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„Umweltkultur“ und Getreideproduktion
Nov 12th, 2014 by Gao

Zhihe Wang, Huili He, Meijun Fan: The Ecological Civilization Debate in China (Monthly Review)

China is facing many serious environmental issues, including pollution in the air, groundwater, and soil. These problems have increased since China surpassed Japan as the world’s second-largest economy—and in spite of the Chinese government’s 2007 proposal to build an “ecological civilization,” and writing “ecological civilization” into the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) constitution in 2012.

Zhun Xu, Wei Zhang, Minqi Li: China’s Grain Production. A Decade of Consecutive Growth or Stagnation? (Monthly Review)

Some progressive writers have argued that while China’s agricultural privatization achieved short-term gains, it did so by undermining long-term production facilities such as the infrastructure and public services built in the socialist era. Environmental scholars have questioned the sustainability of the Chinese agriculture. In a report published in 1995, Lester R. Brown raised the question: “Who will feed China?” He argued that the Chinese population’s changing diet, shrinking cropland, stagnating productivity, and environmental constraints would lead to a widening gap between China’s food supply and demand, a gap the world’s leading grain exporters would not be able to fill.

Ältere Artikel:
Zhihe Wang: Ecological Marxism in China (Monthly Review)
Wen Tiejun, Lau Kinchi, Cheng Cunwang, Huili He, Qiu Jiansheng: Ecological Civilization, Indigenous Culture, and Rural Reconstruction in China (Monthly Review)
Zhihe Wang, Meijun Fan, Hui Dong, Dezhong Sun, Lichun Li: What Does Ecological Marxism Mean For China? Questions and Challenges for John Bellamy Foster (Monthly Review)

Geopolitik
Okt 22nd, 2014 by Gao

Pierre Rousset: Geopolitical chaos and its implications: introductory notes for collective thinking (International Viewpoint)

Climate chaos is a new structural situation caused by atmospheric warming of human (in fact capitalist) origin. The current geopolitical chaos also seems to be a new structural situation caused by capitalist globalization and the choices imposed by the traditional imperialist bourgeoisies. Because chaos exists, and its causes are deep.

Patrick Bond: BRICS and the tendency to sub-imperialism (Pambazuka)

The rise of the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) bloc represents a potentially important geopolitical and economic force that, in early 2014, suffers a worsening schizophrenia, in terms of positioning within global political economy. The bloc’s more radical proponents argue it has ‘anti-imperialist’ potential. But there are far greater dangers of BRICS playing a ‘sub-imperialist’ role in contributing to neoliberal regime maintenance (especially in Africa), or even an inter-imperialist role as Russia appears tempted in the Ukraine/Crimea theatre. But there is potential, as well, for popular forces to unite in a role more akin to solidaristic cross-border anti-imperialism, given the extreme contradictions and intensity of social unrest in each site.

Pierre Rousset: D’où surgit le nouveau capitalisme chinois ? « Bourgeoisification » de la bureaucratie et mondialisation (Europe solidaire sans frontières)

D’où surgit le nouveau capitalisme chinois, qu’est-ce qui a permis son envol et quelles sont ses particularités ? Quelles interrogations de fond cette expérience contemporaine soulève-t-elle ? Ce sont ces questions que la présente contribution veut aborder.

Pierre Rousset: Chinese ambitions – An imperialism in formation (International Viewpoint)

China is not an „emerging country“ but a power that has emerged. It is not a „sub-imperialism“ ensuring order in its own region, but an imperialism „in formation.“ The new Chinese bourgeoisie is aiming to play in the big league. The success of its enterprise is still far from assured, but this ambition determines its international policies, both economic and military.

Großer Sprung Vorwärts
Sep 29th, 2014 by Gao

孙经先:“饿死三千万”不是事实(《中国社会科学报》)

站在今天的角度看,那三年间出现250万人“营养性死亡”,既是天灾,也是人祸,历
史的教训值得深刻汲取;但是,片面地、无端地夸大非正常死亡人数,并不是严谨的学风,更无助于正确地总结历史的经验教训,坚定今日的前行方向。

孙经先:“中国饿死三千万”的谣言是怎样形成的?(《中国社会科学报》)

最近三十年以来,国内外广泛流传着我国三年困难时期“饿死3000万”的重大谣言。在这一谣言的传播过程中,杨继绳先生的《墓碑》一书起了重大作用。该书认为1958年至1962年中国饿死3600万人。

北原:对“三年困难时期”人口非正常死亡问题的若干解析(《中国社会科学报》, auch bei 新华网 und 人民网

某些西方敌对势力反复炒作中国饿死几千万人,而且一再夸大,把它描述成是中共的“蓄意性罪恶”,企图动摇和否定中国共产党执政的合法性,应当引起人们的高度警觉。……
  第一,1959—1961年三年困难时期,因“左”的错误所造成的农村大量人口非正常死亡现象确实是存在的,损失是极其惨重的,应当永远记取这一教训。……
  第二,这一错误是中国共产党在探索建设社会主义道路过程中所犯的错误。也就是说,既然是探索,就有可能成功,也可能失败。因而,这是一种探索性质的错误。某些西方敌对势力反复炒作中国饿死几千万人,而且一再夸大,把它描述成是中共的“蓄意性罪恶”,企图动摇和否定中国共产党执政的合法性,应当引起人们的高度警觉。

王周生(微博):

“探索性错误”,让我睡不着觉。那时我十几岁,亲见三伯到上海求助,他一家吃了半个月野菜,饿死边缘。家乡启东鱼米之乡,没遭灾,粮食哪里去了?大姐是农村干部,说了真话被批判。几十年来,如此惨烈饿死人事件,却纠缠于数字,责境外反动势力,毫无检讨之意,今又在百姓伤口撒盐,是可忍,孰不可忍!

樊建川(微博):

中国社会科学院,是个啥子科学单位哎?是干啥子活路的哎?科研人员多不多哎?有啥子推动社会的贡献哎?财政一年拿好多钱来养他哎?相当于旧社会的啥子衙门哎?相当于国外的啥子单位哎?宣称阶级斗争仍然是主线索的王伟光院长是啥子级别、啥子阶级哎??

„Chinesischer Imperialismus“?
Jul 27th, 2014 by Gao

Pierre Rousset: Chinese ambitions – An imperialism in formation (Europe solidaire sans frontières)

China is not an “emerging country” but a power that has emerged. It is not a “sub-imperialism” ensuring order in its own region, but an imperialism “in formation.” The new Chinese bourgeoisie is aiming to play in the big league. The success of its enterprise is still far from assured, but this ambition determines its international policies, both economic and military.

Michael Pröbsting: China’s Emergence as an 
Imperialist Power (New Politics)

One of the most important issues in world politics today is China’s rise as a great imperialist power. Most left-wing writers consider China either as a “socialist country,” a “deformed workers’ state,” or as a “dependent capitalist country” exploited by Western monopolies. As I have elaborated elsewhere, I believe that such analyses, positions, and terminology deriving from Communist, post-Trotskyist, and dependency theorists fail to understand China’s transformation into an imperialist Great Power during the past decade.

Debatte über den Yue-Yuen-Streik
Apr 29th, 2014 by Gao

Michael bzw. Cathy hat diesen Artikel geschickt:
Ashok Kumar: 5 reasons the strike in China is terrifying! (to transnational capitalism) (Communists in situ, 25. April 2014)

1. It’s the largest strike in modern China…
2. Chinese state repression is tempered…
3. It’s too big to cut-and-run…
4. The price of consumer durables is rising…
5. It’s gone global…

Es gibt eine Debatte über Erfolg oder Misserfolg des Streikes bei Yue Yuen (Yùyuán 裕元). Daniel hat auf dieses Interview hingewiesen:
与裕元一位老工人的深度访谈 (公平社,27. April 2014)

小邱:这次罢工失败的原因是什么?这次罢工之后会不会裁一批工人?
裕友:主要原因是:1.政府强力打压,甚至警察封住厂门不让员工出来,到车间强迫工人复工。2.部分工人受前述情况影响,产生悲观、畏惧和失败情绪,觉得反正搞不赢了,捞了230元,见好就收,无奈复工。
裁人很难说。我们25日才正式复工,台湾佬就宣布以后控制加班,周末只有确实很急的工作才可以报加班。果然不出所料,台湾佬要秋后算帐了。控制加班明显是秋后算账。加班成了他们手里的一根骨头。
小邱:今天(26日)复工了,这次“12天的休假”结束了,大家是什么心情?复工后又有什么情况?经过大罢工后,工人有什么新的想法?
裕友:大家虽然复工了,但心里都憋着一股怨气。今天大家心里都特别难受,感到很屈辱。表面看来,罢工已平息,但矛盾仍然存在,问题没解决,员工怨气很大。尤其是对政府强势介入打压员工非常不满。所有人都感觉到愤怒,尤其是被强迫劳动!
听说老三厂25日有些人复工,下班后听说是有强迫复工的干部被打了,组长级别以上的干部下班都有警察护送。26日警察就到各厂找积极分子问话,据我所知,G3模具厂有个钳工就被问话了,并且在问话记录上按了手印,还要了他的QQ号。YY3模具厂有三个积极分子被叫到写字楼问话,被警告,鞋厂很多员工被叫到写字楼问话,被警告。(小邱:你不算积极分子吧?)很可惜,我还算不上。罢工期间我曾在网上指责警察强迫员工复工,不晓得会不会找我?
这次罢工只是在强势打压下被迫复工的,问题依然没得到解决。本来只是单纯的劳资纠纷,却由于政府的强势打压,导致更多人对政府和资方的不满。可说,这次罢工事件是三败俱伤,员工被打压,资方需付出几十亿的补偿和罚款/滞纳金,政府的威信下降。
小邱:但是你想过没有,这次罢工也使许多工人觉醒。之前那种对官方包括总工会、甚至对警察的幻想,现在都破灭了,这种觉悟会让下次斗争更有力量,至少思想上不再那么软弱。
裕友:是的。这次罢工的前期,员工还企望政府协调,当工会介入后镇压加剧,员工看清了政府的真正面目,他们就是资方的打手和走狗。
可以说,只是明火被扑灭了,仍有暗藏的火种,下次遇到诱因,可能会更加爆发!而且经过这次的洗礼,下次的罢工,肯定会更有组织性和战斗力!

Heiko hingegen hat diese Links geschickt:
Stephanie Won, Ben Livesey, John Lear: Yue Yuen Says 80% of Workers Return After Plant Strike (Bloomberg, 25. April 2014)
China Confirms Strike-Struck Shoemaker Yue Yuen Owes Social Benefits (Wall Street Journal, 24./27. April 2014)
Dongguan union releases response to Yue Yuen workers’ demands (China Labor Watch, 24. April 2014)

Rolf wies darauf hin, dass das Arbeitsministerium auf Seiten der Arbeiter interveniert hat:
Jill Geoghegan: Strike ends at Adidas and Nike supplier in China (Drapers, 29. April 2014)

Weitere Artikel:
Felix Lee: Streiks in chinesischer Turnschuhfabrik (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 18. April 2014)
王传涛:“裕元鞋厂大罢工”是工人维权意识的苏醒 (人民日报海外版~劳工互助网, 19. April 2014)
Felix Lee: „Sie betrügen uns alle zusammen“ (Südwest Presse [sic], 23. April 2014)
Adidas shifts orders from striking Yue Yuen factory in Dongguan (Global Times, 24. April 2014)
广东省总工会主席黄业斌:裕元鞋厂“目前已有90%的员工复工” (劳工互助网, 24. April 2014)
Felix Lee: China hat ein riesiges Rentenproblem (Zeit, 25. April 2014)
Stefan Sauer: Grobes Foul von Adidas (Frankfurter Rundschau, 25. April 2014)
AFP: Huge China strike peters out as workers cite intimidation (Breitbart, 28. April 2014)
William Hurst: Chinese factory strike portends global workplace changes (AlJazeera, 28. April 2014)
Jonathan Sullivan, Samantha Hoffman: China can’t ignore workers‘ well-being if it wants to avert strikes (South China Morning Post, 28./29. April 2014)
Markus Ackeret: Streik-Ende unter dem Druck des Staates (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 29. April 2014)
AFP: Huge China strike peters out as workers cite intimidation (NDTV, 28. April 2014)
Yue Yuen Workers Won’t Cry (China Labour Net, 28. April 2014)

Workshop: Zur Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in China (Nachschau)
Mrz 14th, 2014 by Gao

Workshop: Zur Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in China (Universität Wien)
Samstag, 22. Februar 2014, 9–17 Uhr, Amerlinghaus Stiftgasse 8, 1070 Wien. Mit Can Cui, Hermann Dworczak, Daniel Fuchs, Rolf Geffken, Thomas Immervoll und Felix Wemheuer. Eine Veranstaltung der China Study Group Europe mit Unterstützung der Marx-Engels-Stiftung (Wuppertal), von transform!europe und transform!at.

Zur Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in China 中国工人阶级状况

Videoaufnahmen einiger Vorträge jetzt auf YouTube:

  • Thomas Immervoll: Die Fragmentierung der Arbeiter_innenklasse in China – Zur Entwicklung des Arbeitsmarktes und des informellen Sektors (YouTube)
  • Can Cui: WanderarbeiterInnen der zweiten Generation (YouTube)
  • Hermann Dworczak: Chinesische ArbeiterInnenklasse und Weltproletariat (YouTube)
  • Rolf Geffken: Neue Arbeits- und Sozialgesetze – emanzipatorisches Potenzial? (YouTube)
  • Felix Wemheuer: Die Dynamik der Protestbewegungen 1956/1957, 1967/1968 und 1989 (YouTube)
  • Heiko Khoo: Die Arbeiterklasse und der widersprüchliche Charakter des Staates (YouTube)
  • Heiko Khoo hat ein Interview mit Theodor Bergmann veröffentlicht:
    Heiko Khoo: Theodor Bergmann: A revolutionary communist since 1927 (China.org.cn)

    Cao Zhenglu
    Nov 17th, 2013 by Gao

    Yan Hairong: Rethinking Is Not Demonizing (Monthly Review)

    Cao Zhenglu is a well-known contemporary Chinese realist writer. His stories “Na’er” (“There,” about the tragic experience of a union cadre in a state-owned enterprise undergoing “structural reform”) and “Nihong” (“Neon,” about the life and death of a laid-off woman worker) expose the predicament of Chinese workers in the reform period. His novel Wen cangmang (Asking the Boundless—an allusion to a line from one of Mao’s poems, “I ask, on this boundless land, who rules over man’s destiny”) has a Taiwanese-owned factory in Shenzhen as the central theater, around which different characters struggle to understand and play their roles in the larger context of “investment.” This novel has been celebrated as “the first novel that uses Chinese reality to explain Das Kapital.” His most recent novel, Minzhu ke (Lessons in Democracy [Taipei: Taiwan shehui yanjiu zazhishe, 2013]), initiates a further reflection on the Cultural Revolution. Cao’s novel re-narrates the Cultural Revolution in terms of its historical unfolding—its aims, processes, contradictions, and significance, and links this story with the contemporary problem of China’s path today.

    曹征路:那儿‍‍ (PDF; 清华大学/archive.org)

    3. Plenum des XVIII. Zentralkomitees
    Nov 4th, 2013 by Gao

    杜建国:十八届三中全会不会有大动作(新浪博客)

    “十八届三中全会将会在经济改革方面有大动作”,这是一年来(十八大以来)“自由派”掌控的中国主流媒体和部分国外媒体(如华尔街日报、英国金融时报)的宣传工作的重点。不过相对于这一鼓噪而言,即将于11月召开的三中全会肯定是雷声大、雨点小,不会有大动作出台。
    何谓大动作?在笔者看来,媒体所宣扬的大动作,无非是两条:第一,对庞大的国有资产进行重大改革,即私有化;第二,金融改革,包括对外和对内两方面。掠夺资本——即“自由派”资本——企图通过这两项措施将中国高速发展三十多年的成果都装进自己口袋里。笔者认为,在这两个领域,三中全会不会有大动作。先谈谈金融方面。中国政府肯定不会允许资本自由流动,1997年亚洲金融危机的教训历历在目,中国政府岂能重蹈覆辙?国内方面,中国政府今年已经做出了促进私人资本成立银行的决定,这是“自由派”的胜利,不过自由派欲壑难填,还企图有进一步的要求。自由派不仅要求放开私人银行的限制,相反还要求进一步的优惠或特权,比如降低保证金门槛等,这无异于玩火,政府肯定不会予以支持。另一个是放纵非法集资与集资诈骗,即让吴英、曾成杰们为所欲为,对此政府也不会答应。

    Wolfgang Pomrehn: China baut sich um (junge Welt)

    Heute endet das 3. Plenum des Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei. Vom Gremium ­werden weitreichende Reformen der Wirtschaft erwartet.

    Minxin Pei: What’s the real test to Xi Jinping and the Communist Party at the Third Plenum? (South China Morning Post)

    There is something odd and disturbing about the conventional wisdom surrounding the upcoming Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As the November 9-12 conclave draws near, the international community’s attention seems to be focused mainly on technocratic policy changes deemed essential to restructuring China’s state-dominated economy and reenergising growth.
    Will the government liberalise interest rates or loosen capital controls? How will the fiscal system be revamped? Will land reform be part of the package?
    The list of such questions goes on. Outside China, the prevalent view among business leaders is that President Xi Jinping’s new administration has consolidated its power and acquired enough authority to push through far-reaching economic reforms. He and his colleagues need only to get the specific policies right.

    Felix Lee: Chinas Wirtschaft hofft auf das Zentralkomitee (Zeit)

    Als die neue chinesische Führung im März ihr Amt antrat, waren die Erwartungen groß. Verglichen mit ihren Vorgängern sind Premier Li Keqiang und Präsident Xi Jinping noch jung: Li ist 58 Jahre alt, Xi wurde im Juni 60. Sie würden China verändern, hoffte man im In- und Ausland. Bislang hat sich das allerdings nicht erfüllt, auch nicht wirtschaftspolitisch. Zwar gab es Ankündigungen, aber noch keine Taten.
    In den nächsten Wochen könnte sich das ändern. Am 9. November beginnt das “Dritte Plenum des 18. Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei”. Die Zusammenkunft der Parteikader ist wesentlich spannender, als der sperrige Titel vermuten lässt, denn hier treffen sich die 376 mächtigsten Männer und Frauen Chinas zu einer ehrgeizigen Konferenz: Sie legen die Umrisse der Wirtschaftspolitik für die kommenden Jahre fest.

    Larry Elliott: China prepares to liberalise finance as hedge funds and estate agents salivate (Guardian)

    Analysts at Capital Economics say the third plenum will come up with a direction of travel rather than a detailed policy programme. But they expect the new leadership to address three key issues: the low share of national income going to average households; the dominant role of the state in much of the economy; and the inefficient use of capital.

    Willy Lam: SOE links threaten china reform drive (Asia Times)

    The recent detention of senior executives of the China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) has highlighted a major question about China’s economic plans: Whether the Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang administration has finally decided to restructure the 110 or so yangqi, or state-owned enterprise (SOE) groupings.

    A world to turn upside down (Economist)

    Of the economic issues facing November’s plenum of the Chinese Communist Party, none looms larger than land reform in the countryside.

    Linda Yueh: What to expect from the Third Plenum? (China Policy Institute)

    Will 2013 be another 1978 or at least 1993 for China? Third Plenums held in those years resulted in significant overhauls of economic policy. The Third Plenum refers to the third time that the new leaders of China lead a plenary session of the Central Committee. The current one is being billed as being as significant as the one in December 1978 that marked the start of market-oriented reforms in China over 3 decades ago under Deng Xiaoping. Change of a similarly dramatic nature is unlikely, but there are high expectations that the new Chinese leaders will launch reforms that are as notable as those made in 1993, which dismantled a large part of the state-owned sector.

    Barry Naughton: What the Heck is China’s ‘Third Plenum’ and Why Should You Care? (ChinaFile)

    Gradually—perhaps over three years—China will liberalize interest rates, open up the renminbi capital account and let the renminbi partially float. However, these important changes are already “baked in” and implementation is in the hands of technocrats who can back off if things get rocky.

    Chris Luo: Premier Li Keqiang endorses private entrepreneurs, promises further reforms (South China Morning Post)

    Felix Lee: Chinas Märchen von der niedrigen Arbeitslosigkeit (Zeit)

    Chinas Statistiker haben eine neue Aufgabe: Sie sollen endlich für zuverlässigere Arbeitsmarktdaten sorgen.
    Sei Jahrzehnten liegt die Arbeitslosenquote in der Volksrepublik praktisch konstant bei vier Prozent – sowohl in guten als auch in schlechten Zeiten. Vor Beginn der Weltwirtschaftskrise lag sie bei glatten vier Prozent. Nur im Frühjahr 2009 war die Zahl für kurze Zeit nach oben geschossen. Doch schon das erste Konjunkturpaket drückte sie wieder nach unten. Auf wie viel Prozent? Auf vier natürlich! Aktuell liegt die Quote bei 4,1 Prozent. Kein Wunder, dass kaum ein Ökonom, der etwas auf sich hält, die offizielle Arbeitslosenzahl wirklich ernst nimmt.

    Drogen | „Anpassungsvermögen, Leistungsdenken und Legitimität“
    Okt 16th, 2013 by Gao

    Jonathan Marshall: Cooking the Books: The Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the China Lobby and Cold War Propaganda, 1950-1962 (Japan Focus)

    In recent years, influential interest groups and policy makers have leveled epithets like “narco-terrorism” and “narco-communism” against targets such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, Panama, Syria, the Taliban, and Venezuela to justify harsh policies ranging from economic sanctions to armed invasion, while ignoring or downplaying evidence implicating U.S. allies …
    To shed historical light on the dangers of turning international drug enforcement into a political weapon, this paper re-examines a classic case of alleged manipulation of narcotics intelligence: the vilification of Communist China by U.S. Commissioner of Narcotics Harry J. Anslinger at the height of the Cold War. His inflammatory rhetoric denouncing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as an evil purveyor of narcotics went largely unchallenged in the Western media during the 1950s and early 1960s, when Anslinger acted as America’s leading drug enforcement official and its official representative to the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND). As we shall see, his charges strongly reinforced Washington’s case for diplomatic isolation of China, including its exclusion from the United Nations. …
    As late as 1970, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), successor to the FBN, still officially maintained that “opium is cultivated in vast quantities in the Yunnan Province of China.” But within a year, with the advent of “Ping-Pong diplomacy” and the Nixon administration’s startling opening to China, Washington brazenly reversed its longstanding position.

    John aus Kūnmíng hat diesen Link geschickt:
    Minxin Pei: Wooing China’s Princelings (Project Syndicate)

    Outside China, princelings are feeling the heat as well. Not long ago, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission announced that it was investigating JPMorgan Chase’s hiring of princelings in Hong Kong, who apparently delivered lucrative underwriting deals for the bank.

    Michael C. aus Běijīng hat mich auf diesen vortrag von Eric X. Li (Woher kommt das X? Er heißt Lǐ Shìmò!) hingewiesen:
    Eric X. Li: A tale of two political systems (TED/YouTube)
    auch mit chinesischen und englischen Untertiteln verfügbar:
    李世默:两种制度的传说 (TED/Youku)
    „Anpassungsvermögen, Leistungsdenken und Legitimität sind die drei Merkmale, die das Ein-Parteien-System in China kennzeichnen.“ Alles was er da sagt, könnte man sehr kontrovers diskutieren.

    Dikötter
    Okt 7th, 2013 by Gao

    Isabel Hilton: The Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution 1945-1957 by Frank Dikötter – review (Observer)

    Frank Dikötter’s critique of the early years of Chinese communist rule is relentlessly partial. Among the more startling claims that Frank Dikötter makes in his new book, The Tragedy of Liberation, is that there were no landlords in China. … By [Dikötter’s] account, there was never a moment when liberation deliveredanything more than hunger, immiseration and servitude.

    Becker urteilt natürlich ganz anders über Dikötters jüngstes Buch:
    Jasper Becker: The Tragedy of Liberation, by Frank Dikötter – review (Spectator)

    The historian of China Frank Dikötter has taken a sledgehammer to demolish perhaps the last remaining shibboleth of modern Chinese history. This is the notion, propagated in countless books and documentaries, that Mao’s regime started off well, deservedly coming to power on a wave of popular support and successfully tackling the evils left behind by the corrupt and incompetent Nationalists. … The Tragedy of Liberation serves as reminder of the ruinous failure of American (and other) experts properly to comprehend both the nature of the communist triumph — a Soviet-backed military conquest — and its disastrous record in government. This should be recognised as one of the great scandals of academic life, on a par with the gross overestimation of the Soviet economy during the Cold War. … Dikötter bluntly states in his first paragraph that the story of the liberation of revolution is ‘first and foremost a history of calculated terror and systematic violence’.

    Ähnlich Lovell:
    Julia Lovell: ‘The Tragedy of Liberation’ (Financial Times)
    Auch ein Hayek-Zitat macht sich gut als Titel:
    The road to serfdom (Economist)

    With a mixture of passion and ruthlessness, he marshals the facts, many of them recently unearthed in party archives. Out of these, Mr Dikotter constructs a devastating case for how extreme violence, not a moral mandate, was at the heart of how the party got to power, and of how it then governed.

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