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Geostrategisches | Wanderarbeiter
Jun 21st, 2015 by Gao

Rückschlag für US-Dollar als Leitwährung: China zahlt Gazprom künftig in Yuan (RT)

China und die Russische Föderation machen Ernst mit ihrer Ankündigung, bei ihrer Geschäftsabwicklung den US-Dollar so weit wie möglich außen vor zu lassen. Sowohl die Exporte der Gazprom aus der Östlichen Sibirisch–Pazifischen Pipeline nach China als auch das Öl-Geschäft aus der Arktis werden in Zukunft in der Landeswährung Yuan getätigt.

Kenneth Shortgen jun.: There are now two reserve currencies as petro-yuan joins petro-dollar (Examiner)

Ever since Henry Kissinger forged the global petro-dollar agreement with Saudi Arabia and OPEC in 1973, the U.S. currency has remained the singular global reserve for over 40 years. However, on June 9 that sole monetary reign has come to an end as Russian gas giant Gazprom is now officially selling all oil in Chinese Yuan, making the petro-Yuan a joint global reserve, and ending America’s sole control over the world’s reserve currency.

Bart Gruzalski: An Economic Reason for the US vs. China Conflict (CounterPunch)

There are many reasons that the US is pushing on China in the South China Sea. Two articles have been published on Counterpunch in recent weeks exploring “why?” None mention an important economic reason that has, at least in part, motivated the US to go to war and is very much at stake in the growing dispute with China: the value of the dollar.

Steve LeVine: China is building the most extensive global commercial-military empire in history (Quartz)

Much has been made of Beijing’s “resource grab” in Africa and elsewhere, its construction of militarized artificial islands in the South China Sea and, most recently, its new strategy to project naval power broadly in the open seas.
Yet these profiles of an allegedly grasping and treacherous China tend to consider its ambitions in disconnected pieces. What these pieces add up to is a whole latticework of infrastructure materializing around the world. Combined with the ambitious activities of Chinese companies, they are quickly growing into history’s most extensive global commercial empire.

Mel Gurtov: Rules and Rocks: The US-China Standoff Over the South China Sea Islands (Asia-Pacific Journal)

The long-running, multi-party dispute over control of islets in the South China Sea (SCS) is worsening both in rhetoric and provocative activity. Meeting in late May at the Shangri-La Dialogue on regional security, US and Chinese defense officials sparred over responsibility for the increased tension, though they stopped short of issuing threats. In fact, all sides to the dispute say they want to avoid violence, prefer a diplomatic resolution, and support freedom of navigation. Both the US and China insist that the dispute notwithstanding, their relationship overall is positive and enduring. But China, citing its indisputable sovereignty over the SCS, is backing its claim in ways that alarm the US and several Asian governments: construction of an air strip on the Spratly Islands, a land reclamation project that has artificially expanded its claimed territory, and most recently emplacement of two mobile artillery vehicles.
Accompanying these latest Chinese actions are acknowledgments by the foreign ministry of their military purposes. The original explanation of China’s expanding presence on the islands was that they were intended for search-and-rescue operations, environmental protection, and scientific work. Now the explanation is the need to protect Chinese territory. The Pentagon has responded by publicly discussing US options such as flyovers and navigation in Chinese-claimed air and sea space. A US navy surveillance aircraft has already challenged China’s sovereignty claim by overflying Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys, prompting a Chinese order (which the aircraft ignored) to leave the area. In the meantime, US military assistance to other claimants, including Vietnam and the Philippines, has enabled their coast guards to at least keep an eye on Chinese activities.

John Bellamy Foster: Marxism, Ecological Civilization, and China (Monthly Review)

China’s leadership has called in recent years for the creation of a new „ecological civilization.“ Some have viewed this as a departure from Marxism and a concession to Western-style „ecological modernization.“ However, embedded in classical Marxism, as represented by the work of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, was a powerful ecological critique. Marx explicitly defined socialism in terms consistent with the development of an ecological society or civilization — or, in his words, the „rational“ regulation of „the human metabolism with nature.“
In recent decades there has been an enormous growth of interest in Marx’s ecological ideas, first in the West, and more recently in China. This has generated a tradition of thought known as „ecological Marxism.“
This raises three questions: (1) What was the nature of Marx’s ecological critique? (2) How is this related to the idea of ecological civilization now promoted in China? (3) Is China actually moving in the direction of ecological civilization, and what are the difficulties standing in its path in this respect?

Lynette H. Ong: Breaking Beijing? (Foreign Affairs)

Chinese President Xi Jinping is leading one of the most vigorous campaigns against corruption and dissent since the Mao era. In fact, it appears that his campaign has extended as far as Canada; Beijing is attempting to extradite the Vancouver-based businessman Mo Yeung (Michael) Ching for alleged corrupt business dealings in the mid-1990s. Ching is the son of Cheng Weigao, a senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official who was charged with corruption in 2003. Some view these campaigns as the key to restoring the CCP’s strength and legitimacy. Others predict that they will be destabilizing because of the scale, opaqueness, and intensity—by attacking both “tigers” and “flies” (that is, high- and low-level officials), Xi is striking at the core of the patronage networks that hold the political system together, weakening the party from within. And by tightening the reins on public discourse through an increasingly centralized censorship apparatus, Xi is further diminishing his party’s legitimacy.

Chasing Shadows: Policing Migrants in Guangzhou’s Urban Villages (Chuang)
Patti Waldmeir: China’s rural migrants: life as a trashpicker in a Shanghai hole (Financial Times)

AP: Chinese women’s rights group collapses under official pressure (Guardian)

Suzanne Sataline: ‘Hong Kong Is Quite Seriously Divided’ (Foreign Policy)

Democracy — even a half-cooked version with Chinese characteristics — will not be coming soon to Hong Kong. On June 18, the city’s legislature, the Legislative Council, vetoed a constitutional amendment that would have let Hong Kong voters cast ballots for their chief executive — albeit for a maximum of 3 candidates, restricted and vetted by Beijing — in 2017.

Jonathan Mirsky: China’s Panchen fires a surprise ‚poisoned dart‘ at Beijing (Nikkei Asian Review)

China’s 11th Panchen Lama, Tibet’s second-highest religious leader, „discovered“ and installed by Beijing, recently expressed alarm that Buddhism in Tibet may soon exist in name only because of a shortage of monks — the implication being that the shortage was due to Chinese policy. Will this unexpected criticism be seen as a „poisoned arrow“ by the Chinese Communist Party, like the one for which his predecessor, the 10th Panchen Lama, was punished in the 1960s? And if so, will he, also, face punishment?

David Dawson: No, that trite folklore isn’t Chinese (World of Chinese)

Ignorance of other cultures can be a marvelous thing sometimes. It allows you to attribute whatever you want to that culture, and come off sounding wise.
Chinese wisdom is a popular target here. How many hokey bits of wisdom have been attributed to ancient Chinese philosophers? After all, sometimes it’s pretty easy to confuse them for pop culture pap.

Zhou Dongxu: China Prepares ‚Traditional Culture‘ Textbooks for Its Officials (Caixin)

Südchinesisches Meer | Energieabkommen | Korruption
Jun 10th, 2014 by Gao

Eklat um Territorialstreit bei Asiens Dialogkonferenz (Standard)
Gebietsstreitigkeiten in Ostasien – beanspruchte Wirtschaftszonen
Christoph Prantner: Konflikt im Südchinesischen Meer: Die Zeichen stehen auf Krieg (Standard)

Ashley Smith: Russia and China make a deal (Socialist Worker)

An alliance between Russia, the world’s largest energy producer, and China, the world’s largest energy consumer, will remake superpower relations …
Russia’s state-owned energy company, Gazprom, has promised to drill new gas fields in Siberia, construct a new 2,500-mile pipeline and ship 1.3 trillion cubic feet of gas each year to the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation. China will invest $20 billion and Russia $55 billion to fund this massive project…
China will pay $350 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to National Public Radio, a bit lower than the European standard and dramatically lower than the average in Asia. China will in turn use the deal with Russia to pressure its other suppliers to lower their prices. By securing gas through an overland pipeline from Siberia, China lessens its dependence on imports of oil and gas through the chokepoint of the Straight of Malacca, which the U.S. polices with its Navy.

Johnny Erling: China verurteilt zwei Konzernchefs zum Tode (Standard)

Luftabwehridentifizierungszone
Dez 7th, 2013 by Gao

Knut Mellenthin: Vorteil China (junge Welt)

Die erste Runde ging an China: Die US-Regierung hat den Fluggesellschaften ihres Landes dringend empfohlen, die »Luftverteidigungsidentifizierungszone« der Volksrepublik über dem Ostchinesischen Meer zu respektieren. Diese Entscheidung wurde am Freitag offiziell bekanntgegeben, war den Unternehmen aber angeblich schon am Mittwoch mitgeteilt worden. Damit halten gegenwärtig nur noch Japan und Südkorea daran fest, ihre Fluggesellschaften zur Mißachtung der Zone zu nötigen und damit die Passagiere erheblichen Risiken auszusetzen. Die meisten ausländischen Gesellschaften, dem Vernehmen nach auch die australische Quantas, hatten sich den neuen chinesischen Anweisungen von vornherein gefügt. Auch die beiden größten japanischen Luftfahrtunternehmen hatten sich mehrere Tage lang daran gehalten, bis ihnen das von ihrer Regierung untersagt wurde.

Peter Lee: Has Abe overreached on China’s ADIZ? (Asia Times)

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has cleverly exploited the China’s unilateral announcement of its air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in order to assert Japanese impunity in military flights equal to that of the United States, a key element of Japan’s ambitions to act as the local hegemon in oceanic East Asia.

Huang Wei: China’s Perspective on the ADIZ: Backfire or Signal Flare? (China Policy Institute)
Richard Javad Heydarian: ADIZ stirs fears for South China Sea (Asia Times)

China’s Defense Ministry’s announcement said that it will „establish other air defense identification zones at an appropriate time after completing preparations“. To Manila and Hanoi, these statements signal that China intends to eventually adopt an ADIZ over the contested Paracel and Spratly islands and other features in the South China Sea. …
„There’s this threat that China will control the air space [in the South China Sea] … It transforms an entire air zone into China’s domestic air space,“ Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario said in response to China’s ADIZ announcement. „That is an infringement and compromises the safety of civil aviation … it also compromises the national security of affected states.“

Peter Lee: More Fun With China’s ADIZ (China Matters)
Peter Lee: Del Rosario Not Afraid to Be Stupid About ADIZ (China Matters)
Peter Lee: China makes a splash with coastguard rules (China Matters)

Reuters for some reason continued to beat the Hainan coast guard regulations dead horse with an analysis posted on December 9 that begins:
Imagine if the U.S. state of Hawaii passed a law allowing harbor police to board and seize foreign boats operating up to 1,000 km (600 miles) from Honolulu.

The jurisdiction of the state of Hawaii extends 1380 miles from Honolulu to the outermost Northwestern Hawaiian Island, the Kure Atoll.
For the mathematically challenged Reuters scribe, that’s more than twice as far as 600 miles that supposedly symbolizes the irresponsible overreach of the Hainan provincial government.

Südkorea spitzt Inselstreit zu (junge Welt)

Im Streit um Gebietsansprüche im Ostchinesischen Meer sorgt nun Südkorea für eine weitere Zuspitzung. Die Regierung in Seoul kündigte an, ihre eigene Zone zur Luftraumüberwachung in südlicher Richtung zu erweitern. Das neue Areal schließt künftig auch eine unter Wasser gelegene Felsformation ein, die von Südkorea kontrolliert, aber auch von China beansprucht wird. Die Regelungen für die neue Zone würden Mitte Dezember in Kraft treten, teilte das Verteidigungsministerium in Seoul am Sonntag mit. Es gebe durch den Schritt künftig weder Beschränkungen für die Zivilluftfahrt, noch werde der Luftraum anderer Länder verletzt. Die Luftverteidigungszone war ursprünglich 1951 während des Koreakriegs von den USA eingerichtet worden.

Luftraumüberwachungszone
Nov 27th, 2013 by Gao

Beat U. Wieser: China zeichnet seine Hoheitsansprüche an den Himmel (Neue Zürcher Zeitung)

Chinas neue Luftraumüberwachungszone begründet keinen Hoheitsanspruch. Trotzdem hegt Peking solche Ideen, strebt es doch nach einer erweiterten Einflusssphäre in Ostasien.

Johnny Erling: Angst vor der Katastrophe im Ostchinesischen Meer (Welt)

Völlig unerwartet ruft China eine neue Luftverteidigungszone aus. Zwar betont Peking, dass diese sich nicht gegen ein bestimmtes Land richtet – aber Experten fürchten einen Konflikt mit Japan.

Tim Kelly, Phil Stewart: Defying China, U.S. bombers and Japanese planes fly through new air zone (Reuters)

Two unarmed U.S. B-52 bombers flew over disputed islands on a training mission in the East China Sea without informing Beijing while Japan’s main airlines ignored Chinese authorities when their planes passed through a new airspace defense zone on Wednesday.
The defiance from Japan and its ally the United States over China’s new identification rules raises the stakes in a territorial standoff between Beijing and Tokyo over the islands and challenges China to make the next move.
China published coordinates for an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone over the weekend and warned it would take „defensive emergency measures“ against aircraft that failed to identify themselves properly.

Julian E. Barnes, Jeremy Page: U.S. Sends B-52s on Mission to Challenge Chinese Claims (Wall Street Journal)

The U.S. moved forcefully to try to counter China’s bid for influence over increasingly jittery Asian neighbors by sending a pair of B-52 bombers over disputed islands in the East China Sea, U.S. officials said Tuesday.
The B-52s took off from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam and flew more than 1,500 miles northwest, crossing into what China has declared as its new air-defense identification zone, at about 7 p.m. ET Monday. The U.S. deliberately violated rules set by China by refusing to inform Beijing about the flight, officials said.

Peter Lee: China’s defense zone creates a flap (Asia Times)

Bonnie Glaser gets it about right regarding China’s newly announced Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ: „I don’t know that this is specifically directed against Japan, so much as it is the Chinese feeling that every modern country should have an Air Defense Identification Zone.“
Just to make it clear. An ADIZ is not a „no fly zone“ or extension of sovereignty. It is defined by the speed of modern enemy jets and the amount of time needed to challenge, identify hostile intent, and prepare air defenses. …
I like that. In a tense area of the Pacific, potentially hostile planes are supposed to identify themselves when they are flying around. You don’t want somebody shooting at your plane, all you have to do is get on the radio. Good. Extend that ADIZ out to Midway. Maybe it’ll stop World War III.
The ADIZ looks like it’s stabilizing, not destabilizing the region.

Peter Lee: China ADIZ: You Furnish the Hysterics, We’ll Furnish the Heightened Tensions (China Matters)

I’m not going to engage in Fisking by bulk here, but Western outlets have unanimously spun the Chinese ADIZ as some reckless stunt to challenge Japan over the Senkaku airspace.
Bullshit.

Luftüberwachungszone Chinas nicht gegen ein bestimmtes Land gerichtet (China.org.cn)

Die Luftüberwachungszone, die China über dem Ostchinesischen Meer eingerichtet hat, deckt sich teilweise mit der Zone Japans. Dazu sagte der chinesische Militärexperte Chai Lidan, geographisch gesehen sei diese Situation unvermeidlich, beide Länder sollten die Kontakte intensivieren und die Flugsicherheit gemeinsam wahren.

Chinas Position zur Frage der Flugüberwachungszone (Radio China International)

Der Sprecher des chinesischen Außenministeriums Qin Gang teilte am Sonntag vor der Presse mit, China habe die Zone gemäß den international üblichen Gepflogenheiten festgelegt. Die Festsetzung der Flugüberwachungszone ziele darauf ab, die staatliche Souveränität und die Sicherheit des territorialen Luftraums zu verteidigen sowie den geordneten Flugverkehr zu wahren. Sie richte sich nicht gegen irgendein Land oder Ziel und werde die Freiheit des Flugverkehrs nicht beeinträchtigen.

Senkaku-Inseln: Chinas Luftwaffe verfolgte Flug von US-Bombern durch „Sperrzone“ (RIA Novosti)

„Die chinesische Luftwaffe hat den Flug auf der gesamten Strecke verfolgt und (die Flugzeuge) zeitgerecht als amerikanische Luftschiffe identifiziert. Die chinesische Seite verfügt über die Möglichkeit, den Flugverkehr in dem festgelegten Gebiet effektiv zu kontrollieren“, heißt es in der Mitteilung des chinesischen Verteidigungsamtes.

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