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Bildungswesen in Xinjiang
Jun 6th, 2017 by Gao

Die chinesische Regierung hat seit einigen Jahren Absolvent_innen der sogenannten „zweisprachigen“ Mittelschulen systematisch privilegiert. (Das sind Mittelschulen, deren Zweisprachigkeit darin besteht, dass die Muttersprache der Schüler_innen nicht Chinesisch, die Unterrichtssprache jedoch ausschließlich Chinesisch ist.)

Adrian Zenz: Problematic Privilege in Xinjiang (Diplomat)

On April 12, China’s Ministry of Education announced that the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the restive Muslim province in China’s far west, would no longer provide added points to university entrance exam applicants from bilingual educational tracks. Bilingual education was established in 2004 with the aim to promote Chinese language education among the region’s ethnic minorities, especially the Uyghurs. In the bilingual system, the role of the minority language is typically restricted to that of a single language subject, creating a highly immersive Chinese language environment.

2016年新疆高考各批次录取分数线正式公布(新疆维吾尔自治区教育厅 / Xinjiang Uyƣur Aptonom Rayonluⱪ maarip nazariti)

6月26日,自治区招生办公布了2016年新疆普通高考各批次最低投档控制分数线。

第二代民族政策探讨(中国民族宗教网)

第二代民族政策是清华大学国情研究中心主任胡鞍钢与胡联合,以及北京大学社会学系教授马戎提出来的民族政策思路,倡导推行淡化族群意识和56个民族的观念,强化中华民族的身份意识和身份认同,推进中华民族一体化和国家认同的政策。第二代民族政策的指导思想是效仿美国的民族大熔炉模式,不容许任何一个族群生活在一块属于自己的历史疆域内。

James Leibold: Ethnic Policy in China: Is Reform Inevitable? Policy Studies 68 (2013) (PDF, East-West Centre)

There are … signs that interethnic conflict may be growing as free-market forces and increased interethnic communication and mobility intensifies ethnic-based competition… Amid this perception of crisis, Chinese academics, policymakers, and other thought-leaders are engaged in unprecedented debate over the future direction of their country’s ethnic policies… A “melting pot” model is increasingly being accepted as better for de-emphasizing ethnic consciousness, improving ethnic relations and solidifying national unity in the long run… Barry Sautman argues that [these] proposals to “curb minority rights” “emanate from a small number of Chinese academics” yet “reflect a prominent strand of thinking about ethnic policies”.

Ma Rong: The development of minority education and the practice of bilingual education in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. (PDF, Case Western Reserve University)

Maoisten
Apr 12th, 2017 by Gao

Brian Hioe: A Red Star Over China? (New Bloom) 丘琦欣:紅星照耀中國?(破土)

Perhaps one of the most significant intellectual formations operating in today’s world, China’s New Left arose in the 1990s in opposition to the turn of China away from a centrally planned economy and a return to free market principles after the Deng Xiaoping period. More broadly, the New Left project emphasizes the growing disparities between rural and urban areas in post-Deng China, the sacrifice of principles of equality in order to drive toward development, and calls for a critical revaluation of China’s Maoist legacy in light of China’s present—inclusive of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
What is “New Left” is hard to pin down. The name “New Left” was a term appropriated from conservative critics who were quick to claim the New Left to be some form of resurgent Red Guard fanaticism. In that sense, “New Left” may be a misleading term, insofar as the Chinese New Left is a contemporary phenomenon, and one with little to do with the western New Left of the late 1960s. The New Left largely consists of academics, many of which have studied abroad and are influenced by forms of western critical theory. The New Left finds itself in opposition to the “Liberals” who welcome China’s capitalization and call for the institution of western style political reforms along the lines of America or of western European powers.

中國的新左派可說是當代世界中最重要的知識分子群體之一,他們在 1990 年代因為反對中國在鄧小平時代過後放棄計畫經濟,轉向自由市場原理而竄起。更大程度上,新左派的研究課題著重於後鄧小平時期城鄉差距的持續擴大,以及為求發展而犧牲平等原則,並呼籲對毛澤東時代的遺產進行批判性再評價以回應當前局勢,其中包括大躍進和文化大革命。
   「新左派」究竟是什麼,其實很難明確定義。「新左派」一名取自於那些急於將新左派定性為某種紅衛兵狂熱再現的保守派批評者。照那樣說來,「新左派」這個詞恐怕會產生誤導,因為中國的新左派是個當代現象,和 1960 年代晚期西方的新左派幾乎毫無關聯。新左派的成員大多是學者,其中很多人都曾出國留學,受到各種西方批判理論影響。新左派與歡迎中國走向資本主義化,呼籲依照美國及西歐強國的路線進行西方式政治改革的「自由派」彼此對立。

Brian Hioe: Anti-Capitalist Within China, Imperialist Outside of China? (New Bloom) 丘琦欣:中國國內的反資本主義者,出了境外卻是帝國主義者?(破土)

From a left perspective, the Chinese New Left’s critique of capitalism remains quite sympathetic when confined to within China’s borders. With the recent arrest of labor activists in Guangzhou, Chinese New Left publication Ground Breaking, for example, was one of the first to rally for support—even at risk to itself. Ground Breaking has reacted similarly in past incidents in which the Chinese state acts on behalf of capital and against the interests of the working class. Perhaps in this respect, given the threat of state suppression, they are to be praised for their bravery on certain issues. It is the New Left’s international viewpoints, concerning outside of China, which may ultimately be most problematic.

從左翼觀點來看,新左派對資本主義的批判多少還是能引人共鳴的,只要它的適用範圍限於中國國內。比方說,近日多位勞工運動者在廣州被逮捕之後,中國新左派的網刊「破土」(Ground Breaking,GB)是首先發動聲援的,卻不顧自身同樣面臨風險。而在過去幾次中國政府為資本利益護航,侵害工人階級利益的事件之中,「破土」也採取了同樣的行動。或許就這點來說,考慮到國家鎮壓的威脅,他們確實應當為了勇於聲援某些議題而得到讚揚。可是新左派的國際主義觀點一旦涉及境外議題,恐怕就再令人存疑不過了。

Chris Buckley: Maoists for Trump? In China, Fans Admire His Nationalist Views (New York Times) 储百亮:特朗普的出现让中国毛左为之一振(New York Times)

They protest, picket and sing to defend Mao’s memory, yearning for the East to be red again. But lately some of China’s Maoists are finding inspiration in an unlikely insurgent in the West: Donald J. Trump.
Mr. Trump “has torn up the old rules of the ruling elites, not just of the capitalist West,” said Zhang Hongliang, a polemicist who is the loudest proponent of what could be loosely called “Maoists for Trump.” In a recent essay, Mr. Zhang lauded the American president as being alone among national leaders daring “to openly promote the political ideas of Chairman Mao.”
President Xi Jinping of China will be sizing up Mr. Trump during a visit to his Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida this week, in the leaders’ first summit meeting. Meanwhile, many ordinary Chinese people have also been taking the measure of the new American president and have been bewildered, incensed and yet, sometimes, inspired.
The global wave of nationalist, anti-establishment sentiment that Mr. Trump rode to power has washed ashore in China, encouraging a hard-left fringe that is hostile to capitalism and Western influence, and that the Communist Party has long sought to cultivate — and contain.

北京——他们用抗议、纠察和歌唱来捍卫对毛泽东的记忆,渴望再现东方红。但最近,让中国的一些毛派人士为之一振的,是西方世界里的一个出人意料的叛逆者:唐纳德·J·特朗普(Donald J. Trump)。
   特朗普“不仅撕裂了西方资本主义世界的旧有规则,还撕裂了统治精英的旧有规则,”能言善辩的“拥护特朗普的毛派”中坚力量张宏良说。在前不久的一篇文章里,张宏良称赞特朗普是唯一一位“敢于公开宣传毛主席政治理念”的国家领导人。
   中美首脑首次峰会于下周在佛罗里达州马阿拉歌庄园举行之际,到访的中国国家主席习近平将对特朗普作出评估。与此同时,很多普通的中国人也在掂量新上台的美国总统的斤两,他或许让他们困惑,或许激起了他们的怒火,但有时也能让他们感到振奋。
   把特朗普送上了权力巅峰的民族主义和反建制情绪正在全球泛滥,中国也不例外。这种潮流让敌视资本主义和西方影响的中国极左派人士受到了鼓励,他们是共产党一直在培育——以及限制——的一个边缘群体。

Planwirtschaft?
Jun 23rd, 2015 by Gao

Ein neuerer Artikel von Heiko Khoo (s. u.) greift diese Debatte von Ende letzten Jahres auf:
Sebastian Heilmann, Oliver Melton: The Reinvention of Development Planning in China, 1993–2012. In: Modern China 39 (November 2013), S. 580–628.

In studies of China’s economic rise and political system, multiyear comprehensive and sectoral plans issued by the national government tend to be played down as futile efforts at reigning in a political economy increasingly driven by market incentives and decentralized decisions. Contrary to this, we provide evidence that China’s planning system has been transformed alongside the economic transition, yet remains central to almost all domains of public policy making and the political institutions that have fostered China’s high-speed growth and economic stability. The incorporation of experimental programs into macro-plans, a tiered hierarchy of policy oversight, newly introduced mid-course plan evaluations, and systematic top-level policy review have allowed Chinese planners to play a central role in economic policy making without succumbing to the rigidity traps that debased traditional planned economies. By better understanding how the planning cycle influences incentives and resources of successive layers of bureaucracies and jurisdictions, and how it updates itself and adapts to new challenges, it is possible to explain a greater proportion of the Chinese policy-making process, including many of its successes and pathologies.

Hu Angang: The Distinctive Transition of China’s Five-Year Plans. Modern China 39 (November 2013), S. 629–639.

China has taken a distinctive path of economic transition, combining both the market and the plan. In introducing the market mechanism, the government has not abandoned the planning mechanism, as was done in other socialist countries, but instead has reformed it. The five-year plan has thus been transformed from economic planning to public affairs governance planning. Today the plan and the market are combined so that the two supplement and stimulate each other.

Barry Naughton: The Return of Planning in China. Comment on Heilmann–Melton and Hu Angang. In: Modern China 39 (November 2013), S. 640–652.

Heilmann and Melton break important new ground in describing the revival of development planning in China and showing how planning is now interwoven with other aspects of the political system, particularly policy formulation and cadre evaluation. Clarification of the instruments planners use and their link to developmental outcomes would improve the argument. Although planners believe their plans are consistent with a market economy, it may turn out that the revival of planning after 2003 was purchased at the cost of significant distortions in the market economy and reduced efficiency.

Heiko Khoo: China’s modern planning system (China.org.cn)

The 12th Five-Year Plan comes to a close this year and the 13th Five-Year Plan is being elaborated, so it is worth looking at how China’s planning system functions so we can better understand the forces driving China’s economy.

Rede vom 18. August und „Dokument Nr. 9“
Okt 22nd, 2013 by Gao

Joseph Fewsmith hat gestern einen Vortrag in Wien gehalten. Hier ist einer seiner jüngsten Artikel:
Joseph Fewsmith: Debating Constitutional Government (China Leadership Monitor)

Rather than pull public opinion together, Xi Jinping’s 习近平 call for realizing the “China Dream” seems to have revealed the depth of cleavage among China’s intellectuals. The newspaper Southern Weekend set off a drama when it responded by writing a New Year’s editorial calling the China Dream the dream of constitutional government, only to have provincial propaganda authorities rewrite it beyond recognition before publication. Subsequently, Xi Jinping authorized a sharp attack on “Western values,” including constitutionalism. This internal talk, written into the now infamous “Document No. 9,” prompted several publications to run articles against constitutionalism, provoking liberal intellectuals to defend the idea. This deep divide suggests there is increasingly little middle ground left among China’s intellectuals, while the backing of different views by different officials reflects a politicization of seemingly intellectual debates. These debates are ultimately about the legitimacy of the government and thus reflect fragility in the political system.

Wikipedia über das vielzitierte „Dokument Nr. 9“:
关于当前意识形态领域情况的通报 (Wikipedia)

关于当前意识形态领域情况的通报,簡稱9號文件,是2013年5月由中共中央办公厅印发的一份旨在通报意识形态领域情况的文件。

《明鏡月刊》獨家全文刊發中共9號文件(墙外楼)
《明鏡月刊》獨家全文刊發中共9號文件(拉清單)

今年春天以來,國內和海外即盛傳中共高層下發文件, 要求“七不講”,一些網絡活躍人士並披露了“七不講”的具體內容,但是一直沒有得到官方權威證實。是真是假?衆說紛紜。於2013年8月上旬最新出版的 《明鏡月刊》43期,獨家全文刊發了中共中央9號文件,人們才得知“七不講”的源頭——雖然措辭和文意在坊間流傳過程中,已經與原來的論述有了出入。

Zur ebenfalls vielzitierten Rede Xi Jinpings vom 19. August 2013:
学习贯彻习近平总书记8·19重要讲话精神(人民网)

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