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CIA- und GMD-Drogenschmuggel
Dez 4th, 2017 by Gao

Jeffrey St. Clair, Alexander Cockburn: The US Opium Wars: China, Burma and the CIA (CounterPunch)

You won’t find a star of remembrance for him on the wall of fallen “heroes” at CIA HQ in Langley, but one of the Agency’s first casualties in its covert war against Mao’s China was a man named Jack Killam. He was a pilot for the CIA’s proprietary airline, Civil Air Transport, forerunner to the notorious Air America which figured so largely in the Agency’s activities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Killam’s job was to fly weapons and supplies from the CIA’s base in Bangkok, Thailand, to the mountain camps of General Li Mi in the Shan States of Burma. Li Mi, Chinese in origin, was the leader of 10,000 Chinese troops still loyal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who had been driven off the Chinese mainland by Mao’s forces and was now ensconced on Taiwan.
Under the direction of the CIA, Li Mi’s army was plotting a strike across Burma’s northern border into China’s Yunnan province. But Li Mi’s troops were not just warriors in Chiang’s cause: they had also taken control of the largest opium poppy fields in Asia. The CAT pilots working for the CIA carried loads of Li Mi’s opium on their return flights to Bangkok, where it was delivered to General Phao Siyanan, head of the Thai secret police and a long-time CIA asset.

Bahnverbindungen
Nov 27th, 2017 by Gao

Sandor Peto: Hungary launches rail link tender as CEE-China summit starts (Reuters)

Hungary will publish a procurement tender on Monday for a modernised railway link with Serbian capital Belgrade to ship Chinese goods into Western Europe, Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto said on Sunday.

Luise Ungerboeck: Österreich zweigleisig zwischen China und Russland (Standard)

Während China auf der Balkanroute massiv Investitionen in Bahn und Infrastruktur anschiebt, blickt Wien besorgt gegen Osten.

Xiang Bo: Ever expanding Chinese rail network boosts German „China city“ (Xinhua)

The city of Duisburg, Germany’s biggest inland port, is on one end of the Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe rail line, which opened in 2011 from the Chinese southwest city of Chongqing.
In recent years, more and more trains operated by the China Railway Express (CRE) from Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Suzhou, Yiwu and other Chinese cities are arriving here.
It takes only 13 days for goods to arrive in Duisburg from Chongqing by rail, 30 days less than by sea, and at a fifth of the cost of air freight.

Lorenz Storch: Oberfranken will Güterzugverbindung nach China (Bayerischer Rundfunk)

Die IHK für Oberfranken in Bayreuth und der Landkreis Hof arbeiten an einer neuen Güterzugverbindung vom Hofer Containerterminal nach China. Der Grund: Viele oberfränkische Unternehmer exportieren nach Fernost und wünschen sich eine solche Verbindung.

Slovakia may benefit from Chinese transport corridors (Slovak Spectator)

A Chinese train with 41 containers dispatched from Dalian port in China to Bratislava’s cargo port in late October arrived in the capital on November 13, carrying goods for customers in central Europe. The railway transport from China to Slovakia was restored after more than one year.

Trump und Goldman Sachs in Beijing
Nov 14th, 2017 by Gao

Thomas Hon Wing Polin: China’s Overture to Wall Street (CounterPunch)

For all the pomp and circumstance of Donald Trump’s Beijing trip, its most interesting outcome was a Chinese overture to the titans of global finance, currently ensconced in Wall Street and London…
Specifically, the watershed has two components. The first is the accord between CIC, China’s top sovereign wealth fund, and Goldman Sachs to set up a USD 5-billion fund to invest in US companies exporting to China. The choice of American partner is significant, of course. Goldman is the most powerful bank in the US and probably the world, the quintessential Wall Street player. Its alumni routinely occupy top positions in the US government, including the present Treasury Secretary. Where Goldman goes, the US power structure often follows.
Beijing’s other move is to open financial institutions to 51% ownership by foreign entities — something Western global banks have long been clamoring for. The CPC leadership is only too aware of the potential disruption, even sabotage, that could result from a too-fast opening of the supremely strategic finance sector. Over the years, Beijing has never hesitated to slow or suspend the process whenever circumstances warranted. That it is now taking this step means China is confident that domestic and international conditions are ripe.

Gesellschaftliche Bonität
Nov 13th, 2017 by Gao

国务院关于印发社会信用体系建设规划纲要(2014—2020年)的通知(中华人民共和国中央政府)

社会信用体系是社会主义市场经济体制和社会治理体制的重要组成部分。它以法律、法规、标准和契约为依据,以健全覆盖社会成员的信用记录和信用基础设施网络为基础,以信用信息合规应用和信用服务体系为支撑,以树立诚信文化理念、弘扬诚信传统美德为内在要求,以守信激励和失信约束为奖惩机制,目的是提高全社会的诚信意识和信用水平。
  加快社会信用体系建设是全面落实科学发展观、构建社会主义和谐社会的重要基础,是完善社会主义市场经济体制、加强和创新社会治理的重要手段,对增强社会成员诚信意识,营造优良信用环境,提升国家整体竞争力,促进社会发展与文明进步具有重要意义。
  根据党的十八大提出的“加强政务诚信、商务诚信、社会诚信和司法公信建设”,党的十八届三中全会提出的“建立健全社会征信体系,褒扬诚信,惩戒失信”,《中共中央 国务院关于加强和创新社会管理的意见》提出的“建立健全社会诚信制度”,以及《中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要》(以下简称“十二五”规划纲要)提出的“加快社会信用体系建设”的总体要求,制定本规划纲要。规划期为2014—2020年。

Übersetzung ins Englische:
Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020) (China Copyright and Media)
国务院关于促进市场公平竞争维护市场正常秩序的若干意见(中华人民共和国中央政府)

以邓小平理论、“三个代表”重要思想、科学发展观为指导,深入学习领会党的十八大、十八届二中、三中全会精神,贯彻落实党中央和国务院的各项决策部署,围绕使市场在资源配置中起决定性作用和更好发挥政府作用,着力解决市场体系不完善、政府干预过多和监管不到位问题,坚持放管并重,实行宽进严管,激发市场主体活力,平等保护各类市场主体合法权益,维护公平竞争的市场秩序,促进经济社会持续健康发展。……
充分发挥市场在资源配置中的决定性作用,把该放的权力放开放到位,降低准入门槛,促进就业创业。法不禁止的,市场主体即可为;法未授权的,政府部门不能为。……
充分发挥法律法规的规范作用、行业组织的自律作用、舆论和社会公众的监督作用,实现社会共同治理,推动市场主体自我约束、诚信经营。……
立足于促进企业自主经营、公平竞争,消费者自由选择、自主消费,商品和要素自由流动、平等交换,建设统一开放、竞争有序、诚信守法、监管有力的现代市场体系,加快形成权责明确、公平公正、透明高效、法治保障的市场监管格局……

Übersetzung ins Englische:
Opinions of the State Council on Promoting Fair Market Competition and Maintaining the Normal Market Order (北大法律英文网)
Rachel Botsman: Big data meets Big Brother as China moves to rate its citizens (Wired)

The Chinese government plans to launch its Social Credit System in 2020. The aim? To judge the trustworthiness – or otherwise – of its 1.3 billion residents.
Imagine a world where many of your daily activities were constantly monitored and evaluated: what you buy at the shops and online; where you are at any given time; who your friends are and how you interact with them; how many hours you spend watching content or playing video games; and what bills and taxes you pay (or not). It’s not hard to picture, because most of that already happens, thanks to all those data-collecting behemoths like Google, Facebook and Instagram or health-tracking apps such as Fitbit. But now imagine a system where all these behaviours are rated as either positive or negative and distilled into a single number, according to rules set by the government. That would create your Citizen Score and it would tell everyone whether or not you were trustworthy. Plus, your rating would be publicly ranked against that of the entire population and used to determine your eligibility for a mortgage or a job, where your children can go to school – or even just your chances of getting a date.

Mirjam Meissner: China’s Social Credit System (PDF; Mercator Institute for China Studies)

Under the catchphrase “Social Credit System,” China is currently implementing a new and highly innovative approach to monitoring, rating, and regulating the behavior of market participants. The Social Credit System will have significant impact on the behavior of individuals, companies, and other institutions, such as NGOs. Despite much international attention on the impact of the system for individuals, the core motivation behind the Social Credit System is to more effectively steer the behavior of market participants…
The ultimate goal is to build self-enforcing mechanisms for business regulation: Based on advanced big data technologies, the system is designed to constantly monitor and evaluate companies’ economic as well as non-economic behavior…
The system will create strong incentives for companies to make their business decisions and operations comply not just with laws and regulations but also with the industrial and technological policy targets laid down by the Chinese government…
At the heart of the Social Credit System lies massive data collection on company activities by government agencies and authorized rating entities.

Celia Hatton: China ’social credit‘: Beijing sets up huge system (BBC)

In most countries, the existence of a credit system isn’t controversial. Past financial information is used to predict whether individuals will pay their mortgages or credit card bill in the future.
But China is taking the whole concept a few steps further. The Chinese government is building an omnipotent „social credit“ system that is meant to rate each citizen’s trustworthiness.

Sara Hsu: China’s New Social Credit System (Diplomat)

Despite hyped concerns in the foreign press, little is actually known about China’s plans to rate citizens and firms.

Shazeda Ahmed: Cashless Society, Cached Data: Security Considerations for a Chinese Social Credit System (Citizen Lab)

In an irony that has plagued many a surveillance apparatus, the spread of a social credit system and its associated sensors, QR codes, and other trace-reading tools can create new security concerns separate from those it allegedly aims to reduce through near-ubiquitous monitoring of behavior. These new threats involve the ways in which credit score data can be forged, and the ends toward which fake credit scores may be used. The expedited security check at the Beijing airport for Sesame Credit users with high enough scores who are traveling on domestic flights provides one example of a situation where a falsified high score could enable someone to bypass more rigorous security checks, which can be a threat to national security from a skilled and determined enough actor. The more widely used the social credit system becomes and the greater the range of rewards it may provide high scorers, the more incentives for figuring out how to hack it will proliferate.

Das Ganze erinnert an Black Mirror, 1. Folge, 3. Staffel: Nosedive (dt.: Abgestürzt) vom Oktober 2016.

Zahlenmystik
Sep 12th, 2017 by Gao

关键词指示习近平“7·26”重要讲话内容(新华网)

2个“牢牢把握”
3个“事关”
5个“什么”
9个“我们”
8个“更”
3个“意味着”
2个“必须”2个“要”

David Bandurski: The Arithmetic of Party-Speak (Medium)

As anyone whose profession it is to parse the language of Chinese Communist Party can tell you, reading Chinese discourse is a frustrating and bewildering exercise, full of rigid and ritualistic formulations that come and go, ebb and flow. Sum up Party-speak with a jingle and it might go something like this:

Deng Xiaoping had Four Basic Principles,
Jiang Zemin, Three Represents
Xi Jinping has Two Undeniables.
And nothing at all makes sense.

Ungleichheit
Sep 6th, 2017 by Gao

Sidney Leng: China’s dirty little secret: its growing wealth gap (South China Morning Post)

China’s wealth gap has widened for the first time in five years, a fact Beijing chose not to mention in this year’s economic report.
The Gini coefficient, a gauge ranging between zero and one that measures income equality, increased slightly to 0.465 last year, from 0.462 in 2015, according to data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) this week…
A study from Peking University last year found that the poorest 25 per cent of mainland households owned just 1 per cent of the country’s aggregate wealth, while the richest 1 per cent owned a third of the wealth.

He Huifeng: In China’s richest province, a yawning gap exists between the haves and the have-nots (South China Morning Post)

The coexistence of great wealth and abject poverty in Guangdong shows why narrowing the income gap is a priority of China’s leadership…
Shenzhen’s per capita GDP is now on par with Portugal’s, but the per capita GDP in Qingyuan … was less than a quarter of Shenzhen’s last year, and lower than the national average. Eleven other cities in Guangdong … were also below the national average last year, and in Meizhou, Heyuan, Shanwei and Yunfu per capita GDP was even lower than in Guizhou, China’s most impoverished province…
Guangdong’s wealth gap has grown in the past couple of years, according to Zheng Zizhen, a sociologist and economist with the Guangdong Academy of Social Sciences, a government think-tank in Guangzhou.
“The wealth of families in [major] cities is soaring, driven by the rapid growth in residential property prices,” he said. “But the poorer areas of Guangdong lack the ability to attract enough capital and talent to bring an industrial boom.”
By the numbers, the Pearl River Delta, which includes some of China’s most developed cities, including Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan and Foshan, covers only 23 per cent of the province but last year it accounted for 79.3 per cent of Guangdong’s economic output, according to official data, up from 79.1 in 2015. The province’s 12 impoverished cities reported average GDP growth of 7.4 per cent last year, according to the provincial development and reform commission, while the Pearl River Delta’s grew by 8.3 per cent.

Zhang Pinghui: Why Xi Jinping cares so much about ending poverty in China: the political significance behind the campaign (South China Morning Post)

China Quarterly
Aug 30th, 2017 by Gao

Ian Johnson: Cambridge University Press Removes Academic Articles on Chinese Site / 迫于审查压力,剑桥大学出版社在华删除敏感内容 (New York Times)

One of the world’s oldest and most respected publishing houses, Cambridge University Press, has bowed to pressure from Beijing and removed sensitive content on its site in China.

Echo Huang: Forced to comply or shut down, Cambridge University Press’s China Quarterly removes 300 articles in China (Quartz)
Cambridge University Press statement regarding content in The China Quarterly (Cambridge University Press)

We can confirm that we received an instruction from a Chinese import agency to block individual articles from The China Quarterly within China. We complied with this initial request to remove individual articles, to ensure that other academic and educational materials we publish remain available to researchers and educators in this market.
We are aware that other publishers have had entire collections of content blocked in China until they have enabled the import agencies to block access to individual articles. We do not, and will not, proactively censor our content and will only consider blocking individual items (when requested to do so) when the wider availability of content is at risk.

Alex Linder: Cambridge University Press bows to Chinese censors, removes 300 ‚politically sensitive‘ articles (Shanghaiist)

On Friday, the CUP said that more than 300 articles had been scrubbed from the China Quarterly’s Chinese website following a request from Chinese censors, which threatened to have its site shut down. Apparently, the articles had been chosen for deletion not through a careful reading and examination of the text, but by quick searches for certain naughty words.

Liste der entfernten Artikel: www.cambridge.org/… (PDF, Cambridge University Press)
Tim Pringle: Message from the editor, The China Quarterly (PDF, Cambridge University Press)

The China Quarterly wishes to express its deep concern and disappointment that over 300 articles
and reviews published in the journal have been censored by a Chinese import agency. We note too
that this restriction of academic freedom is not an isolated move but an extension of policies that
have narrowed the space for public engagement and discussion across Chinese society.

Tim Pringle: China’s bid to block my journal’s articles is a new attack on academic freedom (Guardian)

Cambridge University Press was asked to suppress articles in China Quarterly. It has now resisted, but it is a worrying development

The China Quarterly follow-up statement (Cambridge University Press)

Following a clear order from its Chinese importer, Cambridge University Press reluctantly took the decision to block, within China, 315 articles in The China Quarterly. This decision was taken as a temporary measure pending discussion with the academic leadership of the University of Cambridge, and pending a scheduled meeting with the Chinese importer in Beijing.
The academic leadership of the University has now reviewed this action in advance of the meeting in China later this week. Academic freedom is the overriding principle on which the University of Cambridge is based. Therefore, while this temporary decision was taken in order to protect short-term access in China to the vast majority of the Press’s journal articles, the University’s academic leadership and the Press have agreed to reinstate the blocked content, with immediate effect, so as to uphold the principle of academic freedom on which the University’s work is founded.

Cambridge University Press battles censorship in China (Economist)

This is not the only recent case. Censors have demanded the removal of about 100 articles in the Journal of Asian Studies, also published by CUP. The Communist Party used to allow scholars a modest latitude in their fields of research, permitting, for example, access to foreign academic publications that would be banned from general circulation. But in March the customs authorities tightened rules on importing books. Chinese academics complain that risk-averse librarians will not now order even innocuous scholarly works for fear of offending the customs service.

Cambridge University Press Refuses to Comply With Second Chinese Takedown Request (Radio Free Asia)

Chinese censors have made another request to a top academic journal published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) for the removal of online content from a website hosted in China, the Association for Asian Studies said in a statement.
CUP has refused the request from the State Administration of Press and Publications, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT), which requested the removal of some 100 articles from the website of the Journal of Asian Studies.
The Association for Asian Studies (AAS) said the request was similar to one made by Chinese authorities to CUP, prompting the publishing house to take down some 300 articles from the China website of the China Quarterly academic journal last week.

China Quarterly debate a matter of principle (Global Times)

As the readership of the China Quarterly is limited, there will be little impact over the CUP withdrawing some articles. The Western media, which must have other things to pay attention to, seems more sensitive than some relevant Chinese authorities.
China has a number of laws and regulations concerning cyber security. The China Quarterly is published overseas. There is no overlap between the two sides. The CUP can enjoy academic freedom under British law. But overseas media reports that it set up a server in China hoping to explore the Chinese market, which has to abide by the Chinese law. As long as the Chinese request was made in accordance with the law, there is no reason to be critical.
China has blocked some information on foreign websites that it deems harmful to Chinese society. This is for the sake of China’s security and is within the scope of China’s sovereignty. China is also trying to strike a balance between opening itself up and preventing harmful external information from penetrating into Chinese society, to realize steady and sustainable progress.
Western institutions have the freedom to choose. If they don’t like the Chinese way, they can stop engaging with us. If they think China’s Internet market is so important that they can’t miss out, they need to respect Chinese law and adapt to the Chinese way. Now it seems that some Western institutions would like to make adjustments, while some forces are unhappy about it.

AFP: At Beijing book fair, publishers admit to self-censorship to keep texts on Chinese market (South China Morning Post)

Tiananmen, Tibet and Taiwan are off limits for companies wanting to sell their books in China, publisher says

James A. Millward: Open Letter to Cambridge University Press about its censorship of the China Quarterly (Medium)

Cambridge University Press’s decision to censor the journal China Quarterly as it is viewed online in China is a craven, shameful and destructive concession to the PRC’s growing censorship regime. It is also needless.

Christopher Balding: Petition Cambridge University Press Not to Censor China Articles (Change.org)

As academics and China focused academics, we are disturbed by the request by the Chinese government for Cambridge University Press to censor articles from the China Quarterly. As academics, we believe in the free and open exchange of ideas and information on all topics not just those we agree with. It is disturbing to academics and universities world wide that China is attempting to export its censorship on topics that do not fit its preferred narrative.
We call upon Cambridge University Press to refuse the censorship request not just for the China Quarterly but on any other topics, journals or publication that have been requested by the Chinese government.
If Cambridge University Press acquiesces to the demands of the Chinese government, we as academics and universities reserve the right to pursue other actions including boycotts of Cambridge University Press and related journals.

Maev Kennedy, Tom Phillips: Cambridge University Press backs down over China censorship (Guardian)

Publisher will reinstate articles to which it blocked online access in China in the face of international protests by academics

Simon Denyer: In reversal, Cambridge University Press restores articles after China censorship row (Washington Post)

Cambridge University Press reversed course Monday after facing a major backlash from academics over its decision to bow to Chinese government demands to censor an important academic journal.

Joseph Hincks: A Top Publisher Bowed to China’s Censors. Then it Bowed to Outraged Academics (Time)

Margaret Lewis, Andrew J. Nathan, Pamela Kyle Crossley, Edward Friedman, Yifu Dong, Joseph W. Esherick: Should Publications Compromise to Remain in China? (China File)

Freedom of expression may have won this battle against state censorship, but if state interference continues what compromises is it permissable for academic institutions and publications to make to stay inside China?

Jonathan Sullivan: Censorship and China Studies (China Policy Institute)

CUP’s decision to accede to the demands is a misguided, if understandable, economic decision that does harm to the Press’ reputation and integrity (whether there is any integrity in the business of academic publishing is another story).

In diesem Zusammenhang siehe auch:
中华人民共和国网络安全法(全国人民代表大会)
Inoffizielle Übersetzung ins Englische: 2016 Cybersecurity Law (China Law Translate)

Article 1: This law is formulated so as to ensure network security, to safeguard cyberspace sovereignty, national security and the societal public interest, to protect the lawful rights and interests of citizens, legal persons and other organizations, and to promote the healthy development of economic and social informatization.
Article 2: This law applies with respect to the construction, operation, maintenance and usage of networks, as well as network security supervision and management within the mainland territory of the People’s Republic of China.

People’s Republic of China Cybersecurity Law: A Preliminary Overview for Western Companies (National Law Review)

The PRC Cybersecurity Law maintains the trend from elective regimes toward mandatory cybersecurity standards and requirements. As seen in the EU, with the recently adopted General Data Protection Regulation framework, and in the US, with proposed federal regulations of financial institutions to address the risk of “cyber contagion,” global actors are flexing their regulatory and national security powers to address the threat of cyber-attacks in an increasingly interconnected world.

Neue Seidenstraße
Aug 23rd, 2017 by Gao

Bernd Vasari: Ein Zug wird kommen (Wiener Zeitung)

Nach jahrelangen Forderungen der Wirtschaftskammer gibt es nun auch von Infrastrukturminister Jörg Leichtfried (SPÖ) ein Bekenntnis zum Ausbau der Breitspurbahn nach Wien. „Ich will Österreich zur Logistikdrehscheibe in Europa machen“, sagt er. Die derzeitige Endstation befindet sich im 400 Kilometer entfernten Kosice. Bei einem technisch möglichen Baubeginn in sechs Jahren könnte die Strecke bis zum Jahr 2033 fertiggestellt werden. Österreich wäre dann über die Schiene bis nach China verbunden. …
Bei einem von Chinas Staatschef Xi Jinping einberufenen Seidenstraßen-Gipfel im Mai wurde Österreich nicht hochrangig, sondern nur durch die Botschafterin vertreten. Im Gegensatz zu Ungarn, wo Ministerpräsident Viktor Orban anwesend war.

Zhang Junhua: China – eine Friedensmacht? (Neue Zürcher Zeitung)

Mit einer anvisierten Investition von mehreren Billionen Dollar weltweit ist Chinas Seidenstrassen-Projekt einer der ambitioniertesten Pläne der Menschheitsgeschichte. Sicherlich ist der ursprüngliche Ansatz des Vorhabens auf Chinas strategisches Eigeninteresse fokussiert: Durch den massiven Aufbau der Infrastruktur will man das Problem der Überkapazität chinesischer Industrieproduktion lösen. Mit der Zeit hat sich jedoch eine Eigendynamik entwickelt, die positive Nebeneffekte zeitigt. Die immer wichtiger werdende Rolle Chinas als friedensstiftender Macht ist ein Beispiel dafür.

Neue Seidenstraße: China plant riesigen Bahnbau durch Malaysia (Industrie-Magazin)

Peking will elf Milliarden Euro in den Bau einer neuen Bahnverbindung durch Malaysia investieren. Das Projekt soll Teil der geplanten „Neuen Seidenstraße“ werden.

Norbert Paulsen: Comeback der Seidenstraße (DVZ)
Hermannus Pfeiffer: Offener Handel auf Chinesisch (Frankfurter Rundschau)

Während die USA sich unter Donald Trump abschotten, nutzt Chinas Präsident Xi das Vakuum und wirbt für mehr wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit.

Nicht wirklich zum Thema:
Doris Griesser: Nachrichten von der Seidenstraße (Standard)

Hannes Fellner gehört zur exklusiven Gruppe jener Menschen, die des Tocharischen mächtig sind. Wer noch nie von der Existenz einer solchen Sprache gehört hat, möge sich die Bildungslücke verzeihen: Immerhin hat man diesen ausgestorbenen Sprachzweig der indogermanischen Sprachfamilie erst kurz vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg entdeckt. Und zwar im Zuge militärisch-archäologischer Expeditionen ins damals politisch geschwächte China, wo in der heutigen Region Xinjiang im zweiten Jahrhundert n. Chr. zahllose buddhistische Gemeinden und Klöster entlang der Seidenstraße entstanden waren.

Afrika
Aug 23rd, 2017 by Gao

Kartik Jayaram, Omid Kassiri, Irene Yuan Sun: The closest look yet at Chinese economic engagement in Africa (McKinsey)

Field interviews with more than 1,000 Chinese companies provide new insights into Africa–China business relationships.

Mozi
Jul 2nd, 2017 by Gao

區龍宇:【五一專題】公元前的華夏工黨(無國界社運) Au Loong-yu: China’s Ancient Labor Party (Solidarity)

我說的是墨子和他的團體。
台灣學者王讚源說,先秦諸子,幾乎全部集中在社會、政治、倫理等價值觀方面,只有墨子最類似西方標準的哲學家,他的學問除了上述之外,橫跨形上學、知識論和道德哲學,也是西方型的科學家和哲學家。[註1] 鄭杰文、張倩兩位學者則說:短短不足一萬字的墨經,涵蓋了哲學、邏輯學、心理學、政治學、倫理學、教育學、自然科學等,稱得上是一部百科全書。[註2] 古代教育缺乏科技教育及生產事業的教育。孔子便罵想學耕種的樊遲為小人。墨子一書突出之處,也在於它包含非常多的科學和技術的知識。

By “China’s ancient Labor Party” I am referring to Mozi and his group. Although his group disappeared entirely from history at the latest during the end of the Warring State period (475–221 BC), his book, also called Mozi, although largely forgotten was able to survive through millennia. He was an outstanding thinker and what is more a militant, grounded on a well-defined program, who fought on behalf of the toilers in ancient China.

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