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Lehrer | Zhou Yongkang | Australien | China Airlines
Jun 20th, 2016 by Gao

China’s teachers: The unsung heroes of the workers’ movement (China Labour Bulletin)

Images of worker activism in China tend to be dominated by factory workers and, more recently, coal miners and steel workers. However, some of the largest, best organized and most determined worker protests of the last few years have been staged by teachers.
Teachers make up less than two percent of China’s overall workforce but they account for about four percent of the strikes and protests recorded on China Labour Bulletin’s Strike Map. Moreover, unlike workers in privately-owned factories, most teachers are employed by the state and their protests often pose a direct challenge to local government officials and administrators.

Xinhua: Son of Zhou Yongkang sentenced to 18 years in prison (China Daily)

A court in central China’s Hubei Province on Wednesday sentenced Zhou Bin, son of Zhou Yongkang, to 18 years in prison for taking bribes and illegal business operations.
Zhou Bin was also fined 350.2 million yuan (53 million U.S. dollars) and all of his illegally obtained assets will be confiscated, according to the verdict of Yichang City Intermediate People’s Court.

Liam Ward: Radical Chinese labour in Australian history (Marxist Left Review)

Flick through any mainstream book on Australian history and chances are you’ll find some version of the phrase “cheap Chinese labour”. Historians usually employ it to explain the alleged centrality of the organised working class in establishing racist anti-Chinese immigration laws, particularly the cluster of federal government legislation broadly known as the White Australia policy. This competition from pliant non-union labour was interpreted through the racial supremacist ideas of the time and, so the argument goes, prompted unionists to respond with vociferous calls for the total exclusion of non-white immigrants.
But a subtle shadow tracing through the history books suggests a problem with the argument. Time and again, often without any significant conclusions being drawn, we see passing reference to Chinese workers in Australia organising, striking and generally giving hell to their employers. These are fleeting glimpses of a neglected history of class struggle waged by Chinese workers whose memory continues to be dismissed as both separate from and somehow a threat to the workers’ movement.

Nele Husmann: China Airlines darf nicht nach Athen fliegen (AeroTelegraph)

Die griechische Regierung hat China Airlines eine Absage erteilt: Ihre Flugzeuge dürfen nicht in Athen landen. Das angespannte Verhältnis zwischen Taiwan und der Volksrepublik China ist wohl der Grund.

Kulturrevolution – Fellner, Brown, Wemheuer, Mai/Chou, Rittenberg, Wasserstrom
Mai 15th, 2016 by Gao

Hannes Fellner: »Rebellion ist gerechtfertigt« (junge Welt)

Die »Große Proletarische Kulturrevolution« war ein Zeitabschnitt in der Geschichte der Volksrepublik China, der widersprüchlicher nicht sein konnte. Die Kulturrevolution stand und steht gleichzeitig für Voluntarismus und diktatorische Maßnahmen von den um Mao Zedong versammelten Kadern der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas (KPCh), aber auch für eine partizipative und demokratische Massenbewegung. Sie stand und steht gleichzeitig für gesellschaftliches Chaos und Not, aber auch für ökonomischen, sozialen und kulturellen Fortschritt, welcher die Grundlagen für den Wirtschaftsboom des Landes ab den späten 1970er Jahren legte. Sie stand und steht gleichzeitig für Chinas Besinnung nach innen und seine internationale Isolation, aber auch für den Beginn seines Aufstiegs zur Weltmacht.

Ian Johnson: Jeremy Brown on the Cultural Revolution at the Grass Roots | 50周年纪念之外,被忽略的文革历史 (New York Times)

Jeremy Brown, 39, a history professor at Simon Fraser University in Burnaby, British Columbia, studied in Harbin and did research in Tianjin, focusing especially on the rural-urban divide in China under Mao Zedong. Most recently, he helped edit “Maoism at the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China’s Era of High Socialism.” In an interview, he discussed the 50th anniversary of the Cultural Revolution, what we miss in elite-focused narratives from that time and his pursuit of flea-market historiography.

Felix Wemheuer: 50 Jahre Kulturrevolution: Der Kampf geht weiter (Deutsche Welle)

50 Jahre nach dem Ausbruch der „Großen Proletarischen Kulturrevolution“ [hat] die chinesische Gesellschaft noch immer keinen Konsens gefunden, wie Maos Massenbewegung zu beurteilen ist.

Felix Wemheuer: Kulturrevolution und die Neue Linke im Westen (Deutsche Welle)
Jun Mai, Oliver Chou: Cultural Revolution, 50 years on (South China Morning Post)

Fifty years ago today, China issued a top directive calling on its people to rid society of “members of the bourgeoisie threatening to seize political power from the proletariat” – marking the start of a decade-long violent class struggle.
For 10 tumultuous years from 1966, the country underwent massive sociopolitical upheaval that saw countless politicians and intellectuals driven to their deaths, civilians killed in armed conflicts, and cultural relics and artefacts destroyed. The official death toll numbered more than 1.7 million.

Wen Liu: Sidney Rittenberg on Cultural Revolution 50 years later, its violence, its lessons (WA China Watch Digest)

This website was not meant to be this political. But one cannot watch China and skip a historic date, May 16, the 50th anniversary of the official start of the Cultural Revolution from 1966-1976, which served as perhaps more than anything dark, scorched, bloody yet fertile soil for, as well as a huge rear-view mirror of, today’s China of skyscrapers, bullet trains, Xi Jinping, and even Internet censorship. One cannot also watch China and forget that it was in 1972, during the Cultural Revolution, that President Nixon went to meet Mao in Beijing. To help us reflect on the Cultural Revolution, its meaning, its violence, its lessons, there is no better person than a great fellow Washingtonian, journalist, scholar, a participant as well as a prisoner of not only the Cultural Revolution, but for 35 years Mao’s revolution: Sidney Rittenberg.

Jeffrey Wasserstrom: How Will China Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Cultural Revolution? (Nation)

This month marks the anniversary of two surges of youth activism in China. One, the May 4 Movement, began with student protests 97 years ago. The other is the 50th anniversary of the Cultural Revolution, which is sometimes said to have begun with the first Red Guards putting up wall posters in late May of 1966. May 4 and Red Guard activists were once seen as part of related movements, but now they tend to be regarded as radically dissimilar.

Walder | Žižek
Jul 10th, 2015 by Gao

Ian Johnson: Andrew G. Walder on ‘China Under Mao’ (New York Times)

Q. You write that about 1.1 million to 1.6 million people died during the Cultural Revolution.
A. In the literature, the number ranges from 40,000 to eight million. So it’s a relatively conservative estimate. But as a percent of the population, 750 million, that’s about one-fifth the death rate of Stalin’s Great Terror. Some people are annoyed that I’m minimizing the violence, but I’m trying to put it in perspective.
Another point was that in the Cultural Revolution, most killing wasn’t by the students or Red Guards, but by the government.
We focus on students killing their teachers. That touches a nerve. Or we focus on armed conflict between rebel groups. But most of the killing occurred when order — in quotation marks — was restored. It was not the rampaging Red Guards, even though those deaths were the most dramatic. It was the military restoration of order. The cure was far worse than the disease.

Slavoj Žižek: Sinicisation (London Review of Books)

An exemplary case of today’s ‘socialism’ is China, where the Communist Party is engaged in a campaign of self-legitimisation which promotes three theses: 1) Communist Party rule alone can guarantee successful capitalism; 2) the rule of the atheist Communist Party alone can guarantee authentic religious freedom; and 3) continuing Communist Party rule alone can guarantee that China will be a society of Confucian conservative values (social harmony, patriotism, moral order). These aren’t simply nonsensical paradoxes.

Geostrategisches | Wanderarbeiter
Jun 21st, 2015 by Gao

Rückschlag für US-Dollar als Leitwährung: China zahlt Gazprom künftig in Yuan (RT)

China und die Russische Föderation machen Ernst mit ihrer Ankündigung, bei ihrer Geschäftsabwicklung den US-Dollar so weit wie möglich außen vor zu lassen. Sowohl die Exporte der Gazprom aus der Östlichen Sibirisch–Pazifischen Pipeline nach China als auch das Öl-Geschäft aus der Arktis werden in Zukunft in der Landeswährung Yuan getätigt.

Kenneth Shortgen jun.: There are now two reserve currencies as petro-yuan joins petro-dollar (Examiner)

Ever since Henry Kissinger forged the global petro-dollar agreement with Saudi Arabia and OPEC in 1973, the U.S. currency has remained the singular global reserve for over 40 years. However, on June 9 that sole monetary reign has come to an end as Russian gas giant Gazprom is now officially selling all oil in Chinese Yuan, making the petro-Yuan a joint global reserve, and ending America’s sole control over the world’s reserve currency.

Bart Gruzalski: An Economic Reason for the US vs. China Conflict (CounterPunch)

There are many reasons that the US is pushing on China in the South China Sea. Two articles have been published on Counterpunch in recent weeks exploring “why?” None mention an important economic reason that has, at least in part, motivated the US to go to war and is very much at stake in the growing dispute with China: the value of the dollar.

Steve LeVine: China is building the most extensive global commercial-military empire in history (Quartz)

Much has been made of Beijing’s “resource grab” in Africa and elsewhere, its construction of militarized artificial islands in the South China Sea and, most recently, its new strategy to project naval power broadly in the open seas.
Yet these profiles of an allegedly grasping and treacherous China tend to consider its ambitions in disconnected pieces. What these pieces add up to is a whole latticework of infrastructure materializing around the world. Combined with the ambitious activities of Chinese companies, they are quickly growing into history’s most extensive global commercial empire.

Mel Gurtov: Rules and Rocks: The US-China Standoff Over the South China Sea Islands (Asia-Pacific Journal)

The long-running, multi-party dispute over control of islets in the South China Sea (SCS) is worsening both in rhetoric and provocative activity. Meeting in late May at the Shangri-La Dialogue on regional security, US and Chinese defense officials sparred over responsibility for the increased tension, though they stopped short of issuing threats. In fact, all sides to the dispute say they want to avoid violence, prefer a diplomatic resolution, and support freedom of navigation. Both the US and China insist that the dispute notwithstanding, their relationship overall is positive and enduring. But China, citing its indisputable sovereignty over the SCS, is backing its claim in ways that alarm the US and several Asian governments: construction of an air strip on the Spratly Islands, a land reclamation project that has artificially expanded its claimed territory, and most recently emplacement of two mobile artillery vehicles.
Accompanying these latest Chinese actions are acknowledgments by the foreign ministry of their military purposes. The original explanation of China’s expanding presence on the islands was that they were intended for search-and-rescue operations, environmental protection, and scientific work. Now the explanation is the need to protect Chinese territory. The Pentagon has responded by publicly discussing US options such as flyovers and navigation in Chinese-claimed air and sea space. A US navy surveillance aircraft has already challenged China’s sovereignty claim by overflying Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys, prompting a Chinese order (which the aircraft ignored) to leave the area. In the meantime, US military assistance to other claimants, including Vietnam and the Philippines, has enabled their coast guards to at least keep an eye on Chinese activities.

John Bellamy Foster: Marxism, Ecological Civilization, and China (Monthly Review)

China’s leadership has called in recent years for the creation of a new „ecological civilization.“ Some have viewed this as a departure from Marxism and a concession to Western-style „ecological modernization.“ However, embedded in classical Marxism, as represented by the work of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, was a powerful ecological critique. Marx explicitly defined socialism in terms consistent with the development of an ecological society or civilization — or, in his words, the „rational“ regulation of „the human metabolism with nature.“
In recent decades there has been an enormous growth of interest in Marx’s ecological ideas, first in the West, and more recently in China. This has generated a tradition of thought known as „ecological Marxism.“
This raises three questions: (1) What was the nature of Marx’s ecological critique? (2) How is this related to the idea of ecological civilization now promoted in China? (3) Is China actually moving in the direction of ecological civilization, and what are the difficulties standing in its path in this respect?

Lynette H. Ong: Breaking Beijing? (Foreign Affairs)

Chinese President Xi Jinping is leading one of the most vigorous campaigns against corruption and dissent since the Mao era. In fact, it appears that his campaign has extended as far as Canada; Beijing is attempting to extradite the Vancouver-based businessman Mo Yeung (Michael) Ching for alleged corrupt business dealings in the mid-1990s. Ching is the son of Cheng Weigao, a senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official who was charged with corruption in 2003. Some view these campaigns as the key to restoring the CCP’s strength and legitimacy. Others predict that they will be destabilizing because of the scale, opaqueness, and intensity—by attacking both “tigers” and “flies” (that is, high- and low-level officials), Xi is striking at the core of the patronage networks that hold the political system together, weakening the party from within. And by tightening the reins on public discourse through an increasingly centralized censorship apparatus, Xi is further diminishing his party’s legitimacy.

Chasing Shadows: Policing Migrants in Guangzhou’s Urban Villages (Chuang)
Patti Waldmeir: China’s rural migrants: life as a trashpicker in a Shanghai hole (Financial Times)

AP: Chinese women’s rights group collapses under official pressure (Guardian)

Suzanne Sataline: ‘Hong Kong Is Quite Seriously Divided’ (Foreign Policy)

Democracy — even a half-cooked version with Chinese characteristics — will not be coming soon to Hong Kong. On June 18, the city’s legislature, the Legislative Council, vetoed a constitutional amendment that would have let Hong Kong voters cast ballots for their chief executive — albeit for a maximum of 3 candidates, restricted and vetted by Beijing — in 2017.

Jonathan Mirsky: China’s Panchen fires a surprise ‚poisoned dart‘ at Beijing (Nikkei Asian Review)

China’s 11th Panchen Lama, Tibet’s second-highest religious leader, „discovered“ and installed by Beijing, recently expressed alarm that Buddhism in Tibet may soon exist in name only because of a shortage of monks — the implication being that the shortage was due to Chinese policy. Will this unexpected criticism be seen as a „poisoned arrow“ by the Chinese Communist Party, like the one for which his predecessor, the 10th Panchen Lama, was punished in the 1960s? And if so, will he, also, face punishment?

David Dawson: No, that trite folklore isn’t Chinese (World of Chinese)

Ignorance of other cultures can be a marvelous thing sometimes. It allows you to attribute whatever you want to that culture, and come off sounding wise.
Chinese wisdom is a popular target here. How many hokey bits of wisdom have been attributed to ancient Chinese philosophers? After all, sometimes it’s pretty easy to confuse them for pop culture pap.

Zhou Dongxu: China Prepares ‚Traditional Culture‘ Textbooks for Its Officials (Caixin)

Streik bei Cuiheng | Mindestreservesatz | Dokument Nr. 9
Apr 20th, 2015 by Gao

At the sharp end of the workers’ movement in China: The Zhongshan Cuiheng strike (China Labour Bulletin)

A month-long strike at a Japanese-owned bag manufacturer in the Pearl River Delta town of Zhongshan has been characterized by police violence, arrests and intimidation, and the absolute refusal of the boss to negotiate. Welcome to the sharp end of the workers’ movement in China.
The strike broke out in mid-March. The roughly 200 workers at Cuiheng Co. were unhappy at low-pay and the refusal of the company to pay social security and housing fund contributions, year-end bonuses and other benefits.

Tom Barnes, Kevin Lin: China’s growing labour movement offers hope for workers globally (Conversation)

Reuters: China’s central bank cuts reserve ratio (Guardian)

China’s central bank has cut the amount of cash that banks must hold as reserves on Sunday, the second industry-wide cut in two months, adding more liquidity to the world’s second-biggest economy to help spur bank lending and combat slowing growth.
The People’s Bank of China lowered the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) for all banks by 100 basis points to 18.5%, effective from Monday, the central bank said in a statement on its website.

Angus Grigg: China frees up $200b to stoke economy (Financial Review)

The RRR cut is expected to release around 1 trillion yuan ($208 billion) of capital into the economy.

China Steps Up Economy Help With Reduced Bank Reserve Ratios (Bloomberg)

The reserve-requirement ratio was lowered 1 percentage point Monday, the People’s Bank of China said. While that was the second reduction this year, the new level of 18.5 percent is still high by global standards. The cut will allow banks to boost lending by about 1.2 trillion yuan ($194 billion)…
The reserve ratio will be reduced by another percentage point for rural financial institutions, two additional percentage points for Agricultural Development Bank and a further 0.5 percentage point for banks with a certain level of loans to agriculture and small enterprises.
Those extra reductions give the move a “reformist flavor,” wrote Bloomberg economists Tom Orlik and Fielding Chen. Still, with growth weak and small companies most at risk, it’s understandable banks see state-owned firms as safer bets.
“As ever, the price of stronger growth is slower progress on structural reform,” they wrote.

Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation (ChinaFile)

This weekend, China’s leaders gather in Beijing for meetings widely expected to determine the shape of China’s economy, as well as the nation’s progress, over the next decade. What exactly the outcome of this Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party will be remains shrouded in no small measure of secrecy, like most matters of high politics in China. President Xi Jinping has signaled that a significant new wave of economic liberalization may be in the works. But in the realm of political reform, Xi also has signaled a deep reluctance. In fact, many of the actions taken and techniques used under his year of leadership suggest a return to ideas and tactics that hark back to the days of Mao Zedong.
One such signal came during this past spring, when reports began to appear that the Party leadership was being urged to guard against seven political “perils,” including constitutionalism, civil society, “nihilistic” views of history, “universal values,” and the promotion of “the West’s view of media.” It also called on Party members to strengthen their resistance to “infiltration” by outside ideas, renew their commitment to work “in the ideological sphere,” and to handle with renewed vigilance all ideas, institutions, and people deemed threatening to unilateral Party rule. These warnings were enumerated in a communiqué circulated within the Party by its General Office in April, and, because they constituted the ninth such paper issued this year, have come to be known as “Document 9.”

Daniel A. Bell: Teaching ‘Western Values’ in China (New York Times)

Nobody is surprised that the Chinese government curbs “Western-style” civil and political liberties. But it may be news to some people that the government has recently called for the strengthening of Marxist ideology in universities and a ban on “teaching materials that disseminate Western values in our classrooms.” On the face of it, such regulations are absurd. It would mean banning not just the ideas of John Stuart Mill and John Rawls, but also those of such thinkers as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

Reporters Without Borders reveals state secrets in reaction to Gao Yu’s sentence (Reporters Without Borders)

Brian Eyler: China’s new silk roads tie together 3 continents (China Dialogue)

China recently unveiled an action plan for its controversial One Belt, One Road initiative to link its economy with the rest of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Known as the ‘new silk roads’, it combines new infrastructure networks of roads, railway lines, ports to strengthen trade, investment, and people-to-people cooperation.

Luftverschmutzung | Xi Jinping
Apr 2nd, 2015 by Gao

北大报告:过去五年北京每周有近5天时间处于污染状态(《财经》~百度)

北京大学3月底发布了一份《空气质量评估报告》引发热议。该报告称,过去五年中,北京平均每周有近5天的时间处于污染状态,每年的重污染天数也比官方公布的高出近一倍。这意味着,北京在过去两年虽采取了激进的大气污染防治行动,但污染情况没有随之改观。
衡量空气质量的重要指标为PM2.5。官方公布2014年的PM2.5年均浓度是85.9微克/立方米,而该报告数字是98.57微克/立方米,比官方数字高近15%。
北大团队采用的是美国驻华大使馆2010年到2014年的PM2.5逐小时浓度的数据,作为分析材料。研究人员从2014年4月份开始收集北京地区的官方PM2.5数据。在此之前的数据官方还未公开。
不过,接受《财经》记者采访的专家分析称,美国大使馆的数据不具有学术分析意义。美国使馆只是一个观测点的数据,无法代表北京全市的PM2.5状况。

Charles Liu: Peking University Report Says Government is Lying about Air Pollution Problem (Nanfang)

An air quality report published by a Peking University research group has taken the government to task over its pollution data, saying the problem is worse than the government is admitting and that measures to clean up Beijing’s smoggy skies aren’t working.
Titled “Air Quality Assessment Report”, the research group found that the average daily reading of PM 2.5 levels in Beijing last year was 98.57, 15 percent higher than the government statistics that say 85.9…
This signifies that despite adopting extreme measures in Beijing to fight against air pollution for the past two years, the situation has not changed.

Willy Lam: Xi Jinping Forever (Foreign Policy)

Is China’s increasingly powerful president angling to break tradition and extend his rule indefinitely?
Foreign and Chinese observers surprised at Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s maneuvers to shake up the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) — and at the same time arrogate powers of the party, state, and military to himself — may be in for another shock. Just two and a half years into his reign, Xi appears to be angling to break the 10-year-tenure rule for the country’s supreme leader, with the aim of serving longer than any Chinese ruler in decades.
According to three sources close to top CCP officials, Xi and several top aides are making plans to ensure that the strongman will rule until at least 2027, when he will still be a relatively sprightly 74 years old.

3. Plenum des XVIII. Zentralkomitees
Nov 4th, 2013 by Gao

杜建国:十八届三中全会不会有大动作(新浪博客)

“十八届三中全会将会在经济改革方面有大动作”,这是一年来(十八大以来)“自由派”掌控的中国主流媒体和部分国外媒体(如华尔街日报、英国金融时报)的宣传工作的重点。不过相对于这一鼓噪而言,即将于11月召开的三中全会肯定是雷声大、雨点小,不会有大动作出台。
何谓大动作?在笔者看来,媒体所宣扬的大动作,无非是两条:第一,对庞大的国有资产进行重大改革,即私有化;第二,金融改革,包括对外和对内两方面。掠夺资本——即“自由派”资本——企图通过这两项措施将中国高速发展三十多年的成果都装进自己口袋里。笔者认为,在这两个领域,三中全会不会有大动作。先谈谈金融方面。中国政府肯定不会允许资本自由流动,1997年亚洲金融危机的教训历历在目,中国政府岂能重蹈覆辙?国内方面,中国政府今年已经做出了促进私人资本成立银行的决定,这是“自由派”的胜利,不过自由派欲壑难填,还企图有进一步的要求。自由派不仅要求放开私人银行的限制,相反还要求进一步的优惠或特权,比如降低保证金门槛等,这无异于玩火,政府肯定不会予以支持。另一个是放纵非法集资与集资诈骗,即让吴英、曾成杰们为所欲为,对此政府也不会答应。

Wolfgang Pomrehn: China baut sich um (junge Welt)

Heute endet das 3. Plenum des Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei. Vom Gremium ­werden weitreichende Reformen der Wirtschaft erwartet.

Minxin Pei: What’s the real test to Xi Jinping and the Communist Party at the Third Plenum? (South China Morning Post)

There is something odd and disturbing about the conventional wisdom surrounding the upcoming Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As the November 9-12 conclave draws near, the international community’s attention seems to be focused mainly on technocratic policy changes deemed essential to restructuring China’s state-dominated economy and reenergising growth.
Will the government liberalise interest rates or loosen capital controls? How will the fiscal system be revamped? Will land reform be part of the package?
The list of such questions goes on. Outside China, the prevalent view among business leaders is that President Xi Jinping’s new administration has consolidated its power and acquired enough authority to push through far-reaching economic reforms. He and his colleagues need only to get the specific policies right.

Felix Lee: Chinas Wirtschaft hofft auf das Zentralkomitee (Zeit)

Als die neue chinesische Führung im März ihr Amt antrat, waren die Erwartungen groß. Verglichen mit ihren Vorgängern sind Premier Li Keqiang und Präsident Xi Jinping noch jung: Li ist 58 Jahre alt, Xi wurde im Juni 60. Sie würden China verändern, hoffte man im In- und Ausland. Bislang hat sich das allerdings nicht erfüllt, auch nicht wirtschaftspolitisch. Zwar gab es Ankündigungen, aber noch keine Taten.
In den nächsten Wochen könnte sich das ändern. Am 9. November beginnt das “Dritte Plenum des 18. Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei”. Die Zusammenkunft der Parteikader ist wesentlich spannender, als der sperrige Titel vermuten lässt, denn hier treffen sich die 376 mächtigsten Männer und Frauen Chinas zu einer ehrgeizigen Konferenz: Sie legen die Umrisse der Wirtschaftspolitik für die kommenden Jahre fest.

Larry Elliott: China prepares to liberalise finance as hedge funds and estate agents salivate (Guardian)

Analysts at Capital Economics say the third plenum will come up with a direction of travel rather than a detailed policy programme. But they expect the new leadership to address three key issues: the low share of national income going to average households; the dominant role of the state in much of the economy; and the inefficient use of capital.

Willy Lam: SOE links threaten china reform drive (Asia Times)

The recent detention of senior executives of the China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) has highlighted a major question about China’s economic plans: Whether the Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang administration has finally decided to restructure the 110 or so yangqi, or state-owned enterprise (SOE) groupings.

A world to turn upside down (Economist)

Of the economic issues facing November’s plenum of the Chinese Communist Party, none looms larger than land reform in the countryside.

Linda Yueh: What to expect from the Third Plenum? (China Policy Institute)

Will 2013 be another 1978 or at least 1993 for China? Third Plenums held in those years resulted in significant overhauls of economic policy. The Third Plenum refers to the third time that the new leaders of China lead a plenary session of the Central Committee. The current one is being billed as being as significant as the one in December 1978 that marked the start of market-oriented reforms in China over 3 decades ago under Deng Xiaoping. Change of a similarly dramatic nature is unlikely, but there are high expectations that the new Chinese leaders will launch reforms that are as notable as those made in 1993, which dismantled a large part of the state-owned sector.

Barry Naughton: What the Heck is China’s ‘Third Plenum’ and Why Should You Care? (ChinaFile)

Gradually—perhaps over three years—China will liberalize interest rates, open up the renminbi capital account and let the renminbi partially float. However, these important changes are already “baked in” and implementation is in the hands of technocrats who can back off if things get rocky.

Chris Luo: Premier Li Keqiang endorses private entrepreneurs, promises further reforms (South China Morning Post)

Felix Lee: Chinas Märchen von der niedrigen Arbeitslosigkeit (Zeit)

Chinas Statistiker haben eine neue Aufgabe: Sie sollen endlich für zuverlässigere Arbeitsmarktdaten sorgen.
Sei Jahrzehnten liegt die Arbeitslosenquote in der Volksrepublik praktisch konstant bei vier Prozent – sowohl in guten als auch in schlechten Zeiten. Vor Beginn der Weltwirtschaftskrise lag sie bei glatten vier Prozent. Nur im Frühjahr 2009 war die Zahl für kurze Zeit nach oben geschossen. Doch schon das erste Konjunkturpaket drückte sie wieder nach unten. Auf wie viel Prozent? Auf vier natürlich! Aktuell liegt die Quote bei 4,1 Prozent. Kein Wunder, dass kaum ein Ökonom, der etwas auf sich hält, die offizielle Arbeitslosenzahl wirklich ernst nimmt.

Außenpolitik und Innenpolitik
Mai 20th, 2013 by Gao

J.B. hat eine Debatte über diese Artikel angeregt:
Susanna Bastaroli: Expertin: „China will nicht so zahnlos wie die Europäer werden“ (Presse)

Laut China-Expertin Weigelin-Schwierdzik dienen Chinas Kriegsdrohungen in Asien der Legitimation einer zunehmend schwächelnden KP. Die Dynamik könnte außer Kontrolle geraten.

Angela Köhler: Wie Japans Umgang mit der Geschichte die Zukunft blockiert (Presse)

Immer wieder sorgt der undiplomatische Umgang japanischer Politiker mit der schmutzigen Vergangenheit für heftige Empörung in den früheren Opferstaaten.

Wolfgang Greber: Die Angst der amerikanischen Admiräle (Presse)

Noch sind die USA im Verbund mit Alliierten wie Japan und Australien Herren des Pazifiks. An deren Thron rüttelt China aber gewaltig.

Zwei Literaturhinweise von H.K.; zunächst zum Thema:
David Shambaugh: China Goes Global. Oxford University Press, 2013.
Ebenfalls lesenswert:
David Shambaugh: China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. University of California Press, 2009.

XVIII. Parteitag der KPCh
Mai 16th, 2013 by Gao

Bruce Gilley: 18th Party Congress to Showcase Rising Status of Private Business (Jamestown Foundation)

Arbeiterklasse und Partei
Mai 16th, 2013 by Gao

Fred Engst: An Investigation of the Relationship Between the Working Class and Its Party Under Socialism / 阳和平: 社会主义时期工人阶级和其政党关系的探析 附录:井冈山精神的三个支点:士兵委员会被忽视了 (China Left Review)

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