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Ungleichheit, Armut und Armutsbekämpfung
Jul 6th, 2018 by Gao

Facundo Alvaredo, Lucas Chancel, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, Gabriel Zucman: Global Inequality Dynamics: New Findings from WID.world (American Economic Review, Mai 2017)

Rising inequality has attracted considerable interest in recent years, as shown by the attention received by an academic book published by one of us (Piketty 2014). Yet we still face important limitations in our ability to measure the changing distribution of income and wealth, within and between countries and at the world level. In this paper, we present new findings about global inequality dynamics from the World Wealth and Income Database (WID.world). We start with a brief history of the WID.world project. We then present selected findings on income inequality, private versus public wealth-to-income ratios, and wealth inequality, with emphasis on the contrast between the trends in the United States, China, France, and the United Kingdom…

Rob Schmitz: Xi Jinping’s War On Poverty Moves Millions Of Chinese Off The Farm (NPR, 19. Oktober 2017)

China’s government hopes city life will push tens of millions into the workforce on their way to joining the world’s largest middle class. In the first five years of Xi’s presidency, more than 60 million Chinese have risen above the poverty line; Xi wants to move 70 million more Chinese above that line within the next three years, a goal China’s government is more tightly focused on than ever. …
[O]fficials in Guizhou … plan to move more than 750,000 people off farms by the end of the year from nearly 3,600 villages.

(Es gibt einen Eugene K. Chow, der Redenschreiber für den New Yorker Bürgermeister Bill de Blasio war.)
Eugene K. Chow: China’s War on Poverty Could Hurt the Poor Most (Foreign Policy, 8. Jänner 2018)

The government is pushing people out of rural squalor — and into urban dependence.

Spencer Sheehan: China’s Hukou Reforms and the Urbanization Challenge (The Diplomat, 22. Feber 2018)

China is speeding up hukou reform, but that won’t be enough to solve the migrant worker problem.
China’s government has announced a lofty goal of expanding urban hukou or residency permits to 100 million migrant workers by 2020 as part of its plan to rebalance its economy. However, the government needs to deliver a whole range of supporting policies to achieve this goal and it may not have the financing to provide them.

Philip Alston: Report of the [UN] Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights on his mission to China (PDF; 28. März 2017)

The achievements that China has made in alleviating poverty have been extraordinary. Its leadership has made a strong and genuine commitment to building a “moderately prosperous society” free of extreme poverty, thus showing political will that is impressive and all too uncommon in today’s world…
While China has done a huge amount to promote economic and social wellbeing, this has not yet been translated into an approach based on treating economic and social rights as human rights.

Javier C. Hernández: Xi Jinping Vows No Poverty in China by 2020. That Could Be Hard. (New York Times, 31. Oktober 2017)

Nearly seven decades after the Chinese Communist Party rose to power on a promise of prosperity for all, President Xi Jinping has vowed to fulfill the Communists’ original intent, staking his legacy on an ambitious plan to complete the eradication of rural poverty by 2020…
Even as Chinese cities have turned into playgrounds for the nouveau riche and the swelling ranks of the middle class, nearly 500 million people, or about 40 percent of China’s population, live on less than $5.50 per day, according to the World Bank.
“The whole idea of socialism was that all Chinese would have a reasonable living standard,” said Kerry Brown, a China scholar at King’s College London. “The nagging concern is that the Communist Party has created billionaires and a strong middle class, and yet there are still a lot of poor people. That seems to be a massive contradiction.”

Ein wichtiger Diskussionsbeitrag in diesem Zusammenhang:
Felix Wemheuer: Auf dem Weg zum Sozialismus? Kritische Anmerkungen zu den Unterstützern der heutigen KP China in der westlichen Linken (Kommunistische Debatte)

Seit dem Ende der Kulturrevolution 1976 und dem Niedergang der westeuropäischen ML-Bewegung haben sich viele Linke lange nicht mehr für die Entwicklung in China interessiert. In den letzten 15 Jahren häufen sich allerdings linke Publikationen zum Charakter der Volksrepublik. Mittlerweile ist China eine politische und wirtschaftliche Großmacht. Während mit dem chinesischen „Wirtschaftswunder“ im Westen lange nur Sweatshops und Billigwaren verbunden wurden, investiert das chinesische Kapital heute auf allen Kontinenten. Selbst in Deutschland kauft es im großen Stil Unternehmen auf. Laut den Plänen der chinesischen Regierung soll die VR zum 100. Jahrestag ihrer Gründung, 2049, ein hochentwickeltes Industrieland sein. „Der Spiegel“ rief sogar die westliche Welt dazu auf, endlich aufzuwachen, da China schon jetzt die Nummer Eins sei. Die gegenwärtige Verschiebung der globalen Machtverhältnisse können auch Linke in Europa nicht ignorieren. Allerdings gehen die Einschätzungen zum Charakter der VR weit auseinander: Theodor Bergmann sieht das Land auf dem Weg zum Sozialismus (…). Der bekannte marxistische Geograph David Harvey hingegen reihte 2005 auf dem Titelbild seines Buches „Kleine Geschichte des Neoliberalismus“ Deng Xiaoping in eine wenig schmeichelhafte Ahnengalerie zusammen mit Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher und dem chilenischen Diktator Augusto Pinochet ein.

EU- und WTO-Forderungen | Atomkraftwerke | Geburtenkontrolle
Mai 31st, 2016 by Gao

Johnny Erling, Andre Tauber, Nina Trentmann: Warum China noch keine Marktwirtschaft ist (Welt)

Die Volksrepublik buhlt um die Anerkennung als WTO-Staat. Doch sie erfüllt nicht alle Bedingungen.
Die EU debattiert über die Anerkennung von China als Marktwirtschaft – eine Entscheidung, die weitreichende Konsequenzen hätte, weil sich nicht mehr so leicht wie bislang Sanktionen verhängen ließen.
Obwohl das Europa-Parlament vergangene Woche in einer nicht bindenden Entscheidung gegen die Anerkennung stimmte, hat die Volksrepublik gute Chancen, im Laufe des Jahres noch den begehrten Titel zu erhalten. Wir zeigen, warum China die Kriterien für eine marktwirtschaftliche Wirtschaftsordnung noch nicht erfüllt.

Kommentar von R.G. dazu:

Was für ein Unfug! Alles was auch hier zur Abwehr der schlimmsten Auswirkungen des neoliberalen Finanzkapitalismus diskutiert wird, soll nach dem Willen der EU in China unterbunden werden: Gezielte Stärkung von Staatsunternehmen, Staatliche Bankenkontrolle, Regulierung des Finanzsystems, kein unbeschränkter Marktzugang für Hedge-Fonds und andere Heuschrecken…..Seien wir froh, dass China sich bisher den größten Segnungen des Finanzkapitalismus widersetzt hat (kleine Bitte: Keine schlaumeirerischen Kommentare derer, die schon immer „wussten“, was China ist und was da laeuft, denn davon gibt’s genug. Danke).

China baut Atomkraftwerk im Sudan (Spiegel)

Saudi-Arabien, Argentinien – und nun Sudan: Die Chinesen wollen mit ihrem Atomkraftwerk Hualong 1 den Weltmarkt erobern. Experten warnen vor Sicherheitsrisiken. …
Der Sudan-Deal ist Teil einer aggressiven Expansionsstrategie. China will ein wichtiger Player auf dem globalen Atommarkt werden. …
Die Volksrepublik hat bereits mit zahlreichen Ländern Verträge zum Bau von Kernkraftwerken unterzeichnet, darunter Rumänien, Saudi-Arabien, Argentinien und Kenia. Der Energiekonzern China General Nuclear Power Corp investiert zudem in den Bau des britischen Atomkraftwerks Hinkley Point C und will später einen Hualong-1-Reaktor in Bradwell in der Grafschaft Essex bauen.

Sudan, China to cooperate in nuclear energy (Xinhua)
Lü Chang: Work to start on 3rd unit of Karachi K3 nuclear plant in Pakistan (China Daily)

Thomas Immervoll: Zwei Kinder für eine Fortsetzung alter Politik (China von links)

Welche Bedeutung hat die Lockerung der Geburtenpolitik, wie sie vom Zentralkomitee der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas angekündigt wurde?

Wanderarbeiter | Geschichte
Sep 6th, 2015 by Gao

Damien Ma: China’s 20 Percent Problem (Foreign Affairs; auch per Google Cache)

For years now, China has faced the daunting challenge of managing its roughly 260 million “domestic immigrants,” or migrant workers. They flow itinerantly from countryside to cities, where they dwell as second-class citizens and temporary guests with no formal urban status because of a system, known as hukou, that prevents them from settling and easily accessing basic services such as health care, social security, primary education for their children, and decent housing.
At nearly 20 percent of the population, China’s migrants, if they were to form their own country, would constitute the world’s fourth most populous nation. It is a demographic that has grown 30 times over the past 30 years, according to figures from an official Chinese Communist Party (CCP) journal, Seeking Truth, even as total population growth has increased by less than one percent over the same period. Relative to the overall population, the migrant demographic is younger, more mobile, and not particularly smitten with the status quo…
Dealing with migrants is all the more challenging because they tend to be younger, especially the new generation. For instance, the average millennial migrant (about 50 percent of the whole migrant cohort) is under 35 and holds a college degree, according to a Nankai University survey of migrants in seven cities.

Sergey Radchenko: China Lost World War II (Foreign Policy)

Forget Beijing’s victory parade: in 1945, China was a failed state.

Richard Bernstein: Assassinating Chiang Kai-shek (Foreign Policy)

The reputation of China’s Nationalist leader is falling in Taiwan and being rehabilitated on the Mainland. What’s going on?

Hongkong | Ramadan | Wirtschaft
Jun 26th, 2015 by Gao

China’s plans for Hong Kong backfire (Washington Post)

For 79 days last year, thousands of protesters occupied major roads in Hong Kong in an attempt to force Chinese authorities to grant the territory genuine democracy. They failed. Local leaders and their overlords in Beijing refused to negotiate over an electoral plan that would allow for a popular vote for Hong Kong’s next leader but would limit candidates to nominees approved by the Communist regime. That left opposition representatives in Hong Kong’s legislature with an unappealing choice this month: Sign off on the inadequate reform or block it at the risk of freezing the current, even less democratic, system in place. “To kowtow, or to veto,” was the way opposition leader Alan Leong summed up the dilemma.
In the end, the opposition voted down the electoral system, which needed a two-thirds majority to pass the legislative council. The rebuff to the regime was amplified when pro-Beijing legislators walked out in a failed attempt to delay the vote; the final tally was 28 to 8. It was a moral victory for Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement, which has made clear it won’t accept China’s attempt to gut its promise to allow universal suffrage.

Tom Phillips: Hong Kong parliament defies Beijing’s insistence and rejects ‚democracy‘ plan (Guardian)
Sad moment for Hong Kong democratic process (Global Times)

According to Beijing’s August 31 decision, if the reform plan fails to pass, Hong Kong will maintain the current election system and its chief executives will be elected by the 1,200-member election committee.
The pan-democratic lawmakers must accept this fact since they have rejected the reform. If they don’t stop but organize more drastic street demonstrations, they will push Hong Kong to a dead end and mean a life and death struggle with the Basic Law. In that case, Hong Kong will face dismal prospects.
We are concerned that a Pandora box is being opened in Hong Kong and various devils are released to ruin the region’s future. People who love Hong Kong should work to keep the box tightly closed so that Hong Kong won’t degenerate from the capital of finance and fashion to a total mess.
The Hong Kong opposition camp shouldn’t overestimate their power. The high yardstick under which the reform plan needs to win a two-thirds majority has enabled a minority of pan-democrats to kidnap the opinion of the mainstream. They are misguided if they think they represent the mainstream public and can indulge themselves in doing whatever they like.

Dai Weisen, Xin Lin: Last Occupy Central Die-Hards Face Eviction From Hong Kong Street (Radio Free Asia)

China bans Ramadan fasting in mainly Muslim region (AlJazeera)

China has banned civil servants, students and teachers in its mainly Muslim Xinjiang region from fasting during Ramadan and ordered restaurants to stay open.

Shohret Hoshur: At Least 18 Dead in Ramadan Attack on Police Checkpoint in Xinjiang (Radio Free Asia)
Richard Javad Heydarian: China’s illusion of harmony (AlJazeera)

For decades, much of China’s economic boom was concentrated in its south and eastern coastal regions, with mega-cities like Guangzhou and Shanghai experiencing stratospheric growth rates. It didn’t take long before Mao’s China was transformed from one of the world’s most egalitarian nations into a highly stratified capitalist society, with income inequality levels rivalling those in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Recognising the gravity of the country’s growing geographical and class-based divide, China’s Communist Party, beginning in 2006, endorsed a political doctrine, at a closed-door plenary session held by the party’s Central Committee, which focused on the creation of a „harmonious society“…
The problem, however, was that the development of interior regions went hand in hand with growing sociopolitical repression of the Uighur population as well as a massive influx of Han Chinese population into autonomous regions such as Xinjiang.

Qiao Long, Hai Nan: Beijing Police Detain Hundreds of PLA Veterans As Thousands Protest Lack of Pension (Radio Free Asia)

Authorities in the Chinese capital have detained hundreds of former People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers after thousands of them staged a sit-in outside China’s central military command on Tuesday in protest over a lack of pension and other benefits, protesters said.
The protesters, mostly veterans of China’s brief 1979 border war with Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet border conflict of March 1969, converged on the Central Military Commission (CMC) headquarters in Beijing on Tuesday morning.
Zhejiang-based veteran Sun Enwei said he had counted around 3,000 retired PLA soldiers outside the complaints department of the CMC before the authorities took some of them to the Jiujingzhuang unofficial detention center on the outskirts of Beijing.
„More than 800 people have been forcibly taken to Jiujingzhuang,“ Sun told RFA. „They have informed the local governments that … they have to send people to Jiujingzhuang to pick them up.“

Charlotte Middlehurst: Robotics revolution rocks Chinese textile workers (AlJazeera)

Hundreds of thousands of jobs are at risk as manufacturers plan to employ hi-tech gadgetry in factories to cut costs.

Marc Bain: US fashion companies are starting to look beyond China for sourcing apparel (Quartz)

China’s clothing manufacturing capabilities are so advanced, and still so relatively cheap for US fashion labels, that right now there are few good substitutes for producing there. But as Chinese production costs begin to creep up, American brands are scouting out other options, primarily in Vietnam, India, Indonesia, and even the US itself.

Christoph Jehle: Elektronikfertigung in Thailand (Telepolis)

Elektronische Produkte kommen in der allgemeinen Wahrnehmung heute mehrheitlich aus der Volksrepublik China (PRC). So steht es auch vielfach auf den Typenschildern der Produkte, weil die Endmontage oft im Reich der Mitte stattfindet und die großen chinesischen Auftragsfertiger bei ihren Auftraggebern einen guten Ruf besitzen. Die Fertigung vieler Baugruppen und Einzelkomponenten wurde jedoch inzwischen in Länder verlagert, die mit günstigeren Löhnen, größeren Steuervorteilen, geringerer Organisierung ihrer Arbeitskräfte und nach Möglichkeit auch staatlicher Unterstützung bei der Werksansiedelung noch attraktiver sind als Mainland China.

Michael Lelyveld: China Pushes Production Abroad With ‚Capacity Cooperation‘ Initiative (Radio Free Asia)
Carrie Gracie: The village and the girl (BBC)
Trying to hit a moving target: The Lide shoe factory workers’ campaign for relocation compensation (China Labour Bulletin)
Noch immer lesenswert:
Eli Friedman: China in Revolt (Jacobin, 2008)

The Chinese working class plays a Janus-like role in the political imaginary of neoliberalism. On the one hand, it’s imagined as the competitive victor of capitalist globalization, the conquering juggernaut whose rise spells defeat for the working classes of the rich world. What hope is there for the struggles of workers in Detroit or Rennes when the Sichuanese migrant is happy to work for a fraction of the price?
At the same time, Chinese workers are depicted as the pitiable victims of globalization, the guilty conscience of First World consumers. Passive and exploited toilers, they suffer stoically for our iPhones and bathtowels. And only we can save them, by absorbing their torrent of exports, or campaigning benevolently for their humane treatment at the hands of “our” multinationals.
For parts of the rich-world left, the moral of these opposing narratives is that here, in our own societies, labor resistance is consigned to history’s dustbin. Such resistance is, first of all, perverse and decadent. What entitles pampered Northern workers, with their “First World problems,” to make material demands on a system that already offers them such abundance furnished by the wretched of the earth? And in any case, resistance against so formidable a competitive threat must surely be futile.

Feng Zhang: Beijing’s Master Plan for the South China Sea (Foreign Policy)

China has far greater ambitions for the region than just reclaiming some tiny islands. In late 2013, Beijing started taking a very different approach to sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea — although few outside China noticed the change. Instead of directly confronting the other regional claimant states, Beijing began the rapid consolidation of, and construction on, the maritime features already under its control. And it did so on a scale and pace befitting China’s impressive engineering prowess.

Heather Timmons: Russia’s importance to China is overblown (Quartz)

Russia overtook Saudi Arabia as China’s largest source of oil in May, shipping a record 3.92 million metric tons, a 20% increase from April.
This isn’t the first time that this has happened (although the last time was more than 10 years ago), and Russia isn’t the only country to ship more oil to China than the Saudis. Angola also sold more oil to China than Saudi Arabia in May.
Still, it is the latest sign of the growing ties between Russia, suffering under sanctions and increasing international isolation, and China, which is investing heavily to bolster its slowing economy, namely by building a global infrastructure network.

Shen Hong: China’s Plan for Local Debt Amounts to a Bailout (Wall Street Journal)

Beijing had promised to let market play a greater role; banks take bonds in place of higher-rate loans

Melvyn Backman: China’s stock market fell hard this week—really hard (Quartz)
Leslie Shaffer: China manufacturing remains mired in June (CNBC)
China Intensifies Steel Cuts as Iron Bull Market Drives Up Costs (Bloomberg)

Jonathan Fenby: What the West should know about Xi Jinping, China’s most powerful leader since Mao (New Statesman)
Andrew Browne: The Whiplash of Xi Jinping’s Top-Down Style (Wall Street Journal)
Tom Phillips: China’s Xi Jinping says poverty is ’nothing to fear‘ after pesticide deaths (Guardian)

China’s president, Xi Jinping, has told villagers in one of the most deprived areas of the country, where four children killed themselves last week by swallowing pesticide, that poverty is nothing to fear.
He made the comments in Huamao, a village in the south-western province of Guizhou, according to China’s official news agency.
The president was quoted as saying: “A good life is created with one’s own hands, so poverty is nothing to fear. If we have determination and confidence, we can overcome any difficulty.”

Anders Hove: What Do Beijing’s Blue Skies Really Mean? It’s Too Soon to Say (Paulson Institute)
Eric Bellman: China’s Air is Much Worse Than India’s, World Bank Report Shows (Wall Street Journal)
Richard Smith: China’s Communist-Capitalist Ecological Apocalypse (TruthOut)

Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian: American Students in China: It’s Not as Authoritarian as We Thought (Asia Society)

For some American students about to embark on a study abroad trip to China, the U.S. media reports of Chinese Internet censorship, jailing of dissidents, and draconian population control laws may dominate their perception of the country. But after more than 30 years of reform and opening, the nominally communist country now combines economic liberalization, lumbering social and legal reforms, and spurts of ideological entrenchment to create a dynamic mix of restriction and freedom that’s hard to parse.

Julian Baggini: Is it OK to eat dogs? (Guardian)

Whenever western meat-eaters get up in arms over barbarous foreigners eating cute animals, it’s easy to throw around accusations of gross hypocrisy. Easy, because such accusations are often true. But responses to the dog meat festival in Yulin, China, which draws to a close today, merit more careful consideration. The double standards at play here are numerous, complicated, and not always obvious.

Korruption | Hochschulbildung
Sep 10th, 2014 by Gao

Didi Kirsten Tatlow: Ren Jianming on the Fight Against Corruption in China, and His Own Solution (New York Times)

Q: When I talk to ordinary people they support the campaign. But what’s interesting is that many feel that officials have no choice but to be corrupt. Do you agree?
A: It’s true. Take the recent situation in Maoming in Guangdong Province, where two successive party secretaries were corrupt. As they investigated they discovered that lots of officials below them were also corrupt. They all had to give bribes to the party secretary and his predecessor. Think for a moment: a party secretary decides how things are. If they’re about money changing hands, then you have no choice. You bribe, or you give up any hope of promotion. So the number of corrupt officials today is very, very high. At the time of economic reform [around 1978, after Mao’s death], we spoke of “moral problems.” Only a few cadres had moral problems. I’m afraid today it’s the other way round. Only a few do not…
My own take is that the higher the official, the greater the corruption. A university student who has just passed the civil service examinations is honest. When he gets to be the head of a ke [the lowest position on the 27-rung civil service ladder], then head of a chu, a ting and a minister, he will make all kinds of connections. Those connections are corrupt. We say that about 30 percent of chu heads are corrupt. By ting level it’s about 50 percent, ministers about 80 percent. You can work out for yourself what it is on the Politburo. So if the investigations stop with Zhou then you can’t say the movement is being pursued to the end.

中纪委:“公款送月饼”将点名道姓曝光(新华网)

据中央纪委监察部网站消息,纠正“四风”,要紧盯重要时间节点。中秋临近,为进一步落实中央八项规定精神,严防“四风”反弹,中央纪委监察部网站8月10日开通公款送月饼等“四风”问题举报窗,畅通监督举报渠道,同时每周通报各级纪检监察机关查处的违反中央八项规定精神的案件。这是继“五一”前后开设纠正“四风”监督举报直通车之后,再次恢复周周通报,旨在强化监督执纪问责工作,发挥警示和震慑作用,努力还大家一个风清气正的节日。

王岐山:八项规定我得抓五年 先整治官员乱作为(凤凰卫视)

Helen Gao: China’s Education Gap (New York Times)

The percentage of students at Peking University from rural origins, for example, has fallen to about 10 percent in the past decade, down from around 30 percent in the 1990s…
While China has phenomenally expanded basic education for its people, quadrupling its output of college graduates in the past decade, it has also created a system that discriminates against its less wealthy and well-connected citizens, thwarting social mobility at every step with bureaucratic and financial barriers.

Streik bei Yue Yuen und Solidaritätsstreiks
Apr 22nd, 2014 by Gao

Biggest Strike In China’s History Enters 6th Day (Revolution News)

The largest strike in China’s history has entered the sixth day, defying state attempts to repress workers struggling against economic and social injustice. Police arrested several organizers of the strikers at the Yue Yuen factory, which produces shoes for Nike and Adidas.
As the situation deteriorates, the thousands of workers are ever angrier after the management of the factory completely denies any violations in the payment of their social security. Workers in Dongguan, where exists the largest labor rights movement, have taken solidarity actions with the strikers of Yue Yuen. Large numbers of workers in Dongguan – apparently in thousands – took it to the streets to protest wage injustice and the government’s oppression of migrant workers, and to demand the government pay the social security it owned to the workers.

裕元鞋廠工潮蔓延至江西廠房(網易~星島日報)

台資的裕元鞋廠繼東莞廠房持續多日有員工罷工之後,工潮亦蔓延至集團在江西安福市的廠房。消息指,18日江西安福的廠房有2000名工人罷工,大批工人聚集在廠房外,部分女工仍身穿橙色的圍裙。東莞裕元鞋廠被指剋扣工人福利,以臨時工標準繳納社保,東莞廠房的工人上星期一開始大罷工,要求廠方補繳養老保險和公積金,並補簽正規勞動合同以及加薪。

AP: Chinese government trade union to mediate shoe factory strike by tens of thousands of workers (Fox News)

The Guangdong Federation of Trade Unions urged the workers to act rationally, but said it was „taking a clear-cut stand“ that the workers‘ rights must be protected. The federation said it had instructed its municipal agency in the southern city of Dongguan — where the factory complex is located — to mediate.

Yue Yuen shoe strike expands from Guangdong to Jiangxi (Want China Times)

A week after 30,000 workers from the Yue Yuen shoe factory in Dongguan in southern China’s Guangdong province took to the streets over invalid contracts, 2,000 workers from another of the company’s factories, located in Ji’an in eastern China’s Jiangxi province, have also joined the strike, reports the Hong Kong-based Oriental Daily.
Operated by the Taiwan-based Pou Chen Group, the Yue Yuen factory in Dongguan’s Gaobu township is one of the biggest shoe factories in China and produces footwear for more than 30 top brands such as Nike, Adidas and Reebok. The factory currently employs more than 60,000 workers.

3. Plenum des XVIII. Zentralkomitees
Nov 4th, 2013 by Gao

杜建国:十八届三中全会不会有大动作(新浪博客)

“十八届三中全会将会在经济改革方面有大动作”,这是一年来(十八大以来)“自由派”掌控的中国主流媒体和部分国外媒体(如华尔街日报、英国金融时报)的宣传工作的重点。不过相对于这一鼓噪而言,即将于11月召开的三中全会肯定是雷声大、雨点小,不会有大动作出台。
何谓大动作?在笔者看来,媒体所宣扬的大动作,无非是两条:第一,对庞大的国有资产进行重大改革,即私有化;第二,金融改革,包括对外和对内两方面。掠夺资本——即“自由派”资本——企图通过这两项措施将中国高速发展三十多年的成果都装进自己口袋里。笔者认为,在这两个领域,三中全会不会有大动作。先谈谈金融方面。中国政府肯定不会允许资本自由流动,1997年亚洲金融危机的教训历历在目,中国政府岂能重蹈覆辙?国内方面,中国政府今年已经做出了促进私人资本成立银行的决定,这是“自由派”的胜利,不过自由派欲壑难填,还企图有进一步的要求。自由派不仅要求放开私人银行的限制,相反还要求进一步的优惠或特权,比如降低保证金门槛等,这无异于玩火,政府肯定不会予以支持。另一个是放纵非法集资与集资诈骗,即让吴英、曾成杰们为所欲为,对此政府也不会答应。

Wolfgang Pomrehn: China baut sich um (junge Welt)

Heute endet das 3. Plenum des Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei. Vom Gremium ­werden weitreichende Reformen der Wirtschaft erwartet.

Minxin Pei: What’s the real test to Xi Jinping and the Communist Party at the Third Plenum? (South China Morning Post)

There is something odd and disturbing about the conventional wisdom surrounding the upcoming Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As the November 9-12 conclave draws near, the international community’s attention seems to be focused mainly on technocratic policy changes deemed essential to restructuring China’s state-dominated economy and reenergising growth.
Will the government liberalise interest rates or loosen capital controls? How will the fiscal system be revamped? Will land reform be part of the package?
The list of such questions goes on. Outside China, the prevalent view among business leaders is that President Xi Jinping’s new administration has consolidated its power and acquired enough authority to push through far-reaching economic reforms. He and his colleagues need only to get the specific policies right.

Felix Lee: Chinas Wirtschaft hofft auf das Zentralkomitee (Zeit)

Als die neue chinesische Führung im März ihr Amt antrat, waren die Erwartungen groß. Verglichen mit ihren Vorgängern sind Premier Li Keqiang und Präsident Xi Jinping noch jung: Li ist 58 Jahre alt, Xi wurde im Juni 60. Sie würden China verändern, hoffte man im In- und Ausland. Bislang hat sich das allerdings nicht erfüllt, auch nicht wirtschaftspolitisch. Zwar gab es Ankündigungen, aber noch keine Taten.
In den nächsten Wochen könnte sich das ändern. Am 9. November beginnt das “Dritte Plenum des 18. Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei”. Die Zusammenkunft der Parteikader ist wesentlich spannender, als der sperrige Titel vermuten lässt, denn hier treffen sich die 376 mächtigsten Männer und Frauen Chinas zu einer ehrgeizigen Konferenz: Sie legen die Umrisse der Wirtschaftspolitik für die kommenden Jahre fest.

Larry Elliott: China prepares to liberalise finance as hedge funds and estate agents salivate (Guardian)

Analysts at Capital Economics say the third plenum will come up with a direction of travel rather than a detailed policy programme. But they expect the new leadership to address three key issues: the low share of national income going to average households; the dominant role of the state in much of the economy; and the inefficient use of capital.

Willy Lam: SOE links threaten china reform drive (Asia Times)

The recent detention of senior executives of the China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) has highlighted a major question about China’s economic plans: Whether the Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang administration has finally decided to restructure the 110 or so yangqi, or state-owned enterprise (SOE) groupings.

A world to turn upside down (Economist)

Of the economic issues facing November’s plenum of the Chinese Communist Party, none looms larger than land reform in the countryside.

Linda Yueh: What to expect from the Third Plenum? (China Policy Institute)

Will 2013 be another 1978 or at least 1993 for China? Third Plenums held in those years resulted in significant overhauls of economic policy. The Third Plenum refers to the third time that the new leaders of China lead a plenary session of the Central Committee. The current one is being billed as being as significant as the one in December 1978 that marked the start of market-oriented reforms in China over 3 decades ago under Deng Xiaoping. Change of a similarly dramatic nature is unlikely, but there are high expectations that the new Chinese leaders will launch reforms that are as notable as those made in 1993, which dismantled a large part of the state-owned sector.

Barry Naughton: What the Heck is China’s ‘Third Plenum’ and Why Should You Care? (ChinaFile)

Gradually—perhaps over three years—China will liberalize interest rates, open up the renminbi capital account and let the renminbi partially float. However, these important changes are already “baked in” and implementation is in the hands of technocrats who can back off if things get rocky.

Chris Luo: Premier Li Keqiang endorses private entrepreneurs, promises further reforms (South China Morning Post)

Felix Lee: Chinas Märchen von der niedrigen Arbeitslosigkeit (Zeit)

Chinas Statistiker haben eine neue Aufgabe: Sie sollen endlich für zuverlässigere Arbeitsmarktdaten sorgen.
Sei Jahrzehnten liegt die Arbeitslosenquote in der Volksrepublik praktisch konstant bei vier Prozent – sowohl in guten als auch in schlechten Zeiten. Vor Beginn der Weltwirtschaftskrise lag sie bei glatten vier Prozent. Nur im Frühjahr 2009 war die Zahl für kurze Zeit nach oben geschossen. Doch schon das erste Konjunkturpaket drückte sie wieder nach unten. Auf wie viel Prozent? Auf vier natürlich! Aktuell liegt die Quote bei 4,1 Prozent. Kein Wunder, dass kaum ein Ökonom, der etwas auf sich hält, die offizielle Arbeitslosenzahl wirklich ernst nimmt.

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