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Gesellschaftliche Bonität
Nov 13th, 2017 by Gao

国务院关于印发社会信用体系建设规划纲要(2014—2020年)的通知(中华人民共和国中央政府)

社会信用体系是社会主义市场经济体制和社会治理体制的重要组成部分。它以法律、法规、标准和契约为依据,以健全覆盖社会成员的信用记录和信用基础设施网络为基础,以信用信息合规应用和信用服务体系为支撑,以树立诚信文化理念、弘扬诚信传统美德为内在要求,以守信激励和失信约束为奖惩机制,目的是提高全社会的诚信意识和信用水平。
  加快社会信用体系建设是全面落实科学发展观、构建社会主义和谐社会的重要基础,是完善社会主义市场经济体制、加强和创新社会治理的重要手段,对增强社会成员诚信意识,营造优良信用环境,提升国家整体竞争力,促进社会发展与文明进步具有重要意义。
  根据党的十八大提出的“加强政务诚信、商务诚信、社会诚信和司法公信建设”,党的十八届三中全会提出的“建立健全社会征信体系,褒扬诚信,惩戒失信”,《中共中央 国务院关于加强和创新社会管理的意见》提出的“建立健全社会诚信制度”,以及《中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要》(以下简称“十二五”规划纲要)提出的“加快社会信用体系建设”的总体要求,制定本规划纲要。规划期为2014—2020年。

Übersetzung ins Englische:
Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020) (China Copyright and Media)
国务院关于促进市场公平竞争维护市场正常秩序的若干意见(中华人民共和国中央政府)

以邓小平理论、“三个代表”重要思想、科学发展观为指导,深入学习领会党的十八大、十八届二中、三中全会精神,贯彻落实党中央和国务院的各项决策部署,围绕使市场在资源配置中起决定性作用和更好发挥政府作用,着力解决市场体系不完善、政府干预过多和监管不到位问题,坚持放管并重,实行宽进严管,激发市场主体活力,平等保护各类市场主体合法权益,维护公平竞争的市场秩序,促进经济社会持续健康发展。……
充分发挥市场在资源配置中的决定性作用,把该放的权力放开放到位,降低准入门槛,促进就业创业。法不禁止的,市场主体即可为;法未授权的,政府部门不能为。……
充分发挥法律法规的规范作用、行业组织的自律作用、舆论和社会公众的监督作用,实现社会共同治理,推动市场主体自我约束、诚信经营。……
立足于促进企业自主经营、公平竞争,消费者自由选择、自主消费,商品和要素自由流动、平等交换,建设统一开放、竞争有序、诚信守法、监管有力的现代市场体系,加快形成权责明确、公平公正、透明高效、法治保障的市场监管格局……

Übersetzung ins Englische:
Opinions of the State Council on Promoting Fair Market Competition and Maintaining the Normal Market Order (北大法律英文网)
Rachel Botsman: Big data meets Big Brother as China moves to rate its citizens (Wired)

The Chinese government plans to launch its Social Credit System in 2020. The aim? To judge the trustworthiness – or otherwise – of its 1.3 billion residents.
Imagine a world where many of your daily activities were constantly monitored and evaluated: what you buy at the shops and online; where you are at any given time; who your friends are and how you interact with them; how many hours you spend watching content or playing video games; and what bills and taxes you pay (or not). It’s not hard to picture, because most of that already happens, thanks to all those data-collecting behemoths like Google, Facebook and Instagram or health-tracking apps such as Fitbit. But now imagine a system where all these behaviours are rated as either positive or negative and distilled into a single number, according to rules set by the government. That would create your Citizen Score and it would tell everyone whether or not you were trustworthy. Plus, your rating would be publicly ranked against that of the entire population and used to determine your eligibility for a mortgage or a job, where your children can go to school – or even just your chances of getting a date.

Mirjam Meissner: China’s Social Credit System (PDF; Mercator Institute for China Studies)

Under the catchphrase “Social Credit System,” China is currently implementing a new and highly innovative approach to monitoring, rating, and regulating the behavior of market participants. The Social Credit System will have significant impact on the behavior of individuals, companies, and other institutions, such as NGOs. Despite much international attention on the impact of the system for individuals, the core motivation behind the Social Credit System is to more effectively steer the behavior of market participants…
The ultimate goal is to build self-enforcing mechanisms for business regulation: Based on advanced big data technologies, the system is designed to constantly monitor and evaluate companies’ economic as well as non-economic behavior…
The system will create strong incentives for companies to make their business decisions and operations comply not just with laws and regulations but also with the industrial and technological policy targets laid down by the Chinese government…
At the heart of the Social Credit System lies massive data collection on company activities by government agencies and authorized rating entities.

Celia Hatton: China ’social credit‘: Beijing sets up huge system (BBC)

In most countries, the existence of a credit system isn’t controversial. Past financial information is used to predict whether individuals will pay their mortgages or credit card bill in the future.
But China is taking the whole concept a few steps further. The Chinese government is building an omnipotent „social credit“ system that is meant to rate each citizen’s trustworthiness.

Sara Hsu: China’s New Social Credit System (Diplomat)

Despite hyped concerns in the foreign press, little is actually known about China’s plans to rate citizens and firms.

Shazeda Ahmed: Cashless Society, Cached Data: Security Considerations for a Chinese Social Credit System (Citizen Lab)

In an irony that has plagued many a surveillance apparatus, the spread of a social credit system and its associated sensors, QR codes, and other trace-reading tools can create new security concerns separate from those it allegedly aims to reduce through near-ubiquitous monitoring of behavior. These new threats involve the ways in which credit score data can be forged, and the ends toward which fake credit scores may be used. The expedited security check at the Beijing airport for Sesame Credit users with high enough scores who are traveling on domestic flights provides one example of a situation where a falsified high score could enable someone to bypass more rigorous security checks, which can be a threat to national security from a skilled and determined enough actor. The more widely used the social credit system becomes and the greater the range of rewards it may provide high scorers, the more incentives for figuring out how to hack it will proliferate.

Das Ganze erinnert an Black Mirror, 1. Folge, 3. Staffel: Nosedive (dt.: Abgestürzt) vom Oktober 2016.

Militär | Korruption
Feb 16th, 2015 by Gao

Michael S. Chase, Jeffrey Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, Kristen A. Gunness, Scott Warren Harold, Susan Puska, Samuel K. Berkowitz: China’s Incomplete Military Transformation. Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PDF; Rand Corporation)

[T]he new core missions of the PLA are ones that received official recognition under the rubric of former President Hu Jintao’s “New Historic Missions” concept. These missions call on the PLA to perform internal and external missions in peacetime and include “participating in emergency rescue and disaster relief,” both internally in China and increasingly internationally; “subduing subversive and sabotage attempts and cracking down on separatist forces” to support antiterror efforts; “accomplishing security provision and guarding tasks,” both at home and abroad through involvement in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs); “merchant vessel protection” from nonstate actors and possibly state actors; “evacuation of Chinese nationals” for the hundreds of thousands of overseas workers in countries where security has significantly deteriorated; and “security support for China’s interests overseas,” such as protecting maritime commerce through antipiracy operations.
These broad new missions focus specifically on the CCP’s evolving conceptions of how the PLA can “support China’s peaceful development,” on which CCP legitimacy is largely based…
[T]he PLA enjoys an almost absolute immunity from external oversight, budgetary transparency, and/or accountability to the legislature for how it spends its funds and operates. As a consequence, the PLA is believed to be riddled with corruption (…). Examples of such corruption abound, from the 2000 arrest of Ji Shengde, Director of Military Intelligence in the PLA’s General Staff Department (GSD); to the 2012 detention of the former deputy director of the General Logistics Department (GLD), Lieutenant General Gu Junshan; and culminating in the 2014 arrest and expulsion from the Party of former CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou. Xu’s co–Vice Chairman, General Guo Boxiong, is also widely rumored to be under investigation for personal and family members’ corruption (…).
Another tendency is to avoid training sufficiently or under challenging conditions. Often, exercises are seen as failures if “red” (i.e., the PLA) does not win, so exercises are not seen as a chance to identify problems during training that can be remedied before actual wartime operations commence. Additionally, political pressures and a culture of treating exercises and training as opportunities to impress one’s superiors further erode the utility of exercises as tools to surface and address problems in military organization, planning, and execution…
The cornerstone of China’s approach to nuclear weapons, ever since its first nuclear test in 1964, has been its no-firstuse policy. Chinese writings on military strategy and missile force campaigns are generally consistent with this approach… Although its nuclear force is relatively small, China is not standing still.

Katie Hunt: China’s military not ready ‚to fight and win future wars,‘ new report says (CNN)
Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga: U.S. Suggestion For Japanese Patrols in South China Sea Prompts ADIZ Threat (Jamestown China Brief)

A recent U.S. suggestion for Japanese patrols in the South China Sea has elicited a sharp rebuttal by the Chinese government and reignited Chinese media discussion of a South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).

Willy Wo-Lap Lam: Growing Power of Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection Brings Questions of Politically-Motivated Purge (Jamestown China Brief)

[T]he CCDI, which is a secretive Party organ outside the purview of both the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the courts, seems to be an extra-legal institution that derives its authority from just one person: President and Commander-in-Chief Xi…
The CCDI is the only Party or government organ that has its own Organization and Propaganda offices, which were set up in March 2013. This means, for example, that the CCDI leadership can recruit cadres outside the established channels of the CCP Organization Department…
Starting late last year, the CCDI has stationed sub-offices in a number of top Party and government units. These include the CCP Central Committee’s General Office, the Organization Department and the Propaganda Department…
Studies conducted by Ren Jianming, Head of the Clean Governance Research Center at Beijing’s Beihang University, have shown that up to one third of cadres with the rank of ministers or above have accepted bribes and commissions or helped their close relatives and cronies profit in commercial deals. This figure is similar to a 2014 report that quoted an internal document as saying that “more than 30 percent of party, government and military officials were found to be involved in some form of corruption”…
According to the official media, the CCDI last year detained for investigation 42 officials with the rank of vice-ministers and vice-governors or above. This was substantially more than the 17 officials of similar ranks nabbed in 2013—and the comparable annual figure of six to eight during the Jiang and Hu administrations… Senior cadres incriminated in 2014 included a former Politburo Standing Committee member (Zhou Yongkang), a former Politburo member and vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (General Xu Caihou) and two former vice-chairmen of the CPPCC (Ling Jihua and Su Rong). Questions have been asked, however, as to whether Xi and Wang have used the anti-corruption campaign as a weapon to bring down political foes. For example, Zhou, Ling, General Xu and former Politburo member Bo Xilai—who are described as “the new Gang of Four” by the Hong Kong and overseas-Chinese media—are rumored to be leaders of an “anti-Xi Jinping cabal” within the Party (…). It is perhaps not surprising that the two previous Politburo members who went to jail for corruption—former Beijing Party secretary Chen Xitong and former Shanghai Party boss Chen Liangyu—were political foes of ex-presidents Jiang and Hu, respectively…

全国政协原副主席苏荣严重违纪违法被开除党籍和公职(中央纪委监察部)

日前,经中共中央批准,中共中央纪委对全国政协原副主席苏荣严重违纪问题进行了立案审查。

Top China official to face prosecution for corruption (BBC)

Former senior official Su Rong has been expelled from the Chinese Communist Party for corruption and faces prosecution, said the country’s top anti-corruption body.

Celia Hatton: The case against Chinese human rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang (BBC)

Pu Zhiqiang’s blunt weibo messages, many of them expressing frustration with the ruling Chinese Communist Party, are forming the state’s case against him.
Police supplied a short list to Pu Zhiqiang’s lawyer, Mo Shaoping.
„From top to bottom, the Communist Party can’t get through a single day without telling lies,“ he posted on 24 July, 2012.
A few months earlier, on 5 February 2012, he wrote: „We should give Liaoning province and Shandong province to Japan, give some land in the south to Vietnam.
„Control of Beijing can be handed directly over to Washington. I’m willing to guide our guests to these places. As long as I can live better than I am now, I’ll be satisfied“.
Other messages criticise the Chinese government’s policies towards Uighurs, the mainly Muslim minority living in Xinjiang in China’s far west.
„They claim Xinjiang belongs to China. So they shouldn’t treat it like a colony. Don’t be a predator and a conqueror. You treat them as your enemy,“ he wrote on 7 May 2014, referring to strict government restrictions placed on Uighurs…
Mr Pu has been charged with creating a disturbance, inciting ethnic hatred and separatism.

Prozess gegen Ilⱨam Tohti
Sep 18th, 2014 by Gao

Jonathan Kaiman: China begins trial of Ilham Tohti (Guardian)

Chinese authorities began trying the Uighur academic Ilham Tohti on charges of “separatism” on Wednesday morning, in what human rights groups have called a “travesty of justice” that underscores the government’s unwillingness to field even moderate criticisms of its ethnic policies.
Tohti, 44, is being tried at the Urumqi intermediate court in Urumqi, capital of the Xinjiang Uighur autonomous region, more than 1,800 miles (3,000km) west of his home in Beijing. He will almost certainly be convicted; possible sentences range from 10 years to life in prison. He firmly denies the charge.

Uigurischer Regimekritiker vor chinesischem Gericht (Deutsche Welle)
Johnny Erling: Xinjiang will Uigurenanwalt Tohti zum Terroristen stempeln (Standard)
Johhny Erling: China statuiert Exempel an Bürgerrechtler (Welt)
Edward Wong: Uighur Scholar Ilham Tohti Goes on Trial in China on Separatist Charges (New York Times)

Mr. Tohti had been harshly treated throughout the detention, his lawyers say. “He was never allowed to see his family anytime during the eight months of detention,” Mr. Li said. “He was not allowed to meet with lawyers for the first five months.”
Seven students of Mr. Tohti have also been detained, and some have been formally arrested and charged, the parents of one student said in an interview near the courthouse here. The parents said the police in Urumqi had sent them a notice saying their son was being charged with harming the security of the state. They have been unable to contact him since his arrest in Beijing on Jan. 15, they said.

Separatism trial of Uighur professor in China enters second day (AFP/Yahoo)

Nine diplomats from countries including Germany, Britain and Canada travelled to Urumqi to observe the trial but were barred from entering the courtroom.

ئىلھام توختى سوتتا خىتاي تەپتىش ئەمەلدارىنىڭ بارلىق ئەيىبلەشلىرىنى رەت قىلدى (Radio Free Asia)

ئىلھام توختىنىڭ چارشەنبە كۈنى باشلانغان ئۈرۈمچى شەھەرلىك ئوتتۇرا سوت مەھكىمىسىدىكى سوتىنىڭ تۇنجى كۈنى، تەپتىش ئەمەلدارى ئۆزىنىڭ ئەيىبنامىسىنى ئوقۇپ ئۆتۈپ، ئىلھامنى «دۆلەتنى پارچىلاشقا»، «شىنجاڭنى مۇستەقىل قىلىشقا» ئۇرۇنۇش بىلەن ئەيىبلىگەن ۋە بۇ قارىشىنى ئىلگىرى سۈرىدىغان «پاكىتلار» نى ئوتتۇرىغا قويغان. تەپتىش ئەمەلدارى ئەيىبنامىسىدە، ئىلھام توختىنىڭ بۇرۇنقى ئوقۇغۇچىلىرىنىڭ «گۇۋاھلىق» سۆزلىرىنى پاكىت قىلىپ كۆرسىتىپ، بۇنى ئىلھامنىڭ بۆلگۈنچىلىك بىلەن شۇغۇللانغانلىقىنىڭ ئىسپاتى قىلىپ ئوتتۇرىغا قويغان. لېكىن ئىلھام توختىنىڭ ئادۋوكاتى لى فاڭپىڭ ئۇنىڭ ئۆزىگە قارىتىلغان بارلىق ئەيىبلەشنى رەت قىلىدىغانلىقىنى بىلدۈردى.

Timeline of Ilham Tohti’s Case (Human Rights Watch)

Thomas Latschan: Ilham Tohti – der leise Kritiker (Deutsche Welle)

An der Minzu-Universität in Peking untersuchte Tohti unter anderem über mehrere Jahre die soziale Lage der Uiguren in seiner Heimatprovinz Xinjiang. Dabei kam er zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Uiguren in Xinjiang keineswegs den Han-Chinesen gleichgestellt sind. Im Gegenteil: Für Uiguren gebe es weniger Arbeitsplätze, sie würden für die gleiche Arbeit schlechter bezahlt und von den chinesischen Behörden systematisch benachteiligt.
Nach den Unruhen von 2009 wurden die Sicherheitsmaßnahmen in der Provinz Xinjiang massiv verschärft
Wiederholt kritisierte Tohti die Politik der Zentralregierung gegenüber den Uiguren. Im Gegensatz zu anderen uigurischen Regimekritikern – wie der mittlerweile in den USA lebenden Rebiyah Kadeer – gilt er als gemäßigter Regimekritiker, der immer für eine bessere Verständigung zwischen Uiguren und Han-Chinesen geworben hat.

Celia Hatton: Is Ilham Tohti friend or foe of China? (BBC)

So, is Ilham Tohti really a moderate? It depends who you ask.
China’s mission to the EU appears not to think so.
The mission said in August that Mr Tohti had been „personally involved“ in orchestrating two episodes of violence in Xinjiang, diplomatic sources have told the BBC.

Uyghur Scholar Tohti ‚Humiliated‘ in Prison, Shackled Again (Radio Free Asia)
Reuters: Uighur academic held on separatism charges in China kept in shackles (Guardian)

Lawyer for economics professor Ilham Tohti says his client has also been denied warm clothes ahead of his trial this week…
„We intend to send somebody to the trial,“ the EU ambassador to China, Hans Dietmar Schweisgut, told reporters when asked if the EU would dispatch a diplomat to Urumqi even if China did not respond to its request to allow an observer in court.

ئىلھام توختىنىڭ ئايالى گۈزەلنۇر ۋە قېرىنداشلىرى سوتقا قاتنىشىش ئۈچۈن ئۈرۈمچىگە يېتىپ كەلدى (Radio Free Asia)
ئىلھام توختى سوتلانغان كۈنى ئامېرىكا ئەلچىسى ئۈرۈمچىگە كەلگەن (Radio Free Asia)
خەلقئارا جەمئىيەت ۋە قانۇنچىلار ئىلھام توختىنىڭ سوتىغا يېقىندىن كۆڭۈل بۆلمەكتە (Radio Free Asia)

Prinzchenkonten
Jan 24th, 2014 by Gao

R.G. hat diesen Link geschickt:
Christoph Heinzle: Die Prinzlinge und ihre Auslandskonten (NDR)
Dazu die Artikel in der Süddeutschen:
OffshoreLeaks (Süddeutsche)
Bastian Brinkmann, Christoph Giesen, Bastian Obermayer, Frederik Obermaier: Chinas Elite hortet Geld in Steueroasen / 中国秘密离岸避税港一一中国政府官员、太子党和富商如何为其资产避税 (Süddeutsche)

Chinas Machtelite wickelt offenbar seit etlichen Jahren heimlich und in großem Stil lukrative Geschäfte über Steueroasen ab. Auch nahe Verwandte wichtiger chinesischer Politiker steuern Transaktionen über anonyme Briefkastenfirmen in der Karibik. Das geht aus bislang vertraulichen Unterlagen – den sogenannten Offshore-Leaks-Daten – hervor.
In den Dokumenten tauchen neben dem Schwager des amtierenden Staatschefs Xi Jinping auch der Sohn, die Tochter und der Schwiegersohn von Ex-Premierminister Wen Jiabao auf. Der Name der Tochter des früheren Premiers Li Peng steht ebenso in den Unterlagen wie der Name eines Neffen zweiten Grades von Ex-Staatschef Hu Jintao. Selbst der Name eines der Schwiegersöhne des einstigen Reformers Deng Xiaoping findet sich in den Papieren. Zudem sind etliche Mitglieder des Nationalen Volkskongresses gelistet, genauso wie einige der reichsten Männer und Frauen des Landes sowie Führungskräfte staatlicher Unternehmen, die in Korruptionsskandale verwickelt waren.
Bei Offshore-Geschäften soll es gängige Praxis von Politikern sein, Firmen auf Namen von Angehörigen laufen zu lassen, um bei Enthüllungen nicht selbst mit diesen in Verbindung gebracht werden zu können. Auf Anfrage äußerte sich keine der betroffenen Politikerfamilien. Die Dokumente belegen auch, wie viel Mühe einflussreiche Chinesen offenkundig darauf verwenden, ihren Reichtum vor den Augen der Öffentlichkeit zu verbergen.

An der langen Liste der unter der Führung des ICIJ an den Recherchen beteiligten kann man die Größe des Projektes ersehen:

International Consortium for Investigative Journalism (USA): Leaked Records Reveal Offshore Holdings of China’s Elite / 中国离岸金融解密
Asahi Shimbun (Japan): 租税回避地、根を張る中国マネー 7千社が本土と関連
BBC (Großbritannien): Report reveals offshore dealings of China’s elite
CBC (Kanada): Offshore assets of China’s elite revealed in leaked records
Tiānxià zázhì / Commonwealth Magazine (Taiwan): 國庫十年流失三千億? / Taiwan’s NT$300 Billion Drain
L’Espresso (Italien): China Leaks: i soldi degli oligarchi nei paradisi fiscali
Global Mail (Australien): China’s Elite Master the Secret Offshore Cash Stash
Guardian (Großbritannien): China’s princelings storing riches in Caribbean offshore haven
Le Matin (Schweiz): Comment Credit Suisse fait son nid en Chine
Ming Pao (Hongkong): 密檔證溫家寶婿擁BVI公司 轉售股份涉溫家好友 曾向摩通收千萬顧問費
Le Monde (Frankreich): OffshoreLeaks : révélations sur l’argent caché des « princes rouges » chinois / 机密文件披露中国精英的海外资产 两万多名中国内地及香港投资者在避税天堂注册公司
Norddeutscher Rundfunk (BRD): „Offshore-Leaks“: Steueroasen und Strohmänner
Nyusŭt‘ap‘a – Korea Center for Investigative Journalism (Südkorea): 시진핑 등 中 최고위층 일가 조세피난처 行
El Pais (Spanien): La élite del régimen chino oculta empresas en paraísos fiscales
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (Philippinen): Leaked Records Reveal Offshore Holdings of China’s Elite
Le Soir (Belgien): Chinaleaks: les secrets offshore de la Chine
SonntagsZeitung (Schweiz): Die Geschäfte der CS mit den Prinzlingen
Süddeutsche Zeitung (BRD): Chinas Elite hortet Geld in Steueroasen
Trouw (Niederlande): De rode adel gaat offshore

Im Oktober 2012 hatte die New York Times einen ähnlichen Bericht veröffentlicht:
David Barboza: Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader (New York Times)

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