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Bildungswesen in Xinjiang
Jun 6th, 2017 by Gao

Die chinesische Regierung hat seit einigen Jahren Absolvent_innen der sogenannten „zweisprachigen“ Mittelschulen systematisch privilegiert. (Das sind Mittelschulen, deren Zweisprachigkeit darin besteht, dass die Muttersprache der Schüler_innen nicht Chinesisch, die Unterrichtssprache jedoch ausschließlich Chinesisch ist.)

Adrian Zenz: Problematic Privilege in Xinjiang (Diplomat)

On April 12, China’s Ministry of Education announced that the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the restive Muslim province in China’s far west, would no longer provide added points to university entrance exam applicants from bilingual educational tracks. Bilingual education was established in 2004 with the aim to promote Chinese language education among the region’s ethnic minorities, especially the Uyghurs. In the bilingual system, the role of the minority language is typically restricted to that of a single language subject, creating a highly immersive Chinese language environment.

2016年新疆高考各批次录取分数线正式公布(新疆维吾尔自治区教育厅 / Xinjiang Uyƣur Aptonom Rayonluⱪ maarip nazariti)

6月26日,自治区招生办公布了2016年新疆普通高考各批次最低投档控制分数线。

第二代民族政策探讨(中国民族宗教网)

第二代民族政策是清华大学国情研究中心主任胡鞍钢与胡联合,以及北京大学社会学系教授马戎提出来的民族政策思路,倡导推行淡化族群意识和56个民族的观念,强化中华民族的身份意识和身份认同,推进中华民族一体化和国家认同的政策。第二代民族政策的指导思想是效仿美国的民族大熔炉模式,不容许任何一个族群生活在一块属于自己的历史疆域内。

James Leibold: Ethnic Policy in China: Is Reform Inevitable? Policy Studies 68 (2013) (PDF, East-West Centre)

There are … signs that interethnic conflict may be growing as free-market forces and increased interethnic communication and mobility intensifies ethnic-based competition… Amid this perception of crisis, Chinese academics, policymakers, and other thought-leaders are engaged in unprecedented debate over the future direction of their country’s ethnic policies… A “melting pot” model is increasingly being accepted as better for de-emphasizing ethnic consciousness, improving ethnic relations and solidifying national unity in the long run… Barry Sautman argues that [these] proposals to “curb minority rights” “emanate from a small number of Chinese academics” yet “reflect a prominent strand of thinking about ethnic policies”.

Ma Rong: The development of minority education and the practice of bilingual education in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. (PDF, Case Western Reserve University)

Maoisten
Apr 12th, 2017 by Gao

Brian Hioe: A Red Star Over China? (New Bloom) 丘琦欣:紅星照耀中國?(破土)

Perhaps one of the most significant intellectual formations operating in today’s world, China’s New Left arose in the 1990s in opposition to the turn of China away from a centrally planned economy and a return to free market principles after the Deng Xiaoping period. More broadly, the New Left project emphasizes the growing disparities between rural and urban areas in post-Deng China, the sacrifice of principles of equality in order to drive toward development, and calls for a critical revaluation of China’s Maoist legacy in light of China’s present—inclusive of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
What is “New Left” is hard to pin down. The name “New Left” was a term appropriated from conservative critics who were quick to claim the New Left to be some form of resurgent Red Guard fanaticism. In that sense, “New Left” may be a misleading term, insofar as the Chinese New Left is a contemporary phenomenon, and one with little to do with the western New Left of the late 1960s. The New Left largely consists of academics, many of which have studied abroad and are influenced by forms of western critical theory. The New Left finds itself in opposition to the “Liberals” who welcome China’s capitalization and call for the institution of western style political reforms along the lines of America or of western European powers.

中國的新左派可說是當代世界中最重要的知識分子群體之一,他們在 1990 年代因為反對中國在鄧小平時代過後放棄計畫經濟,轉向自由市場原理而竄起。更大程度上,新左派的研究課題著重於後鄧小平時期城鄉差距的持續擴大,以及為求發展而犧牲平等原則,並呼籲對毛澤東時代的遺產進行批判性再評價以回應當前局勢,其中包括大躍進和文化大革命。
   「新左派」究竟是什麼,其實很難明確定義。「新左派」一名取自於那些急於將新左派定性為某種紅衛兵狂熱再現的保守派批評者。照那樣說來,「新左派」這個詞恐怕會產生誤導,因為中國的新左派是個當代現象,和 1960 年代晚期西方的新左派幾乎毫無關聯。新左派的成員大多是學者,其中很多人都曾出國留學,受到各種西方批判理論影響。新左派與歡迎中國走向資本主義化,呼籲依照美國及西歐強國的路線進行西方式政治改革的「自由派」彼此對立。

Brian Hioe: Anti-Capitalist Within China, Imperialist Outside of China? (New Bloom) 丘琦欣:中國國內的反資本主義者,出了境外卻是帝國主義者?(破土)

From a left perspective, the Chinese New Left’s critique of capitalism remains quite sympathetic when confined to within China’s borders. With the recent arrest of labor activists in Guangzhou, Chinese New Left publication Ground Breaking, for example, was one of the first to rally for support—even at risk to itself. Ground Breaking has reacted similarly in past incidents in which the Chinese state acts on behalf of capital and against the interests of the working class. Perhaps in this respect, given the threat of state suppression, they are to be praised for their bravery on certain issues. It is the New Left’s international viewpoints, concerning outside of China, which may ultimately be most problematic.

從左翼觀點來看,新左派對資本主義的批判多少還是能引人共鳴的,只要它的適用範圍限於中國國內。比方說,近日多位勞工運動者在廣州被逮捕之後,中國新左派的網刊「破土」(Ground Breaking,GB)是首先發動聲援的,卻不顧自身同樣面臨風險。而在過去幾次中國政府為資本利益護航,侵害工人階級利益的事件之中,「破土」也採取了同樣的行動。或許就這點來說,考慮到國家鎮壓的威脅,他們確實應當為了勇於聲援某些議題而得到讚揚。可是新左派的國際主義觀點一旦涉及境外議題,恐怕就再令人存疑不過了。

Chris Buckley: Maoists for Trump? In China, Fans Admire His Nationalist Views (New York Times) 储百亮:特朗普的出现让中国毛左为之一振(New York Times)

They protest, picket and sing to defend Mao’s memory, yearning for the East to be red again. But lately some of China’s Maoists are finding inspiration in an unlikely insurgent in the West: Donald J. Trump.
Mr. Trump “has torn up the old rules of the ruling elites, not just of the capitalist West,” said Zhang Hongliang, a polemicist who is the loudest proponent of what could be loosely called “Maoists for Trump.” In a recent essay, Mr. Zhang lauded the American president as being alone among national leaders daring “to openly promote the political ideas of Chairman Mao.”
President Xi Jinping of China will be sizing up Mr. Trump during a visit to his Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida this week, in the leaders’ first summit meeting. Meanwhile, many ordinary Chinese people have also been taking the measure of the new American president and have been bewildered, incensed and yet, sometimes, inspired.
The global wave of nationalist, anti-establishment sentiment that Mr. Trump rode to power has washed ashore in China, encouraging a hard-left fringe that is hostile to capitalism and Western influence, and that the Communist Party has long sought to cultivate — and contain.

北京——他们用抗议、纠察和歌唱来捍卫对毛泽东的记忆,渴望再现东方红。但最近,让中国的一些毛派人士为之一振的,是西方世界里的一个出人意料的叛逆者:唐纳德·J·特朗普(Donald J. Trump)。
   特朗普“不仅撕裂了西方资本主义世界的旧有规则,还撕裂了统治精英的旧有规则,”能言善辩的“拥护特朗普的毛派”中坚力量张宏良说。在前不久的一篇文章里,张宏良称赞特朗普是唯一一位“敢于公开宣传毛主席政治理念”的国家领导人。
   中美首脑首次峰会于下周在佛罗里达州马阿拉歌庄园举行之际,到访的中国国家主席习近平将对特朗普作出评估。与此同时,很多普通的中国人也在掂量新上台的美国总统的斤两,他或许让他们困惑,或许激起了他们的怒火,但有时也能让他们感到振奋。
   把特朗普送上了权力巅峰的民族主义和反建制情绪正在全球泛滥,中国也不例外。这种潮流让敌视资本主义和西方影响的中国极左派人士受到了鼓励,他们是共产党一直在培育——以及限制——的一个边缘群体。

Taiwan
Aug 29th, 2016 by Gao

丘琦欣:華文世界中的「左獨」與「左統」(破土) Brian Hioe: The pro-independence left versus the pro-unification left in the Sinophone world (New Bloom)

目前,隨著社會民主黨、時代力量黨、自由台灣黨等第三勢力左傾政黨先後成立,似乎已經開啓了一個台灣左翼復興的時代,或許也是台灣歷史上政治左翼第一次成為可能。畢竟,經過威權時期國民黨長期動用國家力量強制推行,將共產中國呈現為1949年至今台灣主權存續最大威脅的反共教育,台灣社會對於任何自我標榜為政治左翼的團體都是很有敵意的。

With the rise of new, Left-leaning third parties as the Social Democratic Party, the New Power Party, and the Free Taiwan Party, the present seems like an era of a resurgent Taiwanese Left. Or perhaps the present represents an era in which a political Left seems possible for the first time in Taiwanese history. After all, after so many years of state-enforced anti-communism at the hands of the KMT during the authoritarian period, and that has Communist China presented the most pressing threat to Taiwan’s continued sovereignty since 1949, Taiwanese society was rather hostile towards any self-proclaimed political Left.

洪凌:秩序之虐:太陽花/大腸花的排遺與孽瘴(苦勞網)

約莫在3月20日,佔領立法院行動第三天,我的情人(香港公民,堪稱良善自由主義者與中產階級,對於香港近年來的反中驅蝗動員極度不安且不贊成)詢問我,是否支持這場異議與激化的佔領。從反服貿的起初動員到近期的佔領立院,只要稍微有注意到相關脈絡與背後的意識型態操作,很難不得知是在反中恐共、型塑強烈異族恐懼的基礎上,進行政治正確的排拒強權大國(super power)之名。不過,「攻堅佔領」國家機器代議廳堂的動作,畢竟讓人驚訝且精神一振,甚至連我也不例外;再者,當時攻入的成員包括我認識的許多性/別異議者與激進社運成員。於是,距今三個星期以前,我告訴情人的答案是:「或許在主導意識形態戰場上,這是和我並不契合的戰役,但樂見騷亂體制的渾沌能量捲起更多的辯論與異質行動。」

Kulturrevolution
Aug 28th, 2016 by Gao

Grassroots Factionalism in China’s Cultural Revolution: Rethinking the Paradigm (H-PRC)

Discussants: Felix Wemheuer (University of Cologne), Andrew Walder (Stanford University), Jonathan Unger (Australian National University), Joel Andreas (Johns Hopkins University), Yiching Wu (University of Toronto)
Notes from a roundtable at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Seattle March 2016
In the 1980s, Western scholars developed a powerful paradigm to explain mass political factionalism in Mao’s Cultural Revolution (1966-69) in rational terms, rather than portraying the movement as mere “madness.” They explained mass factionalism as the escalation of latent conflicts between groups from different social backgrounds and with different political interests in the period before the Cultural Revolution. This influential paradigm has since been challenged from several angles, most prominently by Andrew Walder in his book Fractured Rebellion: The Beijing Red Guard Movement (Harvard University Press, 2009). Walder and several other scholars have argued that the roles of social background and ideological differences in explaining factional divisions have been exaggerated, and that contingent events and instrumental interests were far more important. The aim of this discussion is to bring new light to this debate. How was grassroots factionalism linked to conflicts at higher levels? How did the social and political backgrounds of participants impact factional participation? Did different interpretations of Maoist ideology matter? Were ordinary participants fighting mainly to avoid the consequences of defeat?

Paul Clark: What is cultural about the Cultural Revolution? Creativity Amid Destruction (SupChina)

Paul Clark discusses the films, plays, operas, ballets, architecture and other creative works in China during the Cultural Revolution.

Dikötter und der Große Sprung
Aug 5th, 2016 by Gao

Frank Dikötter: Looking back on the Great Leap Forward (History Today)

Frank Dikötter explains how the gradual opening of Chinese archives has revealed the appalling truth about Chairman Mao’s genocidal rule…
What comes out … is a tale of horror in which Mao emerges as one of the greatest mass murderers in history, responsible for the deaths of at least 45 million people between 1958 and 1962.

Dikötter wiederholt sein Lieblingszitat:

As the minutes of leadership meetings show, Mao was aware of the extent of the famine. At a secret gathering that took place in Shanghai on March 25th, 1959, Mao specifically ordered the party to procure up to one third of all grain. He announced that: ‘When there is not enough to eat people starve to death. It is better to let half of the people die so that the other half can eat their fill.’

Hier das Zitat mit etwas mehr Kontext:

要完成计划,就要大減项目。1078个项目中还应該堅決地再多削減,削到500个。平均使用力量是破坏大跃进的办法。大家吃不飽,大家死,不如死一半,給一半人吃飽。
Um den Plan zu erfüllen, müssen wir die Zahl der Projekte drastisch verringern. Von den 1078 Projekten müssen wir rigoros noch einmal viele streichen, bis auf 500. Die Kräfte gleichmäßig zu verteilen ist eine Methode, den Großen Sprung Vorwärts zu sabotieren. Wenn sich nicht alle sattessen können, sterben alle; es ist besser, wenn nur die eine Hälfte stirbt und sich die andere Hälfte dafür sattessen kann.

Máo spricht also nicht von Menschen, sondern von Industrie- und Bauprojekten, die man „sterben“ lassen soll; man kann es gar nicht anders verstehen. Dass dieses Zitat aus dem Zusammenhang gerissen und der Sinn völlig entstellt ist, stört Dikötter offenbar wenig, und obwohl bereits mehrere Historiker_innen darauf hingewiesen haben (vgl. Looking for Great Leap „smoking gun“ document, H-NET), bringt er es immer wieder.
Und so geistert das gefälschte Zitat auch weiter in den Medien herum:
Ilya Somin: Remembering the biggest mass murder in the history of the world (Washington Post)

Who was the biggest mass murderer in the history of the world? Most people probably assume that the answer is Adolf Hitler, architect of the Holocaust. Others might guess Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, who may indeed have managed to kill even more innocent people than Hitler did, many of them as part of a terror famine that likely took more lives than the Holocaust. But both Hitler and Stalin were outdone by Mao Zedong. From 1958 to 1962, his Great Leap Forward policy led to the deaths of up to 45 million people – easily making it the biggest episode of mass murder ever recorded…
The basic facts of the Great Leap Forward have long been known to scholars. Dikötter’s work is noteworthy for demonstrating that the number of victims may have been even greater than previously thought, and that the mass murder was more clearly intentional on Mao’s part.

Die Phrase “more clearly intentional” ist natürlich entscheidend. Und Somins conclusio?

The horrendous history of China, the USSR, and their imitators, should have permanently discredited socialism as completely as fascism was discredited by the Nazis.

Nachsatz – kleiner Sprung nach Lateinamerika:

Just recently, the socialist government of Venezuela imposed forced labor on much of its population… Venezuela’s tragic situation would not surprise anyone familiar with the history of the Great Leap Forward.

Korea | Inselstreit
Jun 27th, 2016 by Gao

Johnny Erling: Nordkorea: Kim provoziert mit Doppelraketentest

Nordkoreas Machthaber Kim Jong-un schlug zum richtigen Zeitpunkt gleich doppelt zu. Den UN-Sanktionen zum Trotz forderte er wieder einmal alle Welt heraus – mit zwei Raketentests kurz hintereinander, und das, obwohl die Vereinten Nationen solche Tests seinem Land verboten haben. … Kim befahl den ersten Test nach Angaben der südkoreanischen Nachrichtenagentur Yonhap Mittwochfrüh um 5.58 Uhr. Er ließ eine Mittelstreckenrakete vom Typ Musudan von der Ostküste Nordkoreas abschießen. US- und südkoreanisches Militär sehen in ihr eine potenzielle Trägerwaffe, die künftig mit einem Atomsprengkopf bestückt werden könnte. Mit einer Reichweite von 3000 bis 4000 Kilometern erreicht sie angeblich jeden Punkt in Japan und bedroht auch US-Stellungen auf Guam und in Alaska. …
Südkoreas Verteidigungsbehörden nannten den Test „misslungen“. Das Geschoß sei 150 Kilometer vom Start entfernt ins Meer gestürzt. Seit April ist es der inzwischen fünfte Fehlschlag in Folge. Doch um 8.05 Uhr zündete Nordkorea eine zweite Musudan. Sie soll laut Yonhap rund 400 Kilometer weit gekommen sein.

Justin McCurry: North Korea: UN security council ‚to meet‘ after missile tests (Guardian)

The missiles are usually test-fired at a flatter angle to maximise their range, according to Jeffrey Lewis at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in California. “That suggests the missile worked perfectly,” he said. “Had it been fired at its normal angle, it would have flown to its full range.”…
It was not immediately clear whether Pyongyang considered the second Musudan launch a success or failure, or how the flight ended.

Pepe Escobar: Beijing goes mobile in the South China Sea (RT)

Not a day goes by without some sort of turmoil in the South China Sea. Let’s cut to the chase: war is not about to break out.

Scenarios of the Coming Crisis: A Response to Aufheben’s “The Crisis: Afterword” (Chuang)

In China, official politics is a game of arcane signals. Predicting tectonic shifts in policy requires that one read the seismic shudders buried beneath terse statements issued by poker-faced officials. Slight changes in terminology may hint at sliding allegiances or new waves of repression. The most significant signals, however, take the form of interviews with anonymous oracles—almost always an “authoritative person”—their words propagated by the state’s highest media organs without attribution. The more such oracles speak, the greater the magnitude of the coming “intervention.” Such proclamations also often signal internal disagreements within the seemingly monolithic Chinese Communist Party (CCP). With the slowing of economic growth, such disagreements have been exacerbated, as the top leadership debates the future of the economic reforms that have led China into a commanding role within global circuits of capital accumulation.

Qiao Long, Wong Lok-to, Luisetta Mudie: Chinese Blogger Who Compiled Protest Data Missing, Believed Detained (Radio Free Asia)

Kulturrevolution – Fellner, Brown, Wemheuer, Mai/Chou, Rittenberg, Wasserstrom
Mai 15th, 2016 by Gao

Hannes Fellner: »Rebellion ist gerechtfertigt« (junge Welt)

Die »Große Proletarische Kulturrevolution« war ein Zeitabschnitt in der Geschichte der Volksrepublik China, der widersprüchlicher nicht sein konnte. Die Kulturrevolution stand und steht gleichzeitig für Voluntarismus und diktatorische Maßnahmen von den um Mao Zedong versammelten Kadern der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas (KPCh), aber auch für eine partizipative und demokratische Massenbewegung. Sie stand und steht gleichzeitig für gesellschaftliches Chaos und Not, aber auch für ökonomischen, sozialen und kulturellen Fortschritt, welcher die Grundlagen für den Wirtschaftsboom des Landes ab den späten 1970er Jahren legte. Sie stand und steht gleichzeitig für Chinas Besinnung nach innen und seine internationale Isolation, aber auch für den Beginn seines Aufstiegs zur Weltmacht.

Ian Johnson: Jeremy Brown on the Cultural Revolution at the Grass Roots | 50周年纪念之外,被忽略的文革历史 (New York Times)

Jeremy Brown, 39, a history professor at Simon Fraser University in Burnaby, British Columbia, studied in Harbin and did research in Tianjin, focusing especially on the rural-urban divide in China under Mao Zedong. Most recently, he helped edit “Maoism at the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China’s Era of High Socialism.” In an interview, he discussed the 50th anniversary of the Cultural Revolution, what we miss in elite-focused narratives from that time and his pursuit of flea-market historiography.

Felix Wemheuer: 50 Jahre Kulturrevolution: Der Kampf geht weiter (Deutsche Welle)

50 Jahre nach dem Ausbruch der „Großen Proletarischen Kulturrevolution“ [hat] die chinesische Gesellschaft noch immer keinen Konsens gefunden, wie Maos Massenbewegung zu beurteilen ist.

Felix Wemheuer: Kulturrevolution und die Neue Linke im Westen (Deutsche Welle)
Jun Mai, Oliver Chou: Cultural Revolution, 50 years on (South China Morning Post)

Fifty years ago today, China issued a top directive calling on its people to rid society of “members of the bourgeoisie threatening to seize political power from the proletariat” – marking the start of a decade-long violent class struggle.
For 10 tumultuous years from 1966, the country underwent massive sociopolitical upheaval that saw countless politicians and intellectuals driven to their deaths, civilians killed in armed conflicts, and cultural relics and artefacts destroyed. The official death toll numbered more than 1.7 million.

Wen Liu: Sidney Rittenberg on Cultural Revolution 50 years later, its violence, its lessons (WA China Watch Digest)

This website was not meant to be this political. But one cannot watch China and skip a historic date, May 16, the 50th anniversary of the official start of the Cultural Revolution from 1966-1976, which served as perhaps more than anything dark, scorched, bloody yet fertile soil for, as well as a huge rear-view mirror of, today’s China of skyscrapers, bullet trains, Xi Jinping, and even Internet censorship. One cannot also watch China and forget that it was in 1972, during the Cultural Revolution, that President Nixon went to meet Mao in Beijing. To help us reflect on the Cultural Revolution, its meaning, its violence, its lessons, there is no better person than a great fellow Washingtonian, journalist, scholar, a participant as well as a prisoner of not only the Cultural Revolution, but for 35 years Mao’s revolution: Sidney Rittenberg.

Jeffrey Wasserstrom: How Will China Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Cultural Revolution? (Nation)

This month marks the anniversary of two surges of youth activism in China. One, the May 4 Movement, began with student protests 97 years ago. The other is the 50th anniversary of the Cultural Revolution, which is sometimes said to have begun with the first Red Guards putting up wall posters in late May of 1966. May 4 and Red Guard activists were once seen as part of related movements, but now they tend to be regarded as radically dissimilar.

Walder | Žižek
Jul 10th, 2015 by Gao

Ian Johnson: Andrew G. Walder on ‘China Under Mao’ (New York Times)

Q. You write that about 1.1 million to 1.6 million people died during the Cultural Revolution.
A. In the literature, the number ranges from 40,000 to eight million. So it’s a relatively conservative estimate. But as a percent of the population, 750 million, that’s about one-fifth the death rate of Stalin’s Great Terror. Some people are annoyed that I’m minimizing the violence, but I’m trying to put it in perspective.
Another point was that in the Cultural Revolution, most killing wasn’t by the students or Red Guards, but by the government.
We focus on students killing their teachers. That touches a nerve. Or we focus on armed conflict between rebel groups. But most of the killing occurred when order — in quotation marks — was restored. It was not the rampaging Red Guards, even though those deaths were the most dramatic. It was the military restoration of order. The cure was far worse than the disease.

Slavoj Žižek: Sinicisation (London Review of Books)

An exemplary case of today’s ‘socialism’ is China, where the Communist Party is engaged in a campaign of self-legitimisation which promotes three theses: 1) Communist Party rule alone can guarantee successful capitalism; 2) the rule of the atheist Communist Party alone can guarantee authentic religious freedom; and 3) continuing Communist Party rule alone can guarantee that China will be a society of Confucian conservative values (social harmony, patriotism, moral order). These aren’t simply nonsensical paradoxes.

Geschlechterkampf | Senior_innentanz | Zusammenbruchstheorien
Mrz 25th, 2015 by Gao

Gender War & Social Stability in Xi’s China: Interview with a Friend of the Women’s Day Five (1st half) | (2nd half) (Chuǎng)

China to regulate square-dancing (China Today)
Natürlich handelt es sich nicht um “Sqare Dancing” (siehe Wikipedia: Square Dance), sondern um das Tanzen auf öffentlichen Plätzen.
Andrew Jacobs: China Puts a Hitch in the Step of ‘Dancing Grannies’ (New York Times)

The offenders usually emerge at dusk, occupying prime real estate in public plazas or parks as they sashay to treacly Chinese pop tunes with their synchronized dance moves.
In recent years, these cardigan-clad packs of “dancing grannies,” as they are known, have descended on tranquil neighborhoods across the country, occasionally provoking virulent responses from local residents who object to their amplified music.
In 2013, a Beijing man seeking to chase off retirees dancing near his home was arrested after he fired a shotgun into the air and set three Tibetan mastiffs on the group. That same year in the city of Wuhan, angry neighbors dumped feces from the upper floors of a building onto a troupe of gray-haired women below.

Josh Chin: China Moves to Rectify Public Dance Routines (Wall Street Journal)

“From now on, [public dances] will no longer vary from community to community but will instead become a nationally unified, scientifically arranged all-new activity that brings positive energy to the people,” Xinhua declared.

卢苇:12套广场健身操舞优秀作品“统一舞步”(中国体育报 中国国家体育总局)

广场健身操舞作为一种百姓喜闻乐见的健身形式,近年来在全国各地方兴未艾,影响范围广泛,参与人数众多。为了顺应百姓参与健身的迫切需求,推动广场健身操舞健康、有序的发展,3月23日下午,国家体育总局与文化部联合在京召开新闻发布会,正式推出了12套广场健身操舞优秀作品。

“最炫小苹果”出统一舞步 12套广场舞将全国推出(新华)
Josh Chin: Fed-Up Chinese Residents Blast Dancing Grannies With $42,000 Sound System (Wall Street Journal)

Where verbal abuse, sand and buckets of human waste have failed, a warning message blasted over and over again through a $41,900 speaker system appears to have succeeded.
Aggrieved residents in the coastal Chinese city of Wenzhou declared victory this week after successfully routing packs of public dancers that had been gathering in a nearby park, according to state media reports.

Außerdem:
Xie Tao: Why Do People Keep Predicting China’s Collapse? (Diplomat)

The temptation to make predictions about China is probably irresistible, because it is arguably the most important contemporary case in international relations. Thus, a few Western observers have risked their professional reputations by acting as prophets. Perhaps the most (in)famous is Gordon Chang, who published The Coming Collapse of China in 2001. “The end of the modern Chinese state is near,” he asserted. “The People’s Republic has five years, perhaps ten, before it falls,”
China didn’t collapse, as we all know. “So, yes, my prediction was wrong,” he admitted in an article (“The Coming Collapse of China: 2012 Edition”). But he remained convinced about the imminence of a Chinese apocalypse and offered a new timeline: “Instead of 2011, the mighty Communist Party of China will fall in 2012. Bet on it.”

Der Artikel bezieht sich nicht nur auf den lustigen Gordon Chang, sondern u.a. auch auf das hier:
David Shambaugh: The Coming Chinese Crackup (Wall Street Journal)

Maoisten
Feb 10th, 2015 by Gao

Eli Friedman: The Primary Contradiction (Jacobin)

“It’s a golden period to be a leftist in China.” At least that was the assessment of Minzu University of China professor and well-known Maoist Zhang Hongliang in a recent New York Times article. The article went on to suggest that “leftist voices are back in vogue,” while other media outlets have reported widely on President Xi Jinping’s call for more Marxism in the universities. And the Politburo has been holding study sessions to brush up on their dialectical materialism.
But unfortunately, there are more than enough reasons to doubt this analysis.
To begin with, Xi Jinping’s originally ambiguous slogan, the “China Dream,” has come to be officially defined as the “great revival of the Chinese race.” The imperial yearning implicit in this phrase has ominous implications for its neighbors as well as ethnic minorities within China.
Economically, the government is preparing another round of marketization to prop up the flagging debt-fueled growth that China has heavily relied on in recent years. These reforms will include a major wave of privatization of state-owned firms, further commodification of land, reduction in pensions for public employees, and an extension of free trade.
The working class and peasantry remain politically excluded and are viewed with deep suspicion by the state…
Leading Maoist Han Deqiang recently wrote, “The China Dream is the dream of Chinese people. It will inevitably have strong characteristics of nationalism rather than universal values.”

Chris Buckley, Andrew Jacobs: Maoists in China, Given New Life, Attack Dissent (New York Times)

China’s Maoist ideologues are resurgent after languishing in the political desert, buoyed by President Xi Jinping’s traditionalist tilt and emboldened by internal party decrees that have declared open season on Chinese academics, artists and party cadres seen as insufficiently red…
“It’s a golden period to be a leftist in China,” Zhang Hongliang, a prominent neo-Maoist, said in an interview. “Xi Jinping has ushered in a fundamental change to the status quo, shattering the sky.”

Außerdem:
AP: Argentina’s president Cristina Kirchner attacked for ‚racist‘ Chinese joke (Guardian)

Argentina’s President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner caused a furore on Wednesday by joking about her hosts’ accents while on a state visit to China seeking badly needed investment.

APA: Argentiniens Präsidentin spottet über chinesische Aussprache (Standard)

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