Bildungswesen in Xinjiang
Jun 6th, 2017 by Gao

Die chinesische Regierung hat seit einigen Jahren Absolvent_innen der sogenannten „zweisprachigen“ Mittelschulen systematisch privilegiert. (Das sind Mittelschulen, deren Zweisprachigkeit darin besteht, dass die Muttersprache der Schüler_innen nicht Chinesisch, die Unterrichtssprache jedoch ausschließlich Chinesisch ist.)

Adrian Zenz: Problematic Privilege in Xinjiang (Diplomat)

On April 12, China’s Ministry of Education announced that the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the restive Muslim province in China’s far west, would no longer provide added points to university entrance exam applicants from bilingual educational tracks. Bilingual education was established in 2004 with the aim to promote Chinese language education among the region’s ethnic minorities, especially the Uyghurs. In the bilingual system, the role of the minority language is typically restricted to that of a single language subject, creating a highly immersive Chinese language environment.

2016年新疆高考各批次录取分数线正式公布(新疆维吾尔自治区教育厅 / Xinjiang Uyƣur Aptonom Rayonluⱪ maarip nazariti)




James Leibold: Ethnic Policy in China: Is Reform Inevitable? Policy Studies 68 (2013) (PDF, East-West Centre)

There are … signs that interethnic conflict may be growing as free-market forces and increased interethnic communication and mobility intensifies ethnic-based competition… Amid this perception of crisis, Chinese academics, policymakers, and other thought-leaders are engaged in unprecedented debate over the future direction of their country’s ethnic policies… A “melting pot” model is increasingly being accepted as better for de-emphasizing ethnic consciousness, improving ethnic relations and solidifying national unity in the long run… Barry Sautman argues that [these] proposals to “curb minority rights” “emanate from a small number of Chinese academics” yet “reflect a prominent strand of thinking about ethnic policies”.

Ma Rong: The development of minority education and the practice of bilingual education in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. (PDF, Case Western Reserve University)

Landwirtschaft | Hongkong | Korea | Philippinen
Okt 19th, 2016 by Gao

Robert B. Marks: Modern China’s agricultural contradictions / 现代中国的农业矛盾 (ChinaDialogue)

The People’s Republic had to overcome massive environmental degradation and poor quality farmland to drive its industrial transformation

Francesco Sisci: Expect a power struggle at China’s next party plenum (Asia Times)

It is a strange situation: Xi sits on all the power—none of his opponents has enough strength to topple him—but the antagonists can muster enough force to slow down or stop Xi’s plans for change. The vested interests in the country and the party are well rooted, widespread, and unwilling to give up all of their privileges and money for the general benefit of the country – or what they may believe are Xi’s personal ambitions. It is almost a political deadlock, and for both Xi and his opponents, it may be a fight to the bitter end.

Tom Phillips: Rebel Hong Kong politicians defy China at chaotic swearing-in ceremony (Guardian)

Pro-democracy politicians cross fingers and make protest signs and subversive references to Beijing’s authoritarian rulers.

Benny Kung: HK pro-independence lawmakers prevented from retaking oath (Asia Times)

Two pro-independence Hong Kong lawmakers were denied the chance to swear themselves into office on Wednesday after their pro-Beijing peers walked out of the chamber in protest at the duo’s anti-China sentiment.

Hong Kong lawmakers walk out to block swearing-in of democracy activists (Guardian)

Reuters: US and South Korea will ‚pay the price‘ for missile system, China paper says (Guardian)

Noel Tarrazona: Did the US end military drills over Duterte’s China pivot? (Asia Times)

Last Tuesday (Oct 11) was significant for the Philippines. The day marked the early end to the US-Philippines military drills which was supposed to go on till Oct 12…
There may be genuine reasons for this change of plans but many Filipinos and the outside world immediately linked it with Duterte’s recent statement that this would be the last military drill between the two countries.

Wirtschaft | Korruptionsbekämpfung
Sep 26th, 2015 by Gao

Ralf Ruckus: China Crash – Der Umbau der Wirtschaft stockt (gongchao)

In den Tagen der Panikverkäufe und platzenden Blasen wirkten die chinesischen Börsen wie Spielbanken, in denen beim Roulette auf mögliche Wirtschaftstrends gesetzt wurde. Hinter dem Auf und Ab der Kurse stehen wirtschaftspolitische Manöver der herrschenden Kommunistischen Partei Chinas (KPCh) und anderer Spieler sowie langfristige Entwicklungen des chinesischen Kapitalismus.

William H. Overholt: The politics of China’s anti-corruption campaign (East Asia Forum)

Chinese ‘corruption’ is overwhelmingly graft, whereas in, for instance, the Philippines under former president Ferdinand Marcos, and in India, corruption in the narrow sense predominates. Many important Marcos-era projects were designed to fail, leaving the government in debt. In China, good roads and ports get built consistently. In India they don’t. Likewise with primary education and international sporting events.
More costly still, Japan has what’s termed ‘structural corruption’. A few major interest groups dominate the legislature to the extent that they can pervert national policy to their benefit…
In China, the scale of graft has become potentially fatal for the regime. Some claim that China’s authoritarian system inevitably causes extreme corruption and a democratic China would be much cleaner. But poor democracies typically have much more crippling corruption than China. In these countries, there are few or no political contributions other than bribes or candidate self-funding and the complexity of democratic judicial systems makes it difficult to convict criminals, which empowers wealthy criminality.

Luftverschmutzung | Xi Jinping
Apr 2nd, 2015 by Gao



Charles Liu: Peking University Report Says Government is Lying about Air Pollution Problem (Nanfang)

An air quality report published by a Peking University research group has taken the government to task over its pollution data, saying the problem is worse than the government is admitting and that measures to clean up Beijing’s smoggy skies aren’t working.
Titled “Air Quality Assessment Report”, the research group found that the average daily reading of PM 2.5 levels in Beijing last year was 98.57, 15 percent higher than the government statistics that say 85.9…
This signifies that despite adopting extreme measures in Beijing to fight against air pollution for the past two years, the situation has not changed.

Willy Lam: Xi Jinping Forever (Foreign Policy)

Is China’s increasingly powerful president angling to break tradition and extend his rule indefinitely?
Foreign and Chinese observers surprised at Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s maneuvers to shake up the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) — and at the same time arrogate powers of the party, state, and military to himself — may be in for another shock. Just two and a half years into his reign, Xi appears to be angling to break the 10-year-tenure rule for the country’s supreme leader, with the aim of serving longer than any Chinese ruler in decades.
According to three sources close to top CCP officials, Xi and several top aides are making plans to ensure that the strongman will rule until at least 2027, when he will still be a relatively sprightly 74 years old.

Jan 24th, 2014 by Gao

R.G. hat diesen Link geschickt:
Christoph Heinzle: Die Prinzlinge und ihre Auslandskonten (NDR)
Dazu die Artikel in der Süddeutschen:
OffshoreLeaks (Süddeutsche)
Bastian Brinkmann, Christoph Giesen, Bastian Obermayer, Frederik Obermaier: Chinas Elite hortet Geld in Steueroasen / 中国秘密离岸避税港一一中国政府官员、太子党和富商如何为其资产避税 (Süddeutsche)

Chinas Machtelite wickelt offenbar seit etlichen Jahren heimlich und in großem Stil lukrative Geschäfte über Steueroasen ab. Auch nahe Verwandte wichtiger chinesischer Politiker steuern Transaktionen über anonyme Briefkastenfirmen in der Karibik. Das geht aus bislang vertraulichen Unterlagen – den sogenannten Offshore-Leaks-Daten – hervor.
In den Dokumenten tauchen neben dem Schwager des amtierenden Staatschefs Xi Jinping auch der Sohn, die Tochter und der Schwiegersohn von Ex-Premierminister Wen Jiabao auf. Der Name der Tochter des früheren Premiers Li Peng steht ebenso in den Unterlagen wie der Name eines Neffen zweiten Grades von Ex-Staatschef Hu Jintao. Selbst der Name eines der Schwiegersöhne des einstigen Reformers Deng Xiaoping findet sich in den Papieren. Zudem sind etliche Mitglieder des Nationalen Volkskongresses gelistet, genauso wie einige der reichsten Männer und Frauen des Landes sowie Führungskräfte staatlicher Unternehmen, die in Korruptionsskandale verwickelt waren.
Bei Offshore-Geschäften soll es gängige Praxis von Politikern sein, Firmen auf Namen von Angehörigen laufen zu lassen, um bei Enthüllungen nicht selbst mit diesen in Verbindung gebracht werden zu können. Auf Anfrage äußerte sich keine der betroffenen Politikerfamilien. Die Dokumente belegen auch, wie viel Mühe einflussreiche Chinesen offenkundig darauf verwenden, ihren Reichtum vor den Augen der Öffentlichkeit zu verbergen.

An der langen Liste der unter der Führung des ICIJ an den Recherchen beteiligten kann man die Größe des Projektes ersehen:

International Consortium for Investigative Journalism (USA): Leaked Records Reveal Offshore Holdings of China’s Elite / 中国离岸金融解密
Asahi Shimbun (Japan): 租税回避地、根を張る中国マネー 7千社が本土と関連
BBC (Großbritannien): Report reveals offshore dealings of China’s elite
CBC (Kanada): Offshore assets of China’s elite revealed in leaked records
Tiānxià zázhì / Commonwealth Magazine (Taiwan): 國庫十年流失三千億? / Taiwan’s NT$300 Billion Drain
L’Espresso (Italien): China Leaks: i soldi degli oligarchi nei paradisi fiscali
Global Mail (Australien): China’s Elite Master the Secret Offshore Cash Stash
Guardian (Großbritannien): China’s princelings storing riches in Caribbean offshore haven
Le Matin (Schweiz): Comment Credit Suisse fait son nid en Chine
Ming Pao (Hongkong): 密檔證溫家寶婿擁BVI公司 轉售股份涉溫家好友 曾向摩通收千萬顧問費
Le Monde (Frankreich): OffshoreLeaks : révélations sur l’argent caché des « princes rouges » chinois / 机密文件披露中国精英的海外资产 两万多名中国内地及香港投资者在避税天堂注册公司
Norddeutscher Rundfunk (BRD): „Offshore-Leaks“: Steueroasen und Strohmänner
Nyusŭt‘ap‘a – Korea Center for Investigative Journalism (Südkorea): 시진핑 등 中 최고위층 일가 조세피난처 行
El Pais (Spanien): La élite del régimen chino oculta empresas en paraísos fiscales
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (Philippinen): Leaked Records Reveal Offshore Holdings of China’s Elite
Le Soir (Belgien): Chinaleaks: les secrets offshore de la Chine
SonntagsZeitung (Schweiz): Die Geschäfte der CS mit den Prinzlingen
Süddeutsche Zeitung (BRD): Chinas Elite hortet Geld in Steueroasen
Trouw (Niederlande): De rode adel gaat offshore

Im Oktober 2012 hatte die New York Times einen ähnlichen Bericht veröffentlicht:
David Barboza: Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader (New York Times)

Kommende Revolution? Neoautoritarismus?
Dez 7th, 2013 by Gao

Daniel Morley, Congyue Dai: China: Growing Strikes, Corruption and Debt are Harbingers of coming Revolution (International Marxist Tendency)

Six months into China’s new Politburo Standing Committee under Xi Jinping’s Presidency, it has become abundantly clear that the next ten years under his rule will not resemble the relative social stability and rapid growth of the past ten years. The cart will not keep on rolling down the same path. Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party stand at a crossroads, facing that classic dilemma of all ruling classes – either to open up to democratic reform or clamp down on growing dissent?

Chris Buckley: Xi, in ‘Godfather’ Mold, Looks Assertive and Even Imperial (New York Times)

Mr. Xi emerged from a four-day meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee stronger. He won endorsement for a new national security commission that is likely to enhance his influence, as well as for a leadership group on reform that could give him a more direct say in economic policy, which has tended to be the prime minister’s domain. …
“Xi sees power in very personal terms and seems ready to act on that understanding,” said Joseph Fewsmith, a professor at Boston University who specializes in Chinese elite politics. “Whether that is good for China is another question.”
Xiao Gongqin, one of China’s most prominent proponents of “neo-authoritarianism,” thinks Mr. Xi is very a good thing: a new incarnation of his idea of a model leader, Deng Xiaoping.

Nov 28th, 2012 by Gao

Xi Jinping: Bericht auf dem XVIII. Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas ( / 十八大报告全文英汉对照 Full text of Hu’s report at 18th Party Congress (Xinhua / China Daily)
习近平在中央政治局常委中外记者见面会上的讲话 Full text of Xi’s address to the media (Xinhua / China Daily)

Lutz Pohle: Chinas Führung vor enormen Aufgaben (Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung / Reihe standpunkte International)
Michael Roberts: China’s transition: new leaders, old policies (blog)
AU Loong-Yu: The Fall of Socialism in One City And the Fight over Succession in China (Europe solidaire sans frontières)
Heiko Khoo: Hu Jintao and the Scientific Outlook on Socialist Development (
Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik: Chinesische PR-Arbeit. Warum der 18. Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas auch die Europäer interessieren sollte (Wiener Zeitung)
Richard Trappl: „Stimmen mehr Gewicht geben“ – Experte zum 18. Parteitag (Radio China International)
Johannes Kuhn, Wolfgang Kubin: „Die Intellektuellen wollen ihren Besitzstand wahren“ (Süddeutsche)

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