beijing has repeatedly said it does not want military bases abroad.
In 2009, Chinese officials distanced themselves from comments by a rear admiral, Wu Shengli, who urged the nation to set up navy supply bases overseas for the anti-piracy fight. Wu is now China’s naval chief.

White paper outlines China’s ‚active defense‘ strategy (China Daily, Mai 2015)

China opposes hegemony and power politics in all forms and will never seek expansion, according to the paper.
In response to a question from a foreign correspondent at the press conference, Defense Ministry spokesperson Yang Yujun said China has not built any military bases overseas.
Earlier this month, foreign media reported that China was building a permanent military base in the African country of Djibouti.

Interessanter Weise widerspricht China Daily den Berichten „ausländischer Medien“ an dieser Stelle nicht.
Gabe Collins, Andrew Erickson: Djibouti Likely to Become China’s First Indian Ocean Outpost (China Signpost)

Durable access to facilities in Djibouti that can be easily improved by Chinese construction firms would give China a formidable—and more permanent—maritime and potentially aerial springboard deep into the Northwestern Indian Ocean Region, as well as North, East, and Central Africa…
China’s National People’s Congress in May 2015 laid the foundation for the military to claim that long-range overseas missions are a legally recognized operational mandate. Specifically, Clauses 28 and 30 of the new National Security Law (国家安全法) call for the protection of strategic energy supply channels, PRC citizens abroad, and other external interests.

David Brewster: China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti likely to be a taste of things to come (Interpreter)

On 26 November, China confirmed it was in talks with Djibouti to construct its first overseas military base. This represents a major symbolic and practical step in China’s emergence as a global military power.

Außerdem:
Patrick Bond: China’s Path into Africa Blocked (Telesur)

Arbeitsrecht | Südchinesisches Meer
Jun 4th, 2015 by Gao

Rolf Geffken: Die „akademische Exzellenz“ und das chinesische Recht. Deutsche „China-Rechtsexperten“ beim Max-Planck-Institut auf Abwegen (Rat und Tat)

Wer die vom Max-Planck-Institut für Internationales Privatrecht herausgegebene „Zeitschrift für Chinesisches Recht“ (ZChinR) aufmerksam verfolgt, weiß längst, dass dort die offensichtlichen Lieblingsgebiete der Protagonisten vorherrschen. Unternehmensrecht, Monopolgesetz, Insolvenzrecht, Investitionsrecht, Kaufvertragsrecht usw.
Soweit das Arbeitsrecht überhaupt Gegenstand von Betrachtungen ist, wird dieses Gebiet jungen Nachwuchsautoren überlassen, die dann meist eine Aufzählung gesetzlicher Bestimmungen vornehmen oder in rein rechtsdogmatische Betrachtungen verfallen. Allerdings unterlaufen diesen Autoren dann – oft genug – falsche Übersetzungen deutscher oder chinesischer Rechtsbegriffe.
Zu diesen gravierenden Mängeln gibt es bislang keinerlei „Debatte“. Auch und gerade nicht in der Zeitschrift für Chinesisches Recht.

Partido Lakas ng Masa: Statement on West Philippine Sea/South China Sea territorial dispute: US butt out! (Links)

Given the renewed sabre rattling and war cries between the US and China, over the West Philippine Sea and disputed territories, we call on the Philippine government to immediately open bilateral talks with China in order to ease tensions. While we condemn China’s aggressive bullying tactics, we firmly believe that the government must take immediate steps towards a negotiated political settlement to this long-running dispute.
However, we also think that the government has to be sincere about pursuing a political settlement, in order to move towards a peaceful resolution of the conflicting claims. This means that the Philippine government disassociate itself from any actions that makes it a proxy for US interests, that is it must be committed to pursuing a truly independent policy in the region.
Furthermore we demand that the US butt out of the conflict. It has no claims in the disputed territories and no basis to intervene. Its role to date has only led to inflaming the situation and destabilising the region. US surveillance planes entering the airspace over disputed territory, despite several warnings from China, was a provocative and dangerous intervention.

Alberto Lucas López, Cedric Sam: Balance of superpowers — Comparing the armed forces of US and China (South China Morning Post)

Even after several years of double-digit spending increases, China’s military reach is limited to its home territory. The reach of the US armed forces includes historical ties with traditional allies, geographic distribution and cutting-edge technology, as well as income through arms exports.

Alex Lo: Hongkongers must recognise city’s racism (South China Morning Post)
Jennifer Ngo: Occupy protests bring acceptance for ethnic minority youngsters (South China Morning Post)

Luftverschmutzung | Xi Jinping
Apr 2nd, 2015 by Gao

北大报告:过去五年北京每周有近5天时间处于污染状态(《财经》~百度)

北京大学3月底发布了一份《空气质量评估报告》引发热议。该报告称,过去五年中,北京平均每周有近5天的时间处于污染状态,每年的重污染天数也比官方公布的高出近一倍。这意味着,北京在过去两年虽采取了激进的大气污染防治行动,但污染情况没有随之改观。
衡量空气质量的重要指标为PM2.5。官方公布2014年的PM2.5年均浓度是85.9微克/立方米,而该报告数字是98.57微克/立方米,比官方数字高近15%。
北大团队采用的是美国驻华大使馆2010年到2014年的PM2.5逐小时浓度的数据,作为分析材料。研究人员从2014年4月份开始收集北京地区的官方PM2.5数据。在此之前的数据官方还未公开。
不过,接受《财经》记者采访的专家分析称,美国大使馆的数据不具有学术分析意义。美国使馆只是一个观测点的数据,无法代表北京全市的PM2.5状况。

Charles Liu: Peking University Report Says Government is Lying about Air Pollution Problem (Nanfang)

An air quality report published by a Peking University research group has taken the government to task over its pollution data, saying the problem is worse than the government is admitting and that measures to clean up Beijing’s smoggy skies aren’t working.
Titled “Air Quality Assessment Report”, the research group found that the average daily reading of PM 2.5 levels in Beijing last year was 98.57, 15 percent higher than the government statistics that say 85.9…
This signifies that despite adopting extreme measures in Beijing to fight against air pollution for the past two years, the situation has not changed.

Willy Lam: Xi Jinping Forever (Foreign Policy)

Is China’s increasingly powerful president angling to break tradition and extend his rule indefinitely?
Foreign and Chinese observers surprised at Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s maneuvers to shake up the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) — and at the same time arrogate powers of the party, state, and military to himself — may be in for another shock. Just two and a half years into his reign, Xi appears to be angling to break the 10-year-tenure rule for the country’s supreme leader, with the aim of serving longer than any Chinese ruler in decades.
According to three sources close to top CCP officials, Xi and several top aides are making plans to ensure that the strongman will rule until at least 2027, when he will still be a relatively sprightly 74 years old.

Rüstungsbudget
Mrz 4th, 2015 by Gao

Edward Wong, Chris Buckley: China’s Military Budget Increasing 10% for 2015, Official Says (New York Times)

The Chinese military budget for 2015 will be about 10 percent bigger than last year’s, a senior Chinese official said on Wednesday, meaning that such spending is growing at a pace faster than the overall growth rate of the Chinese economy…
A 10 percent increase would put the 2015 military budget around $145 billion, making China the world’s second-largest military spender, though still far behind the United States, which spends more on its armed forces than the next eight countries combined.

Wettlauf mit den USA: China rüstet trotz Wachstumsschwäche kräftig auf (Spiegel)
APA: Chinas Rüstungsboom macht Nachbarn Sorge (Standard)

Der Wirtschaftsboom und die Sorge über die Übermacht des Westens haben Chinas Waffenausgaben in den vergangenen zehn Jahren in die Höhe schnellen lassen. Zwischen 2004 und 2013 sind die Ausgaben in der Volksrepublik nach Schätzungen um 170 Prozent gestiegen. Das lässt bei seinen Nachbarn die Alarmglocken schrillen.

Yang Fan, Ho Shan: Generals probed in Xi’s graft purge (Asia Times / Radio Free Asia)

The ruling Chinese Communist Party is investigating 14 generals for corruption as a nationwide anti-graft campaign widens to encompass the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), official media reported on Monday.
Among those under investigation is navy Rear Adm. Guo Zhenggang, son of a former vice-chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission (CMC), which commands the armed forces headed by President Xi Jinping, the country’s defense ministry said in a statement.

Militär | Korruption
Feb 16th, 2015 by Gao

Michael S. Chase, Jeffrey Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, Kristen A. Gunness, Scott Warren Harold, Susan Puska, Samuel K. Berkowitz: China’s Incomplete Military Transformation. Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PDF; Rand Corporation)

[T]he new core missions of the PLA are ones that received official recognition under the rubric of former President Hu Jintao’s “New Historic Missions” concept. These missions call on the PLA to perform internal and external missions in peacetime and include “participating in emergency rescue and disaster relief,” both internally in China and increasingly internationally; “subduing subversive and sabotage attempts and cracking down on separatist forces” to support antiterror efforts; “accomplishing security provision and guarding tasks,” both at home and abroad through involvement in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs); “merchant vessel protection” from nonstate actors and possibly state actors; “evacuation of Chinese nationals” for the hundreds of thousands of overseas workers in countries where security has significantly deteriorated; and “security support for China’s interests overseas,” such as protecting maritime commerce through antipiracy operations.
These broad new missions focus specifically on the CCP’s evolving conceptions of how the PLA can “support China’s peaceful development,” on which CCP legitimacy is largely based…
[T]he PLA enjoys an almost absolute immunity from external oversight, budgetary transparency, and/or accountability to the legislature for how it spends its funds and operates. As a consequence, the PLA is believed to be riddled with corruption (…). Examples of such corruption abound, from the 2000 arrest of Ji Shengde, Director of Military Intelligence in the PLA’s General Staff Department (GSD); to the 2012 detention of the former deputy director of the General Logistics Department (GLD), Lieutenant General Gu Junshan; and culminating in the 2014 arrest and expulsion from the Party of former CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou. Xu’s co–Vice Chairman, General Guo Boxiong, is also widely rumored to be under investigation for personal and family members’ corruption (…).
Another tendency is to avoid training sufficiently or under challenging conditions. Often, exercises are seen as failures if “red” (i.e., the PLA) does not win, so exercises are not seen as a chance to identify problems during training that can be remedied before actual wartime operations commence. Additionally, political pressures and a culture of treating exercises and training as opportunities to impress one’s superiors further erode the utility of exercises as tools to surface and address problems in military organization, planning, and execution…
The cornerstone of China’s approach to nuclear weapons, ever since its first nuclear test in 1964, has been its no-firstuse policy. Chinese writings on military strategy and missile force campaigns are generally consistent with this approach… Although its nuclear force is relatively small, China is not standing still.

Katie Hunt: China’s military not ready ‚to fight and win future wars,‘ new report says (CNN)
Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga: U.S. Suggestion For Japanese Patrols in South China Sea Prompts ADIZ Threat (Jamestown China Brief)

A recent U.S. suggestion for Japanese patrols in the South China Sea has elicited a sharp rebuttal by the Chinese government and reignited Chinese media discussion of a South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).

Willy Wo-Lap Lam: Growing Power of Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection Brings Questions of Politically-Motivated Purge (Jamestown China Brief)

[T]he CCDI, which is a secretive Party organ outside the purview of both the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the courts, seems to be an extra-legal institution that derives its authority from just one person: President and Commander-in-Chief Xi…
The CCDI is the only Party or government organ that has its own Organization and Propaganda offices, which were set up in March 2013. This means, for example, that the CCDI leadership can recruit cadres outside the established channels of the CCP Organization Department…
Starting late last year, the CCDI has stationed sub-offices in a number of top Party and government units. These include the CCP Central Committee’s General Office, the Organization Department and the Propaganda Department…
Studies conducted by Ren Jianming, Head of the Clean Governance Research Center at Beijing’s Beihang University, have shown that up to one third of cadres with the rank of ministers or above have accepted bribes and commissions or helped their close relatives and cronies profit in commercial deals. This figure is similar to a 2014 report that quoted an internal document as saying that “more than 30 percent of party, government and military officials were found to be involved in some form of corruption”…
According to the official media, the CCDI last year detained for investigation 42 officials with the rank of vice-ministers and vice-governors or above. This was substantially more than the 17 officials of similar ranks nabbed in 2013—and the comparable annual figure of six to eight during the Jiang and Hu administrations… Senior cadres incriminated in 2014 included a former Politburo Standing Committee member (Zhou Yongkang), a former Politburo member and vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (General Xu Caihou) and two former vice-chairmen of the CPPCC (Ling Jihua and Su Rong). Questions have been asked, however, as to whether Xi and Wang have used the anti-corruption campaign as a weapon to bring down political foes. For example, Zhou, Ling, General Xu and former Politburo member Bo Xilai—who are described as “the new Gang of Four” by the Hong Kong and overseas-Chinese media—are rumored to be leaders of an “anti-Xi Jinping cabal” within the Party (…). It is perhaps not surprising that the two previous Politburo members who went to jail for corruption—former Beijing Party secretary Chen Xitong and former Shanghai Party boss Chen Liangyu—were political foes of ex-presidents Jiang and Hu, respectively…

全国政协原副主席苏荣严重违纪违法被开除党籍和公职(中央纪委监察部)

日前,经中共中央批准,中共中央纪委对全国政协原副主席苏荣严重违纪问题进行了立案审查。

Top China official to face prosecution for corruption (BBC)

Former senior official Su Rong has been expelled from the Chinese Communist Party for corruption and faces prosecution, said the country’s top anti-corruption body.

Celia Hatton: The case against Chinese human rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang (BBC)

Pu Zhiqiang’s blunt weibo messages, many of them expressing frustration with the ruling Chinese Communist Party, are forming the state’s case against him.
Police supplied a short list to Pu Zhiqiang’s lawyer, Mo Shaoping.
„From top to bottom, the Communist Party can’t get through a single day without telling lies,“ he posted on 24 July, 2012.
A few months earlier, on 5 February 2012, he wrote: „We should give Liaoning province and Shandong province to Japan, give some land in the south to Vietnam.
„Control of Beijing can be handed directly over to Washington. I’m willing to guide our guests to these places. As long as I can live better than I am now, I’ll be satisfied“.
Other messages criticise the Chinese government’s policies towards Uighurs, the mainly Muslim minority living in Xinjiang in China’s far west.
„They claim Xinjiang belongs to China. So they shouldn’t treat it like a colony. Don’t be a predator and a conqueror. You treat them as your enemy,“ he wrote on 7 May 2014, referring to strict government restrictions placed on Uighurs…
Mr Pu has been charged with creating a disturbance, inciting ethnic hatred and separatism.

Luftraumüberwachungszone
Nov 27th, 2013 by Gao

Beat U. Wieser: China zeichnet seine Hoheitsansprüche an den Himmel (Neue Zürcher Zeitung)

Chinas neue Luftraumüberwachungszone begründet keinen Hoheitsanspruch. Trotzdem hegt Peking solche Ideen, strebt es doch nach einer erweiterten Einflusssphäre in Ostasien.

Johnny Erling: Angst vor der Katastrophe im Ostchinesischen Meer (Welt)

Völlig unerwartet ruft China eine neue Luftverteidigungszone aus. Zwar betont Peking, dass diese sich nicht gegen ein bestimmtes Land richtet – aber Experten fürchten einen Konflikt mit Japan.

Tim Kelly, Phil Stewart: Defying China, U.S. bombers and Japanese planes fly through new air zone (Reuters)

Two unarmed U.S. B-52 bombers flew over disputed islands on a training mission in the East China Sea without informing Beijing while Japan’s main airlines ignored Chinese authorities when their planes passed through a new airspace defense zone on Wednesday.
The defiance from Japan and its ally the United States over China’s new identification rules raises the stakes in a territorial standoff between Beijing and Tokyo over the islands and challenges China to make the next move.
China published coordinates for an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone over the weekend and warned it would take „defensive emergency measures“ against aircraft that failed to identify themselves properly.

Julian E. Barnes, Jeremy Page: U.S. Sends B-52s on Mission to Challenge Chinese Claims (Wall Street Journal)

The U.S. moved forcefully to try to counter China’s bid for influence over increasingly jittery Asian neighbors by sending a pair of B-52 bombers over disputed islands in the East China Sea, U.S. officials said Tuesday.
The B-52s took off from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam and flew more than 1,500 miles northwest, crossing into what China has declared as its new air-defense identification zone, at about 7 p.m. ET Monday. The U.S. deliberately violated rules set by China by refusing to inform Beijing about the flight, officials said.

Peter Lee: China’s defense zone creates a flap (Asia Times)

Bonnie Glaser gets it about right regarding China’s newly announced Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ: „I don’t know that this is specifically directed against Japan, so much as it is the Chinese feeling that every modern country should have an Air Defense Identification Zone.“
Just to make it clear. An ADIZ is not a „no fly zone“ or extension of sovereignty. It is defined by the speed of modern enemy jets and the amount of time needed to challenge, identify hostile intent, and prepare air defenses. …
I like that. In a tense area of the Pacific, potentially hostile planes are supposed to identify themselves when they are flying around. You don’t want somebody shooting at your plane, all you have to do is get on the radio. Good. Extend that ADIZ out to Midway. Maybe it’ll stop World War III.
The ADIZ looks like it’s stabilizing, not destabilizing the region.

Peter Lee: China ADIZ: You Furnish the Hysterics, We’ll Furnish the Heightened Tensions (China Matters)

I’m not going to engage in Fisking by bulk here, but Western outlets have unanimously spun the Chinese ADIZ as some reckless stunt to challenge Japan over the Senkaku airspace.
Bullshit.

Luftüberwachungszone Chinas nicht gegen ein bestimmtes Land gerichtet (China.org.cn)

Die Luftüberwachungszone, die China über dem Ostchinesischen Meer eingerichtet hat, deckt sich teilweise mit der Zone Japans. Dazu sagte der chinesische Militärexperte Chai Lidan, geographisch gesehen sei diese Situation unvermeidlich, beide Länder sollten die Kontakte intensivieren und die Flugsicherheit gemeinsam wahren.

Chinas Position zur Frage der Flugüberwachungszone (Radio China International)

Der Sprecher des chinesischen Außenministeriums Qin Gang teilte am Sonntag vor der Presse mit, China habe die Zone gemäß den international üblichen Gepflogenheiten festgelegt. Die Festsetzung der Flugüberwachungszone ziele darauf ab, die staatliche Souveränität und die Sicherheit des territorialen Luftraums zu verteidigen sowie den geordneten Flugverkehr zu wahren. Sie richte sich nicht gegen irgendein Land oder Ziel und werde die Freiheit des Flugverkehrs nicht beeinträchtigen.

Senkaku-Inseln: Chinas Luftwaffe verfolgte Flug von US-Bombern durch „Sperrzone“ (RIA Novosti)

„Die chinesische Luftwaffe hat den Flug auf der gesamten Strecke verfolgt und (die Flugzeuge) zeitgerecht als amerikanische Luftschiffe identifiziert. Die chinesische Seite verfügt über die Möglichkeit, den Flugverkehr in dem festgelegten Gebiet effektiv zu kontrollieren“, heißt es in der Mitteilung des chinesischen Verteidigungsamtes.

Außenpolitik und Innenpolitik
Mai 20th, 2013 by Gao

J.B. hat eine Debatte über diese Artikel angeregt:
Susanna Bastaroli: Expertin: „China will nicht so zahnlos wie die Europäer werden“ (Presse)

Laut China-Expertin Weigelin-Schwierdzik dienen Chinas Kriegsdrohungen in Asien der Legitimation einer zunehmend schwächelnden KP. Die Dynamik könnte außer Kontrolle geraten.

Angela Köhler: Wie Japans Umgang mit der Geschichte die Zukunft blockiert (Presse)

Immer wieder sorgt der undiplomatische Umgang japanischer Politiker mit der schmutzigen Vergangenheit für heftige Empörung in den früheren Opferstaaten.

Wolfgang Greber: Die Angst der amerikanischen Admiräle (Presse)

Noch sind die USA im Verbund mit Alliierten wie Japan und Australien Herren des Pazifiks. An deren Thron rüttelt China aber gewaltig.

Zwei Literaturhinweise von H.K.; zunächst zum Thema:
David Shambaugh: China Goes Global. Oxford University Press, 2013.
Ebenfalls lesenswert:
David Shambaugh: China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. University of California Press, 2009.

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